00068798

00068798

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 20 February, 2020

AN INVISIBLE KINGDOM

AN INVISIBLE KINGDOM

BEING

SOME CHAPTERS IN ETHICS

By

WILLIAM SAMUEL LILLY

Honorary Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge.

68798

βροτοῖς ἅπασι ἡ συνείδησις Θεὸς—*Menander.*

LIBRA
OF TH
BOME
BRAN
OF TH
ROYAL ASIATIC

LONDON:

CHAPMAN & HALL, LTD.

1919

Printed in England at
The Westminster Press
411a Harrow Road
London

PREFATORY NOTE

MR. W. S. LILLY, the author of the following pages, my old and intimate friend, was born on July 10th, 1840, and died rather suddenly, but after years of broken health and recurrent pains, on August 29th last past. He had seen his volume printed, and was revising it for publication when the end came. His final touches were legible in the fifth chapter, on "The Mystery of Sleep," page 143; and the marvellous "phenomenon of latency," to which Sir William Hamilton there alludes, was occupying his thoughts as the pen dropped from his yet unwearied hand. The last sheaf of proofs sent him is dated on the day he died. Our pious ancestors would have subscribed on them, and I follow their example, R.I.P. May he rest in peace!

By way of seeing my friend's literary Will and Testament—which this book assuredly may claim to be—properly executed, I have supplied running titles to it from where he left off, the page above noted, and a summary of contents, according to the plan adopted by him in previous works. Both titles and summary consist, with rare exceptions, of phrases occurring in the text or their equivalents. That text, of course, I did not venture to

change at all, save in one or two slight grammatical details. It is accurately printed from the author's copy.

Had he lived to write a Preface, he would certainly have made due acknowledgments to the editors of the several Magazines in which these chapters first appeared. I cannot refrain from mentioning, *pietatis causa*, the late Mr. W. Wray Skilbeck, editor of *The Nineteenth Century and After*, who was our common friend as well as editor, and whose unexpected decease early in July brought us a common sorrow.

A pleasant custom which Mr. Lilly kept up, was that of dedicating his books to those whom he delighted to honour. Could he have foreseen that the present volume would be laid on his tomb, I feel sure that he would have addressed the dedication to her who watched over his declining years with entire devotion —to his Wife, Anna Marie Lilly.

Elsewhere I have allowed myself the melancholy but true satisfaction of writing, as a tribute to the genius and character which I knew in its varied aspects, a brief " In Memoriam."

WILLIAM BARRY.

St. Peter's, Leamington,

Sept. 14*th*, 1919.

SUMMARY

PAGE

Chapter I. The Bond of Human Society.

Obedience is the root of all worthy life. It implies the complete idea of man, under the twofold aspects which we may call "personality" and "solidarity." As individual he is one, as a social being he is one of many. Hence the family, the tribe, the nation 1

And hence obedience is the bond of rule, not as on compulsion, but as an ethical command, which mere physical science cannot present to us. "Morality," says Goethe, "is an everlasting search for reconcilement between our personal claims and the laws of an Invisible Kingdom." Throughout the universe of man as of nature law reigns. There is an ideal order of Right, harmonising all private rights, the foundation of justice, and binding on conscience. To illustrate its claims on the society of to-day, the penalties of not following it, and the attacks made upon it in the name of Materialism, Agnosticism, false Democracy, is the object which this book has in view 2

Moral Law was not invented by Christianity; but Christ is the Great Exemplar. He was "obedient even unto death." His Church set up the new order which history terms Christendom; it inculcated obedience for conscience sake; it sanctified the family by Holy Matrimony; it taught wives to obey their husbands, children their parents, subjects their rulers. But every law of

PAGE

man must conform to the Law Eternal, if it would find observance. Otherwise, it is an act of violence 7

" Bound to believe and to do." Quite another principle now governs the minds of men at large—Rousseau's doctrine of the individual who is sovereignly free in thought and action. This brings with it the triumph of the passions over the reason. Marriage is to be sacrificed to " free love " ; the husband's authority flouted ; woman emancipated into immodesty and mannishness ; children to run wild—a moral chaos 14

In the public order, the rule of numbers, the majority, is taken to be the only law. The idea of Justice gives way before sentiment ; defiance to such Law becomes systematic and successful. The bond of European society is vanishing ; but physical science cannot supply the place of religious and philosophic dogma. The sovereignty of the individual *plus* the fatalism of physiology will never make a coherent scheme, whether for man the individual or mankind the race. Facts without principles have no ethical force 22

Neither will the Absolute or the Ideal atone for the loss of God ; they are vain abstractions. We must find a counterpart to the phenomenal order in that Invisible Kingdom of which Goethe speaks, an order controlled by the Law of Righteousness unwritten and unchanging. The Appeal of Antigone 25

PAGE

Chapter II. The Monitions of Strikes.

A new era came for British industrialism in 1911. We beheld the conflict between Labour and Capital assume the form of a "general strike." Mr. Churchill enlarged on "the abyss of horror" into which it would have plunged the nation had it succeeded. The so-called "Triple Alliance" of October, 1915, was its consequence. How has all this come about? 28

It is the net product of three great Revolutions marching close together during the last 150 years;—the Industrial, from manual to machine Labour; the Economic, wrought by Adam Smith and his disciples; and the Political, of which the head and front was the French Revolution of 1789 32

The injustice and cruelty of the manufacturing Era have been extreme, as evidence proves. But its mainstay was Adam Smith's philosophy of "natural freedom" or "free contract," by which the starving labourer was to bargain with the replete capitalist, under competition, for his wages. Trade Unions sprang up,—successors of the Mediæval Guilds, but without religion, "souls extinct, stomachs well alive," said Carlyle 36

Meanwhile, the French preaching their new Gospel according to Jean Jacques, were creating a world-wide belief in the equivalence of all men, the sufficiency of each man, the absolute right of the majority told by the head to govern. This doctrine began its victorious career in England with the Reform

PAGE

Bill of 1832. The old Constitution was overthrown. The Household Suffrage granted in 1867 led to the conversion, as Mr. Lowe predicted, of Trade Unions into political organisations. One class could outvote all other classes combined 39

Socialism, a vague term, became a shibboleth; and Proudhon's borrowed formula, "Property is Theft," was its main contention. No doubt, the right to private property is an inalienable right of man; but ill-gotten gains are far from rare; insane luxury flouts undeserved misery; and the "labouring" classes learn from their Syndicalist teachers that social science calls for the destruction of our social system 44

Mr. Gladstone asked, "Are the classes ever right when they differ from the masses?" The answer is, "Nearly always." That is the verdict of history; and Mill reports, "the extreme unfitness of mankind in general, or of the labouring classes in particular, to meet any considerable demand upon their intellect or virtue." Trade Unions have become powerful corporations uncontrolled by the law. Their "collective bargaining" should imply collective responsibility; but they are exempt by statute from liability for breach of contract on the part of workmen; and in 1906 the Trades Disputes Act granted them exemption from "actions of tort." They have now a legal right to do wrong to others. And "peaceful picketing" means that every workman shall work only when and how they dictate 50

PAGE

Industrial unrest is almost universal; the ideas of Rossel regarding inheritance, the family, and property, are widespread. Nevertheless, a staunch Liberal like J. S. Mill declared that "equal voting is in principle wrong," and protested against its tyranny. The root of these evils, disbelief in conscience and the Moral Law, is the deepest spiritual disease of the day. We need tribunals to decide industrial disputes, and governments that will protect the liberty of the subject 56

"The mere conflict of private interests will not produce a well-ordered Commonwealth"; the State is an ethical entity; and Capital has its rights, for to it are owing "machinery, credit, connexions, traditions, and even art." To ruin Capital, to limit output, is a wrong against the workers themselves 67

Adam Smith's and Mill's postulates on Labour are true moral axioms. As for "Profit-sharing," let us learn something from the old Guilds. Manual labour must be recognized as a social function, its conditions regulated by the community in consultation with operatives. "Basic principles" of such a concordat have already been laid down. They require self-sacrifice on the true social doctrine of Scripture, "Sirs, ye are brethren" 75

Chapter III. The Morality of War.

The culminating period of Peace, the Exhibition of 1851; it was due to the Utilitarian creed with its imaginary ideal of the

PAGE

"city man." Complete failure of those anticipations now patent 82

For "man is born into a state of war." The struggle for existence in every domain proves it; witness our metaphysics, æsthetics, physical science, the sphere of the affections, the career of talents, industry, commerce, religion itself, nations also; and the ultimate arbiter is the sword of Brennus. Virtue is courage 85

The militant instinct is not evil in itself; it may be the source of highest good if brought under moral rules. Such rules are to be found in St. Thomas Aquinas and Suarez. Defensive war is just; not so war for glory or riches; but to redress grave injury it is lawful. "Frightfulness" cannot be defended before ethics. 92

To abolish war, man being what he is, would be no blessing: some of its compensations; "ennobling thoughts"; the "Happy Warrior;" St. George remains one of our highest types; for "the soldier's trade," says Ruskin, "verily and essentially, is not slaying but being slain." War is the safeguard of human solidarity, the explanation of the greatest things in human history 96

Chapter IV. The Ethical Function of Memory.

Pursuing our search into the Invisible Kingdom, by virtue of which all that is visible, and especially the right human order subsists, we descend into the depths of Memory,

PAGE

source and vivifying principle of our intellectual life. St. Augustine's marvellous chapters on it in his "Confessions" 100

Aspects or forms of Memory; nothing ever really forgotten; the whole past revives in moments of crisis; while the present flees, Memory abides, and is the only stable portion of us. Is Memory inherited? Samuel Butler's theory not proved, but not improbable; we are somehow one with former generations 102

Different views of Memory. The physiologist, M. Ribot, reduces it to fibres and cells in the brain, and to cerebral registration. But a school more in accordance with reality points out that the "act of recognition," which is the essence of the problem, is ignored in such a solution. M. Bergson's rejoinder to the theory patronized by M. Ribot 113

This controversy is part of a larger issue, viz., "What am I?" Am I merely "the sum of the actual states of consciousness and of the vital actions in which it has its root"? Or a "permanent thinking subject, contrasted with the succession of states"? We must answer with St. Augustine truly, "Ego, ego animus"—for "I myself I" can never be a chemical reaction only 121

The soul can operate and be operated upon without the intermediation of the bodily senses. Memory in the lower animals differs from man's by not being truly intellectual. If we enquire "Why does it store up life's history in its secret recesses?" there seems

PAGE

to be no other reply possible than this, viz., because " a deed does not perish." The law of remunerative and retributive justice gives the only satisfactory explanation. And so the " book of a man's deeds," according to Mohammed, is put into his hands on " that great and exceeding bitter day," the Dies Iræ of Judgment 125

Chapter V. The Mystery of Sleep.

We may extend, from yet another side, our exploration into the hidden things of man, by considering the state of sleep in which he passes one third of his existence. Sleep is a mystery. How little we know of space, matter, motion, life, will, sensibility! Our short term here " between a sleep and a sleep." Dryden's powerful verses, and the parable of Pope, the lament of Diderot, all agree in taking a dark view of earthly experience. Religion the consoler 131

The cause of sleep is unknown. Many have been the unsatisfactory guesses; but the saying of Buffon remains true: " Sleep is the first state of the living animal and the foundation of life." Atrocious acts of some Continental vivisectors to discover its nature have shed no light on the subject. The soul is freed during sleep from the senses, yet does not apparently enjoy free will 136

What are dreams? Ideas which in sleep " flash into luminous consciousness." Sir W. Hamilton wonders at this " phenomenon of latency." Professor Freud's theories, although probably well-founded to a certain

PAGE

extent, are vitiated by the German love of system. M. Bergson is much sounder. His excellent reflection "To be awake is to will." The present author's view is chiefly metaphysical. There is overwhelming evidence, in his opinion, that in sleep the soul is susceptible of relations independent of time, unfettered by spatial bonds, and so may discern events hidden from the bodily senses, both in the present and in the future; that it is capable of perceiving distant scenes, of communicating with persons who are afar off, and even with disembodied spirits. Schopenhauer anticipated these conclusions, as did also E. v. Hartmann 141

One proved case of telepathy, said Mr. Andrew Lang, would show attributes of the soul not yet recognised by physical science. There appear to be hundreds. Two are submitted—Sir J. Drummond Hay's and another's examples of knowledge received during sleep. The discovery of St. Cecilia's body by Pope Paschal; and the strange case of St. Alphonsus dei Liguori and Pope Clement XIV. Indian ascetics make the body their slave. Sir C. Wade's experiences with a "Fakeer." Can we believe? 148

Chapter VI. The Sociological Value of Christianity.

This work, by Dr. Chatterton-Hill, may be handled as independent confirmation of the principles asserted here, viz., that belief in an "Invisible Kingdom" is necessary to all human society; and in particular that if the Christian Religion be rejected Western

PAGE

civilisation will perish. The writer judges all forms of doctrine by their consequences in the social order; and he maintains that Christ was not a mere preacher of individual regeneration. The strength of Christianity, the secret of its survival, are to be sought in the "social doctrine" of Jesus 166

Dr. Chatterton-Hill puts Theology aside. With Professor Durkheim he desires to exhibit Religion as a fundamental and permanent factor of social existence and evolution. He rejects "Animism," and explains primitive religious systems as due to society, which is something more than its members, whom he likens to the builders of the coral-reef, and which exercises upon them a constraining, universal force. Religion, he proves by reference to facts, contains *in potentia* the elements of the collective life—science, poetry, the plastic arts, law, morals, police, economics, philosophy 168

Religion restrains individual freedom, and compels men to check their anarchic propensities for the good of the community. It demands self-sacrifice. It began as a reign of terror, "Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor"; and only very late in its course did it temper severity with mildness. Dawn of that change in Israel may be studied in the Old Testament 174

But the great revolution whereby Religion, still true to its primary function of assuring social integration and cohesion, became a source of unequalled consolation and unrivalled hope for the individual, was the work

PAGE

of Christianity. It proved to be a creative power in both orders. It adjusted the balance, rewarded self-sacrifice, and restored the lost part of man to him in Eternity 175

Social progress, however, by developing the mind, produces Rationalism, which tends by free thought in excess to ruin society. Here again, Religion steps in, limits private judgment, and keeps the necessary equilibrium. Reason dictates individual Rights, but Christianity with its absolute moral sanction, insists on Duties. And since justice requires that Duty and Compensation be correlative, the Hereafter was held out as a reward to the individual for his earthly sacrifices 177

The teaching of Jesus and its concrete application in the Church are essentially the same. Since, on the whole, they benefit society, their social value is proved. Hence those who, like Tolstoy, set Christ and the Church in antagonism—and that during almost the whole of the Christian era—fall into the delusion of supposing historic evolution to be the product of chance. If they say that this religion had no influence on Western civilisation, or that the Church simply did evil, in either case they fail to explain how, on evolutionary principles, Church and Gospel have not long ago passed away. For history has its laws; and every society is its offspring. To-day cannot deny yesterday; Europe is the heir of the Middle Ages 184

To Christianity, therefore, the Western world owes an immense debt,—nothing less than the fact of its survival. But the nations

PAGE

it has formed are casting it off, thanks to Protestant individualism and to the doctrine of equal Rights, which from French is becoming European. Whereas the Gospel teaches that "All men are free; but all men are not equal." "Social integration, human dignity, individual humility," these are the conditions of the only true fraternity. Weaken them, and anarchy lifts up its head. Modern France is bankrupt in all these principles. The problem of the West to-day is not how to develop liberty, but how to safeguard authority. And, in Dr. Chatterton-Hill's judgment, although he does not counsel a complete submission to Papal Rome, the "only social organisation in our midst in which authority and discipline are adequately safeguarded is that of the Catholic Church" 188

Chapter VII. Prophet of the Moral Law.

We have been occupied all through this volume with one universal truth, call it postulate or axiom, the absolute supremacy of the Moral Law over all departments of human existence and human action. Is there among the conspicuous teachers of the century past a figure whom we can venerate as its chosen prophet? John Henry Newman has left thirty-six volumes in which we may consider this question and find an answer to it. What will be his chief claim upon posterity? 194

Let us quote the reply made by three writers, who belong to different schools of thought, and may be considered fairly representative —the late Lady Blennerhassett, Dr. Charles

PAGE

Sarolea, and Canon William Barry. The accomplished German lady, in a remarkable book, proclaims that his influence has been most enduring on the religious culture of the Anglo-Saxon world; he it was among leaders of his age who "most strongly stirred the souls of men." French divines also have increasingly accepted the principles of his "Development" and "Grammar of Assent." He followed the Christian Fathers; and he "made an end of the old unhistorical view," prevalent before his time 195

Dr. Chas. Sarolea, the Belgian critic, allowing for the complex personality of Newman, still holds that he became a Catholic "because there was a pre-established harmony between his character and the Catholic system." His conversion was the result of a development and inevitable. A dialectician, an idealist, a man of action, he could not be satisfied with an incomplete religion, such as the historical forms of Protestantism offered. He wanted an "integral religion." His "abiding achievement was to prove that the unity and continuity of the Church tradition is found only in Catholicism." His "Development" is "an anticipated application of Darwinism in religious philosophy." Dr. Sarolea believes that Newman will always appeal to "the enormous majority" who "feel the need of an external authority and a visible Church," and more cogently as the years go on 196

Canon William Barry, well known by his contributions to theology and philosophy, by studies in history and in other ways,

PAGE

looks upon Newman as an English classic, from a European point of view. But with Newman literature was a great means to a greater end; he felt called upon "to serve as a messenger from Heaven." What was his message? Canon Barry answers in two chapters of his monograph, one dealing with "The Logic of Belief," the other with "Newman's Place in History." Since Christianity was fading out of the public order, Christians, undeterred by great and permanent losses, would have to rely on personal energy, as in old heathen days. To the all-dissolving scepticism Newman opposed himself. Personality was "the key to truth." He "alone with the Alone" had an adamantine basis of reality for his religion. He wrought on a method of daily life, grappled with the idea of Evolution, the fact of the Unconscious; and thus became "the Christian prophet and philosopher of the coming century." He furnished a common ground of discussion between North and South. His conversion may have on "the world where Shakespeare is King" results not less enduring than St. Augustine's on the intellect of the Middle Ages which he formed 201

To such effect these voices. Another way would be to affirm that Newman is doing as great a work for England as Kant did for Germany. It is an age of intellectual chaos; but a few thinkers rule mankind. Between the Oxford man of genius and the sage of Königsberg there are striking differences; yet on Theism and Immortality their personal witness appears to be identical. To Kant

PAGE

" belief in God and another world " was interwoven with his moral nature. Newman wrote : " The existence of a God of Judgment is as certain to me as my own existence." And, like the teacher of the Categorical Imperative, he affirmed that " the Divine Law, the rule of ethical truth, is the Divine Reason." Thus both men were apostles of the Moral Law 206

To Newman, far more than to Aristotle and the Greeks, man was a " person." He fell into a period of Benthamism where the whole ethical advance of Christianity was denied. There was " a conspiracy against the rights of conscience," by philosophers, an utter disregard of it in the " popular mind." To all that he replied, " Conscience is a Divine Voice speaking in the heart of man," witness to God's existence and God's Law, " a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas." Newman's most enduring service was this vindication of the autonomy and supremacy of the individual conscience 209

But conscience cannot dispense with external authority ; and Newman's handling of this problem is consummately wise. Religion, which is " a rite, a creed, a philosophy, a rule of duty," must have an organ; conscience was subjective, the Catholic Church objective,—" a supreme authority ruling and reconciling individual judgments by a divine right." There will be cases of conflict ; but " Time, which solves all doubt," will determine the issue in favour of the Truth. And

PAGE

so Newman exhibited the old and only true path in ethics. He "reverenced his conscience as his King," and vindicated its august prerogative as the aboriginal Vicar of the Infinite and Eternal 213

CHAPTER I

THE BOND OF HUMAN SOCIETY

IT is a dictum of Burke's that the deep foundations of character, individual and national, are laid in things which "pass with the majority of men for a romance." Of the many profound sayings of that great political thinker, this is one of the most profound, and at the present time we have urgent need to apprehend it. There is a virtue which lies at the root of all worthy life. And that virtue men are ceasing to believe in and to practise. They treat it as out of date; they regard it as a romance. It is the virtue of obedience.

The complete idea of man embraces the two concepts of personality and solidarity—they are two terms of one and the same idea. As an individual person, man belongs to himself. No man can possess the same authority over another that he possesses over an inferior species. No man is simply a chattel. A *person* must never be used as if he were a mere thing. But man does not exist in isolation. *Unus homo nullus homo.* Society is to him what the soil is to the plant. Hence the associations which incorporate individual persons in collective entities: the family, the tribe, the nation. Hence, too, the conception of humanity

which is, in Pascal's phrase, "the human race considered as one man, continually existing and learning." But I am concerned, at present, not so much with mankind as a whole as with the societies, smaller or larger, in which we exist for the purposes of civilised life. Now, the bond which knits them together is obedience. And so the dictum of St. Augustine that the general pact of human society is to obey rulers: *generale quippe pactum est humanae societatis obedire regibus suis.**

II

And here we get to ethics. This bond by which the State unites men is a moral bond. The obligation of obedience to law is the only conception of moral good and moral evil, manifesting to the soul its necessity. That necessity is categorically imperative, to use the phrase of a great master: "The words 'I ought,'" writes Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* "express a species of necessity which nature"—of course he means physical nature—"does not and cannot present to the mind of man. Understanding knows nothing in nature but that which is, or has been, or will be. It would be absurd to say that anything in nature *ought* to be other than it is, in the relations in which it stands: indeed, the word

* *Confes.* 1, iii, c. 8. I do not know whether Lord Tennyson had this passage in his mind when he wrote in *Morte d'Arthur*: "Seeing obedience is the bond of rule."

'ought,' when we consider the course of nature, has neither application nor meaning. Whatever number of motives nature may present to my will, whatever sensuous impulses, it is beyond their power to produce the moral ought. The moral faculty enunciates laws which are imperative or objective laws of freedom, and which tell us what ought to take place, thus distinguishing themselves from the laws of nature, which relate to that which does take place."

Let us pursue the matter a little further. Whence does this ethical ought derive its sovereign and compelling power? From this, that it is the expression of supreme reason. There is an admirable saying of Goethe that morality is an everlasting search for an appeasement (*ein ewiger Friedensversuch*) between our personal claims (*Anforderungen*) and the laws of an invisible kingdom.* This invisible kingdom is as much the realm of law as is the kingdom of external nature. That "nothing is that errs from law" is absolutely true. Consider the word science. It implies law. Where chance ruled, science could not exist. And the wider and the more exact our science, the profounder is our apprehension of the fact that throughout the universe law does reign, dominating the organic and the

* *Unterhaltungen mit dem Kanzler Freidrich v. Müller*, p. 23. He spoke, says the Chancellor, "mit einer Klarheit und Wärme, wie wir sie noch nie an ihm in gleichem Grade gefunden hatten."

inorganic, the smallest things and the greatest, the most complex and the simplest, the most mutable and seemingly capricious, and the apparently most fixed and stable, penetrating all spheres of knowledge, all realms of existence, all time and all space. Now the essence of law is necessity: and to express this necessity in the physical order we are obliged to borrow the word "must" from the metaphysical, for, in strictness, physics cannot get beyond the word "is." The laws of nature may, indeed, be regarded as necessary, but only *ex necessitate consequenti*, as the schoolmen say—that is, as proceeding from a necessary Being; as what they are, because He is what He is; as an expression of His supreme reason, as emanating from Him who is the truth, of whom all truth is part. And so viewed, they may be considered as divine, and precisely because they are divine do they dominate us.

But man is something more than matter in motion and belongs to another world than the physical. He belongs to that invisible kingdom of which Goethe speaks, and is subject to its laws. As physical law rules throughout the universe, so does moral. There is an ideal order of right, embracing and harmonising all private rights, the ultimate foundation of all human justice, and binding upon the human conscience. It is founded on objective reason, and therefore it is universal, like the verities

of mathematics. It is part of the nature of things. Its principles are the ultimate bases of right and duty, and it finds them beyond the phenomena of sense, by means of our imaginative faculty, in the inner world of consciousness, of volition, of finality. Independent both of theologies and theogonies, it claims obedience, not as an instrument of happiness or agreeable feeling, but as a thing absolutely good and an end in itself. Such is the moral law, obedience to which is the condition of moral liberty, just as obedience to physical law is the condition of physical liberty. The rule of what should be, as distinct from what is, it is its own evidence, its own justification. And conscience is the entering into the individual of this objective law of right; its practical judgment or dictate; the witness in ourselves, written on the fleshy tables of the heart, in virtue of which man is what Aristotle called him, "an ethical animal." It is, Aquinas tells us, "the participation of the Eternal Law in the rational creature."

III

I am afraid that what I have just written has a somewhat scholastic sound. My apology must be that it is necessary to my argument. There are some writers of name—the late Sir Leslie Stephen was eminently seen among them—who have applied themselves to

controverting the absurd proposition that the moral law is the creation of Christianity. It has always filled me with pity to see earnest and able men thus wasting time and energy in arguing about the shadow of an ass, as the old Greeks would have said. Assuredly, the moral law is not the creation of Christianity, and none of the great Catholic moralists have contended that it is. It is independent of that religion and of any other. But not less assuredly, Christianity came into the world as a preacher of the moral law, proclaiming it in ampler measure than mankind had before known, and investing it with diviner sanctions: exhibiting it as the key to the problems of existence: revealing the nature of its obligation which the wisest of the ancients had acknowledged but could not explain; pointing to it as the means whereby man

> the nobler mastery learnt
> When inward vision over impulse reigned.

Christianity changed the lives of men by changing the ideal of life, and it changed that ideal by insisting on the supreme value of obedience. Henceforward the rule of action was not to be the individual will, perverse or corrupt, but the Divine Will, good and acceptable and perfect. St. Augustine sums it up in seven words: *nolle quod volebam et velle quod volebas*. Christ was to be the Great Exemplar. To follow "the blessed steps of His most

holy life" was "the system of moral discipline"—this phrase, too, is St. Augustine's—set before the neophyte. Now on that life, from beginning to end, obedience is written. His own last words, "Not My will but Thine," sum it up; and they became the law of His followers. On almost every page of the Epistles and Gospels there are indications of that unquestioning sacrifice of the individual will which dominated the primitive Christians. It is not too much to say that the virtue of obedience, which, indeed, in some sort involves all the others, was esteemed by them the highest. *Factus est obediens*: He became obedient—yes, unto death—it is written of the King; and this principle of obedience was to be the fundamental law of His subjects. In every relation of life, from the highest to the lowest, they were "*bound* to believe and to do." I need not dwell upon what is so familiar.

Thus did the new religion recreate the individual. And thus, too, did it create anew civil society. The true foundation of civil society—no other will be found enduring—is the family. Now the family rests upon marriage. And marriage rests upon the sexual instinct. Those of my readers who are familiar with Schopenhauer will doubtless remember a passage in which he enlarges, in Rabelaisian vein, on this truth—he calls it the pearl of his system. It is, as he presents it, a pearl fit to be thrown before swine. But Kant had long

before him written: "Nature pursues her vast design: beauty, modesty are only her instruments, nay, her baits." Such is the explanation —indubitably a correct one—of the attraction exercised over men by women, however pure and refined. It has been the work of reason and religion to invest this animal instinct for the perpetuation of life with an ideal character, and to make of it the great bulwark of civilised society, potent

> Not only to keep down the base in man,
> But teach high thought and amiable words,
> And love of truth and all that makes a man.

Yes: "the work of reason and religion." Reason had attained to the true norm of marriage, admirably stated in the jurisprudence of ancient Rome: "*Conjunctio maris et feminae et consortium omnis vitae: divini et humani juris communicatio.*" The Catholic Church consecrated, as holy matrimony, this lifelong and indissoluble union of two personalities, and proclaimed their spiritual equality, "for in Jesus Christ there is neither male nor female." But while insisting upon woman's spiritual equality with man, it insisted also on her economic subjection to him. The sexes are interdependent, but in the family the husband is king, and his wife is the first of his subjects—obedience her primal duty. St. Paul puts it with much emphasis: indeed he could hardly be more emphatic: "Wives, be subject to

your husbands, as to the Lord."* The ground of that subjection is exhibited by Nature herself. It is both physical and psychical. I will not dwell upon the physical side of the matter, which surely must be evident to all who will not shut their eyes to the most obvious lesson of woman's corporal constitution. But on the psychical side is it not as evident? Taking women in general, we assuredly must say that in them sentiment predominates over sense, imagination over reason: that in the logical and scientific faculties they are vastly inferior to men; that their emotions are strong, while their will is weak; that they are markedly deficient in the power of comprehending truth and justice under the pure form of principles and ideas apart from persons and things. Spiritually equal to man, woman, in these respects, is unequal, and in this inequality is a ground of her natural subjection to him. Yes, natural subjection, as has been pointed out by St. Thomas Aquinas, with his usual terseness and force.

There are two kinds of subjection [he writes]—one servile, the other economic or civil (*oeconomica vel civilis*). The latter is the kind of subjection whereby woman is naturally subject to man, because of

* The Bible in these days is not so much read as it once was, so a further quotation from the Pauline injunctions to the Christians of Ephesus may not be amiss. "As the Church is subject (ὑποτάσσεται) to Christ, so let wives be to their own husbands in everything." "Let the wife see that she reverence her husband," or, as the Vulgate, more correctly rendering the Greek, has it, "*uxor autem timeat virum suum.*"

the larger discourse of reason which man naturally possesses.*

According, then, to the teaching with which the Catholic Church indoctrinated Christendom, the wife is the first of her husband's subjects in the little kingdom of the family. Her loyal obedience to him is a religious duty. The same duty was held by the new faith to be equally obligatory upon children. Here again Roman jurisprudence had anticipated Christian teaching. The doctrine of the *patria potestas,* however exaggerated in archaic times, is rooted and grounded in the nature of things, and, like the doctrine of marriage, was touched and hallowed by Christianity. The Church exhibited the father as the direct and indefeasible representative of Him "of whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named,"† and as alone ruling by immediate divine right. His duty towards his children is declared to be the bringing them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. Their obedience to him is to be rendered, not grudgingly or as of necessity, not merely mechanically, but by a loving sacrifice of the individual will. Jeremy Taylor well observes, in *The Great Exemplar* :

A sacrifice without a heart was a sad and ominous presage in the superstition of the Roman augurs,

* *Summa Theologica,* 1. q. 92, a. 1, ad. 2.

† Such is the Vulgate reading of the verse in the Epistle to the Ephesians, πατρία being taken as equivalent to πατρότης —whether rightly or not has been matter of much discussion.

and so it is in the service of God, for what the exhibition of a work is to man, that is the presentation of will to God. Without this our exterior service is like the paying of a piece of money in which we have defaced the image: it is not current.

IV

Thus did Christianity recreate the family, by hallowing the virtue of obedience which is its binding tie. It did not owe to Christianity its religious character; no, it possessed that character already. But the Catholic Church transformed it by bringing it under the "obedience of Christ." The work of the Church for the State was similar. Of course, the polities which it found in the world rested upon religious sanctions. Fustel de Coulanges, in his *Cité Antique*, goes so far as to say—and, indeed, is perfectly warranted in saying—"the true legislator among the ancients was not man, but the religious belief which was in man." Hence the dictum of Plato that to obey the laws was to obey the gods. Law was merely religion regulating society. It had never entered into the minds of the sages of antiquity that an irreligious State could exist. The Catholic Church recreated the public order, as it had recreated the family. The existing sanctions of religion remained, but they were transformed. A community of Christians became a Christian community; surely an eminently reasonable proceeding.

A State [Dr. Arnold observes] may as justly declare the New Testament to be its law as it may choose the institutes and code of Justinian. In this manner the law of Christ's Church may be made its law, and all the institutions which that law enjoins, whether in ritual or discipline, may be adopted as national institutions.*

That is just what the Catholic Church did in the Roman Empire, thereby forming Christendom. In the new order, as in the old, civil authority was emphatically clothed with the compelling majesty of religion. It was held to proceed from the θεῖος νοῦς, the Divine mind, which is the true foundation of human society. For such society, and not savage isolation, is natural to man, and is therefore to be attributed to the Author of nature. Not, of course, that civil rulers possess an immediate divine right. Their power comes to them from its Divine source, *mediante populo*, whatever the form of the polity—largely a matter of indifference—in which it is exercised. In obedience to it, we obey the Great Original whose authority is stamped upon the mandates of the magistrates, upon the statutes and ordinances of a realm. For the true source of the legislation whereby we live as civilised men is not arbitrariness or caprice.

A human law [St. Thomas Aquinas teaches] bears the character of law so far as it is in conformity with right reason, and, in that point of view, it is manifestly derived from the Eternal Law. But inasmuch

* *Introductory Lecture on Modern History*, p. 53.

as any human law recedes from reason, it is called a wicked law, and, to that extent, it bears not the character of law, but of an act of violence.*

Or, as he elsewhere puts it :

Laws enacted by man are either just or unjust. If they are just, they have a binding force in the Court of Conscience from the Eternal Law whence they are derived. Unjust laws are not binding in the Court of Conscience, except perhaps for the avoiding of scandal or turmoil.†

The obedience, then, which, according to Christian teaching, is due to the civil ruler, is by no means unlimited. It is conditioned by the higher jurisdiction of that internal judge whose sentences of right and wrong are irreformable—Conscience, which is "the consciousness of God." No grosser blasphemy is conceivable than Mayor Bailly's claim, upon a memorable occasion, "When the law speaks, conscience must be silent."

These considerations are not out of place at the present moment, when our ears are dinned with representations of the duty of submitting to any law for which the votes of the majority of a legislature may be secured. Men are under no moral or religious obligation to yield obedience to legislation believed by them, in good conscience, to be unjust. To pretend that such an obligation exists is to mock them, the more if, as often happens, the legislation which

* *Summa Theologica*, 1, 2, q. 93, a. 3, ad 2.

† *Ibid.* q. 96, a. 4.

it is sought to impose on them is the result of a corrupt bargain between party politicians. Such a law is an act of violence; it is a wicked law, and the constitutional form in which it is hypocritically clothed, merely adds to its wickedness. Whether it should be resisted by force, is a question to be decided by those against whom it is directed, and the considerations for deciding the question are purely of expediency. The State is an association of moral beings. To say that, is to say that its power has moral limits. And grave infringement of those limits invalidates its moral claim to obedience.*

V

This by the way. My present point is that the new order called Christendom, both in public and in private life, rested upon the virtue of obedience, invested with the august sanctions of Christian religion: obedience for conscience sake. I do not know where this is

* The fine verses of Schiller in *Wilhelm Tell* may fitly be quoted here as admirably expressing the true principle.

" Nein, eine Grenze hat Tyrannenmacht:
Wenn der Gedrückte nirgends Recht kann finden,
Wenn unerträglich wird die Last—greift er
Hinauf, getrosten Muthes, in den Himmel,
Und holt herunter seine ew'gen Rechte
Die droben hängen unveräusserlich
Und unzerbrechlich, wie die Sterne selbst.
Zum letzten Mittel, wenn kein andres mehr
Verfangen will, ist ihm das Schwert gegeben."

more strikingly brought out than in the *Church Catechism* which, though written after Christendom had been rent in twain, represents, faithfully enough, many of its ideas and traditions. The words " bound to believe and to do " are the keynote of that beautiful and venerable document. " Action in those days," says Carlyle, " was easy, for the divine worth of things was acknowledged; loyalty still hallowed obedience and made rule noble; there was still something to be loyal to." And now, as we look around the world, what trace do we find of that virtue? Assuredly, it is everywhere vanishing. It is looked upon, in Burke's word, as a romance, all very well, perhaps, in an age of chivalry, such as the mediæval period, but out of date in this twentieth century. Quite another principle has taken its place, and rules the minds of men at large. Of course, it survives, more or less, in various relations of life, for the simple reason that it is there indispensable: the soldier obeys, the sailor obeys, the public functionary obeys, with ever lessening readiness indeed. But it has ceased to be the common and universal law of human existence, as the old Christian tradition has become inoperative. I met a young gentleman the other day who, I was informed, had done very well at Oxford, and was told by him, in the course of conversation, that he believed in Humanitarianism, Utilitarianism, and the greatest happiness of the

greatest number.* Naturally, I was tempted to write him down an ass, in spite of his academical successes. I proceeded, however, blandly to inquire whether he could derive any ethics, any rule of life, from these fine things. He imparted to me his conviction that he regarded all objective standards of right as infringing a man's inalienable prerogative, that he desired the freedom of a purely personal morality. I suggested that this was his reading of Rousseau's doctrine of the sovereignty of the individual. He told me that, as a matter of fact, he had never read Rousseau, but that he judged the doctrine of individual sovereignty, in thought and action, a sound one. Our conversation was here interrupted, and I went away feeling that my young friend had expounded to me, not amiss, the notion—he would probably have called it an idea—which, at this day, dominates a vast section of the popular mind. Rousseau's doctrine of the sovereignty of the individual, intended, primarily, at all events, for the political order, has, naturally enough, invaded the moral, and has been fatal—as it was bound to be—to the maintenance of a definite ethical standard. How find such a standard within the narrow limitations of our merely personal desires, our conflicting experience, our purblind vision?

* I learn that he is dead, poor fellow. I wonder whether the sphere in which he now finds himself is administered on the principles of Utilitarianism, Humanitarianism, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

unless above himself he can
Erect himself, how poor a thing is man!

These are the words of truth and soberness. Assuredly Plato was right in holding that a common faith in unseen and supersensuous realities is the true foundation of any human community. Only such a unitary creed can save men from becoming absolute individualists, with whom anarchy takes the place of obedience. For them, their spiritual perceptions extinguished by egotism and cynicism, the animal side of our nature usually becomes the only reality. Here, too, as in the political order, the sovereignty of the individual means the triumph of the passions over the reason, of which law is a function.

VI

So much as to the influence of a false and pestilent individualism on contemporary society generally. As might be expected, it has made itself specially felt with regard to the relations of the sexes. Obedience, as we have seen, is the bond of the family, as the Catholic Church has established it on the basis of monogamy, holy and indissoluble. Against that obedience what calls itself modern thought rebels. It is worth while to note how the clear eyes of the saintly Keble, before the first half of the last century was out, discerned the connexion of the attack on marriage with numerous other

manifestations of a spirit of anarchy. In his pamphlet *Against Profane Dealing with Holy Matrimony*, published in 1849, he writes:

> No thoughtful person can regard this matter of the marriage laws as standing by itself: it belongs to a much greater and deeper movement, showing itself now nearly all over Christendom by tokens very various, but most curiously tending the same way—*i.e.*, towards lawlessness.

In the sexual sphere the full realisation of that lawlessness would be found, I suppose, in what is called free love; but I am aware that among champions of revolt against the authority of Christian wedlock there are agitators who content themselves with demanding increased facilities for divorce, or the recognition whether of polygamy or of concubinage. The late Mr. Parnell, as we learn from his *Life*, held that "the marriage bond does not bind when love ceases to exist," and we all know that he acted upon his theory, displaying much contempt for the view which public opinion might take of his action. "There will be a howl," he said, "but it will be a howling of hypocrites." It is indeed right to add that he qualified the word "hypocrites" by observing: "Not altogether, for some of these Irish fools are genuine in their belief that forms and creeds can govern life and men; perhaps they are right, so far as they can experience life; but I am not as they, for they are amongst the world's *children*: I am a

man." That was Mr. Parnell's construction of the sovereignty of the virile individual in sexual relationship.

Hardly less—probably more—significant than the attack from without on the family as established by Christianity is what I may call the dry rot within it. The authority of the husband as its king and governor is derided and denied. The words in the Anglican Marriage Service with which the wife promises to obey are, I am told, not seldom omitted. Equality is to take the place of subjection for woman. Of course, reason itself declares that on the physical and psychical* inequality of the sexes, and on the willing obedience of the weaker, the happiness of both depends. It is the lesson which Shakespeare has worked out, with consummate art, in *The Taming of the Shrew*. It is the picture which is traced for us in the beautiful lines of Pope :

> She who ne'er answers till a husband cools,
> Or, if she rules him, never shows she rules,
> Charms by accepting, by submitting sways,
> Yet has her humour most when she obeys.

Certain it is that when the true position of the husband as the ruler of the family is invaded, and his rightful authority impugned, not only is the dignity of the wife impaired, but the filial tie is relaxed, and the moral level of

* Psychical. I remember some words of George Sand in which this is well put : " Que la femme soit différente de l'homme, que le cœur et l'esprit aient un sexe, je n'en doute pas."

society sinks. I shall touch again on this shortly. Here I observe that the law of obedience to the husband is not the only law which is disdained by "the new woman," as the phrase is. She seeks emancipation, too, from those prescriptions of decency to which she has hitherto paid obedience, and which have been rightly regarded as the best defence of her chastity. I will cite only two examples. There surely are few things more immodest than what an old author calls those "garish and wanton dressings"* in which—far too naked to be ashamed—she now exhibits herself for the admiration of men, or those lascivious dances the only conceivable object of which is to stimulate passions, active enough in most of us without artificial irritants. Of other phenomena, equally unpleasant, which attend the so-called emancipation of woman, the time would fail me to speak. The general aim of her revolt seems to be freedom to practise "all that harms distinctive womanhood." What a portent is the athletic woman with her perpetual motor activity, which as a very able

* A recent writer, in a work which seems to be much appreciated—it has gone through many editions—thus describes an experience of a young bride, brought up in the country, at her first dinner-party in Paris. "Dès l'entrée dans le salon je reconnus que je n'étais pas assez habillée, ou, plus justement, assez déshabillée. Je portais, an effet, une robe montante, tandis que toutes les femmes qui se trouvaient là étaient aussi décolletées qu'on peut l'être, si l'on accorde que le cou prend naissance vers l'estomac, et beaucoup plus, en toute conjoncture, que la bienséance ne le permet."—*La Confession d'une Femme du Monde*, par E. Lechartier, p. 51.

writer in *The Times* has recently observed, "may indeed develop her stature, but certainly does not fit her for motherhood, and in many cases leads to complete nervous breakdown and to neurasthenic sterility"—the natural consequence of her defiance of the laws of her corporal constitution. Consider, too—but briefly—the platform woman as she perorates, pruriently, in the name of what she calls "purity," concerning things which it is a shame for her even to speak of. Prurience, indeed, seems to be a distinctive attribute of the new woman. My last remarks have reference, of course, only to adult members of the family. Let us turn for a minute to the children. St. Paul—I must plead in extenuation of frequent references to him my conviction that the world just now urgently needs his teaching—when warning St. Timothy of perilous times to come, mentions, as a note of them, "disobedient to parents." Assuredly it is a special feature of these times. The boy is infected with the notion of his own sovereignty. Why should I obey? he asks. And the *argumentum ad baculum*, the application of the rod of correction, which in a saner age would have replied to his query, is seldom forthcoming. I was talking a day or two ago to the vicar of a large London parish, who told me that the children were his great difficulty. "They are utterly undisciplined," he said, "the parents don't keep them in order: the word is 'Let

them please themselves; let them do what they like.' Parental authority can hardly be said to exist." In this connexion we ought not to forget how much the State, in our own country, among others, has done to undermine that sacred authority, and to destroy filial obedience, by infringing the right of the father to determine the religious education of his children.

VII

Thus is the virtue of obedience vanishing from the family. Now let us turn to the public order. The old conception of the function of the State, as we have seen, was the uniting of men by a moral bond. And precisely because the bond was moral, was obedience claimed for its laws. The task of the lawgiver—let me be permitted to recall what I have said in an earlier page—was to formulate for the guidance of society the concepts of right revealed by reason; reason inherent in human nature and prescribing what men should do and should not do. The first lesson a subject had to learn was obedience, a reasonable service to be rendered for conscience sake. Is it possible to imagine any conception of the State more alien from the modern mind? The view of law now most widely prevalent is empirical. An action is supposed to be wrong because it is forbidden, not forbidden because it is wrong. Indeed, the old notions of right and wrong

have well-nigh disappeared. Thus Lord Morley of Blackburn tells us, in his book *On Compromise,* "Moral principles, when they are true, are at bottom only generalisations from experience." But "generalisations from experience" can only counsel; they cannot command; they cannot bind with the sacrosanct authority of right. And so the axe is laid to the root of the conception of positive law as a function of reason, a dictate of Eternal Justice which should rule human life. Its ultimate source is supposed to be a majority in the legislature—a majority too often obtained by impudent intrigue and cancerous corruption. Carlyle is well warranted when he writes in one of his *Latter Day Pamphlets*:

> Truly one of the saddest sights, in these times, is that of poor creatures on platforms, in parliaments and other situations, making and unmaking "Laws," in whose soul, full of mere vacant hearsay and windy babble, is and was no image of Heaven's Law: whom it never struck that Heaven had a Law or that the Earth could not have what kind of Law you pleased. Human statute books accordingly are grown horrible to think of. An impiety and poisonous futility every Law of them that is so made: all Nature is against it.

It is not surprising that with the old conception of positive law as a function of justice or right reason, the belief in the duty of obedience to it has vanished too. If men obey at all, they obey not for conscience sake, but, as St. Paul puts it, "for wrath." To the demand for

obedience to it the answer is given, "On what compulsion must I? tell me that." And compulsion is becoming ever more and more difficult to apply, owing to the effacement of the idea of justice and the progress of a sickly sentimentalism and spurious humanitarianism. It is no wonder that systematic and successful defiance of the law is spreading.

VIII

To sum up then. The fact is indubitable that the obedience which has been for so many generations the bond of European society is vanishing—nay, has already in great measure vanished—from among us, because the virtue has gone out of it, because the moral force which gave it validity has become inoperative. Can any substitute be found for that moral force? An experiment in search of one is being conducted, with more or less completeness, in several European countries. It is sought to supply the place of religious and philosophical dogma, in the education of the coming generation, by the teaching of merely physical phenomena, of the functions of matter and force, beyond which, it is said, we can know nothing. It seems to me absolutely certain that this experiment is foredoomed to failure. The two great postulates of the school which directs it—a school which usurps the name of modern thought—are the sovereignty of the

individual and physiological fatalism. How is it possible rationally to combine these two postulates in the mind of the man to come—the present child—and to deduce from them a rule of conduct? You ascribe to him unlimited dominion in the world of ideas. In the world of fact he is the servant of events, of his organism, of the past which is in him by heredity. Such is the type of man who is being reared up throughout Europe, void of the idea of God, which is exhibited to him as odious and ridiculous; emancipated from the moral law, which is replaced for him by calculations of profit and loss, of utility, of agreeable feeling; handed over to the blind impulses of egotism, to the savage instincts accumulated in his brain by long centuries of evolution. Such is the human animal which is being prepared in schools called secular or laic, his feelings undisciplined, his passions unchained, the restraints of reason and religion thrown off: lord of himself nominally, slave to himself really—to his lower self, the self of the ape and tiger, of the wild beast within him. It seems to me that to escape from this slavery, the will, the intellect, must be regulated by some idea, must be controlled by some principle. But can that idea, that principle be found in physical science? Impossible. What does physical science yield us? Facts, facts, monotonous—whatever the diversity of their manifestation—by reason of their perpetual

succession, of the identity of their origin; facts, some co-ordinated in the regions where physicists have penetrated, others not as yet so co-ordinated; but all mere mechanical phenomena, none possessing a shred of spiritual element or moral force. It is in vain to seek refuge in formulas: to invoke the Absolute, the Divine, the Ideal. The Absolute, what is it for physicists but the highest of abstractions? What the Divine for them but a decorative epithet? What the Ideal, apart from transcendent reality, but a subjective conception, quite arbitrary, the private, and personal product of your brain or of mine? No; for an idea, a principle that can regulate, can control the will, the intellect, we must seek elsewhere than among the phenomena of the physical universe. True, there you find, everywhere, causation, conservation of energy—law on a scale infinitely great and infinitely little; but it is a law which, taken by itself, does not speak of righteousness or make for righteousness: a law which is neither moral nor immoral, but unmoral. In that Invisible Kingdom of which Goethe speaks we find an order which is the counterpart, in the ethical and spiritual sphere, of the material order in the phenomenal: an order where causation and conservation of energy equally prevail: an order which is absolutely ruled by the moral law: an order as true a reality as the other, or rather a truer; for all phenomena are impermanent, all

integrations are unstable, but the Law of Righteousness, unwritten and unchanging, is not of to-day or yesterday: it abides for ever.*

* I perhaps need hardly say that I have in my mind Antigone's appeal to the ἄγραπτα κἀσφαφῆ θεῶν νόμιμα, of which she declares:

οὐ γάρ τι νῦν τε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε
ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου 'φάνη.

CHAPTER II

THE MONITIONS OF STRIKES

THE year 1911 marks an era in the history of British industrialism. It witnessed the first great conflict between Labour and Capital. England experienced an upheaval of the most serious kind, fraught with uses of terror and amazement. The country was suddenly brought face to face with scenes resembling the incidents of a foreign invasion or of civil war. Traffic almost ceased in our great cities. The transit of goods was stopped. The trains on many lines of railway ran intermittently, or not at all. The public thoroughfares were full of troops. Trade was paralysed. The King's loyal and law-abiding subjects were impeded in the whole range of their daily activities and necessities. Famine stared men in the face, while thousands of tons of food at the docks, and at the railway stations, were inaccessible and were perishing. Raw material was not forthcoming for industries, and factories and workshops were closed. Such was the effect of the great strike, long threatened, but executed with startling rapidity. What its authors' design was, the Home Secretary, Mr. Winston Churchill, told

the House of Commons, in an admirable speech, from which I shall quote a few paragraphs.

England, I think it is true to say, is more than any other country in the world dependent upon railways and open ports. It is true that all parts of England are not equally dependent upon railways and ports. In the Home Counties, in the South and in the East, where agriculture has not fallen so far behind manufacture, the dependence upon railways and overseas importations is not so pronounced, but in great manufacturing areas of England, in South Wales, on the North-east Coast, above all in Lancashire, Yorkshire, and the North Midlands, there is a complete dependence on railways and open ports for the whole means of industry and daily food. . . . It was in those very parts, where the immense population of working people are concentrated together, who have come into existence as communities entirely by reason of the railways and overseas transport, that the pressure of a national railway strike would be, and had actually begun to be, powerfully exerted. And what a pressure! Had the strike proceeded for a week on the lines which its authors apparently intended—that is to say, had it succeeded for a week in producing an entire stoppage of trains in those parts—there must have been practically a total cessation of industry. Everyone would have been thrown out of work. Every mill, every mine, every factory must have been closed. The wages for the household would have ceased. Had the stoppage continued for a fortnight, it is, I think, almost certain that, in a great many places, to a total lack of employment would have been added absolute starvation. . . . In the great quadrilateral of industrialism from Liverpool and Manchester on the West, to Hull and Grimsby on the East, from Newcastle down to

Birmingham and Coventry in the South—in that great quadrilateral, which, I suppose, must contain anything between fifteen and twenty millions of persons, intelligent, hard-working people, who have raised our industries to the forefront of the world's affairs, it is practically certain that a continuance of the railway strike would have produced a swift and certain degeneration of all the means, of all the structure, social and economic, on which the life of the people depends. If it had not been interrupted, it would have hurled the whole of that great community into an abyss of horror which no man can dare to contemplate.

The picture is not overdrawn. Mr. Churchill's words, upon this occasion, were the words of truth and soberness. Well, the strike *was* interrupted. As a matter of fact it had been imperfectly organised: and the Government patched up a truce with the strikers by negotiations of which the less that is said the better. But, abortive as it was, it cost the country—so an eminent statistician calculated—ten millions of money. And what was its true explanation? Ostensibly, it was for the redress of grievances about overtime, Sunday work, inadequate pay, and a multitude of other hardships, greater or less. "Ostensibly": but as one of its leaders candidly told us, this explanation is quite inadequate. We learned from Mr. Thomas Mann that what he calls "industrial solidarity" was the true key to it. And what does that mean? It means, according to Mr. Mann, "the recognition by

the workmen that any section of every industry is interdependent upon every other section, and that the growth of modern industrialism has made this absolutely necessary. Trade Unions," he went on to say, "are not by themselves sufficient"—sectional trade unionism, he called it; Parliamentary action he condemned as ineffective; "but in a universal industrial organisation" he discerned a weapon all-powerful. What he meant by this is the co-ordination of the various battalions of labour in such a way that the entire army shall be able and willing, at any moment, to support the claims of the smallest section by paralysing the industries of the whole country. In the years which have elapsed since he gave this counsel its truth has been discerned, and it has been carried into effect. In 1913 the miners, having in mind the partial failure of the railway, dock, and coal strikes of 1911 and 1912, instructed their Executives to approach other Trade Unions with a view to co-operative action and the support of each others' demands. This was done, and an organisation of the miners, railwaymen and the transport workers was brought about, a special conference of the three being authorised to declare a national strike when one should be thought expedient.*

* "At a specially arranged conference of the Triple Industrial Alliance held yesterday, there were present 152 delegates from the Miners' Federation, 89 delegates of the National Union of Railwaymen, 39 delegates from the Transport Workers' Federation, representing in all 1,286,000 workers (716,000 miners,

The effect of such a strike obviously would be to paralyse the activity of the country, to substitute mob law for the law of the land and to terrorise the community. It was in October, 1915, that this Federation was fully completed. It was not until February, 1919, that its machinery was set in action. A sort of truce between Labour and Capital was observed while the war was in progress.

II

In order to understand any political situation aright we must know how things have become what they are. How then has the present position of Labour versus Capital arisen? During the last century and a half the world has passed through three great contemporaneous Revolutions—the Industrial, from manual to machinery labour; the Economic, wrought by Adam Smith and his disciples; and the Political, manifested by the great French Revolution. The present position

340,000 railway workers, and 280,000 transport workers). Mr. R. Smillie presided, and welcomed the delegates to the first meeting of the Triple Alliance on its fullest representative basis. They had assembled primarily to discuss industrial compulsion. If that body once made up its mind against industrial compulsion there could be no fear of its introduction. The Triple Alliance had, for the period of the war, acted only on the defensive, but there would come a time when they would formulate proposals of aggressive action, but these proposals must await the more favourable opportunity. They must all look to a measure of efficiency and organisation for a stoppage of work. The mere threat ought to be sufficient to bring about their well-thought-out democratic demands."—*The Times*, June 22nd, 1917.

of Labour versus Capital is the outcome of these three revolutions. When the war with France broke out in 1793, England was mainly an agricultural country. Manufactures were largely carried on in cottages by workers who enjoyed a certain amount of economic independence, and whose lot was celebrated as happy by a contemporary poet :

> Oh what a world of profit and delight
> Is open to the studious artisan.

The great mechanical inventions associated with the names of Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton, and Watt made an end of this state of things. Factories were erected to house the new machinery, and the operatives were converted into its servants. The capitalist element became the main figure in production. " But," as Mr. Gibbins observes, " a man cannot become a capitalist without capital, and capital cannot be accumulated without labour, though these remarkably obvious facts are constantly forgotten. The large capitalists of earlier manufacturing days obtained their capital, after the first small beginnings, from the wealth produced by their workmen, and from their own acuteness in availing themselves of new inventions. Of the wealth produced by their workmen they took nearly the whole, leaving their employées only enough to live upon, while producing more wealth for their masters. Hence it may be said that capital was, in this

case, the result of abstinence, but that the abstinence was on the part of the workman and not of his employer."*

During the reigns of George the Fourth and William the Fourth and the early years of Victoria, the working classes employed in coal mines, woollen factories, and cotton factories were simply at the mercy of their employers, from whom they found no mercy. Their wages were utterly insufficient, their labour was inhumanly protracted—it usually lasted twelve hours a day and often sixteen: frauds and extortion of the vilest kinds were practised on them, notably those engineered by the truck system; their term of employment was uncertain, and they were exposed at any time to arbitrary dismissal; their children, who had been impressed as labourers, were treated with a cruelty which, when brought to light by the Reports of a Royal Commission in 1842 and 1843, aroused horror throughout the civilised world.† Their women, also impressed

* *Industrial History of England*, p. 176. One thinks of the verses of the Psalm *Beati Omnes:*

For thou shalt eat the labour of thine hands: O well is thee and happy shalt thou be!
Thy wife shall be as the fruitful vine: upon the walls of thine house;
Thy children like the olive branches: round about thy table.

And then one thinks of the modern factory.

† It is worth while perhaps to put before my readers the following extract—I abridge it slightly—from Mr. Gibbins' *Industrial History of England* (p. 178): "The manufacturers wanted labour by some means or other, and they got it from the workhouses. They sent for parish apprentices from all parts of England, and pretended to apprentice them to the new employments just

for work, were the hopeless victims of unbridled lust. When these things were revealed, our

introduced. The mill owners systematically communicated with the overseers of the poor, who arranged a day for the inspection of pauper children. Those chosen by the manufacturers were then conveyed by wagons or canal boats to their destination and from that moment were doomed to slavery. Sometimes regular traffickers would take the place of the manufacturer, and transfer a number of children to a factory district, and there keep them, generally in some dark cellar, till they could hand them over to a mill owner in want of hands, who would come and examine their height, strength, and bodily capacities, exactly as did the slave dealers in the American markets. After that the children were simply at the mercy of their owners, nominally as apprentices, but in reality as mere slaves, who got no wages, and whom it was not worth while even to feed or clothe properly, because they were so cheap and their places could be so easily supplied. Their treatment was most inhuman. The hours of their labour were only limited by exhaustion after many modes of torture had been unavailingly applied to force continued work. Children were often worked sixteen hours a day, by day and by night. Even Sunday was used as a convenient time to clean the machinery. The author of *The History of the Factory Movement* writes: 'In stench, in heated rooms, amid the constant whirling of a thousand wheels, little fingers and little feet were kept in ceaseless action, forced into unnatural activity by blows from the heavy hands and feet of the merciless overlooker, and the infliction of bodily pain by instruments of punishment invented by the sharpened ingenuity of insatiable selfishness. They were fed upon the coarsest and cheapest food, often with the same as that served out to the pigs of their master. They slept by turns and in relays, in filthy beds which were never cool; for one set of children were sent to sleep in them as soon as the others had gone off to their daily or nightly toil. There was often no discrimination of sexes; and disease, misery, and vice grew as in a hotbed of contagion. Some of these miserable beings tried to run away. To prevent their doing so, those suspected of this tendency had irons riveted on their ankles with long links reaching up to the hips, and were compelled to work and sleep in these chains, young women and girls as well as boys suffering this brutal treatment. Many died and were buried secretly at night in some desolate spot, lest people should notice the number of graves; and many committed suicide.'"

best and wisest expected a social revolution. "We are engulphed," thought Dr. Arnold, "and we must inevitably go down the cataract." We did not, thanks partly to remedial legislation by a series of Factory Acts. "I tremble to think," Toynbee said, "what the country would have been, but for those Acts." The earliest of them, indeed, were very inadequate. In 1833 a beginning was made of more effective statutes for the protection of children. Not, however, till 1847 was the famous Ten Hours Bill passed, reducing the labour of women and young persons to that term daily, the legal day being between 5.30 a.m. and 8.30 p.m. It was mainly through the heroic and indefatigable exertions of Lord Shaftesbury, aided by Fielden, Oastler, and Sadler that this Bill became law.

III

But side by side with the Industrial Revolution an Economical Revolution was in progress. It is usually associated with the name of Adam Smith, and largely influenced the condition of England. He recommended his political economy as a doctrine of Freedom. When he wrote his *Wealth of Nations* the law imposed many restrictions, some of them very salutary, upon various industries. He advocated, successfully, their entire abolition, on the ground that Labour and Capital should be

left free to seek their interests by " the obvious and simple system of natural liberty," that is to say, by freedom of contract. It seems not to have occurred to Adam Smith that a necessary condition of real freedom of contract is parity of condition; and that parity of condition could not possibly exist, under the so-called " law " of supply and demand working by competition, between the replete capitalist and the starving labourer, between the owner of lands, mines, manufactories, and the owners of nothing but their ten fingers, skilled or unskilled. Still the doctrine was well-nigh universally received and believed that competition was the all sufficient rule of industry, and cash payment its sole nexus. It was on this doctrine that the capitalists of early manufacturing days acted, nothing doubting their right to do so, and all legislation for remedying the condition of factory workers was opposed by them, tooth and nail. " A wholly unjustifiable interference," they ingeminated; " factory hands discontented with their lot? Why, it is what they agreed to! " There is a passage in *Little Dorrit*—published in 1855—worth quoting in this connection: " I like business," said Pancks; " what's a man made for? What else? That's what I ask our weekly tenants. Some of them will pull long faces to me and say: ' Poor as you see us, master, we are always grinding, drudging, toiling, every minute we are awake.' I says to them: ' What

else are you made for?' It shuts them up. They haven't a word to answer." Well, they found words. What is more, they founded Trade Unions, which now began to play a potent part; an organisation thanks to which their words have not fallen to the ground. Mr. Smillie told the Coal Commission, "our Federation was established on the tears and starvation of the mine workers." This is virtually the account of the foundation of well-nigh all Trade Unions.

A very interesting chapter regarding the rise and development of the Unions will be found in Dr. Brentano's great work on English Guilds. This learned man tells us they are the successors of those Guilds, directed against "the aggressions of the rising manufacturing lords, as in earlier times, the old freemen formed their Frith Guilds against the tyranny of mediæval magnates, and the free handicraftsmen their Crafts-Guilds against the aggressions of the Old-burghers." No doubt that is so, but there is this great difference, that these old mediæval Guilds were intent upon something more than personal gain or mere material advantage. They had a chaplain to conduct their religious services and to pray for their dead. Indeed "in reading their statutes" Dr. Brentano observes, "we might sometimes fancy that they cared only for the well-being of their souls." Our modern Trade Unions seem to have received the sad gospel "souls

extinct, stomachs well alive," as Carlyle puts it. This, by the way. But " they have fought contests," to quote Dr. Brentano further, " quite as fierce as, if not fiercer than those of the old craftsmen against the patricians ; the history of their sufferings since the end of the eighteenth century, and of the privations endured for their independence is a rich record of heroism." Meanwhile the effect of the great upheaval in the political order, which we commonly call the French Revolution, had been favourable to the workers. The ideas, true and false, promulgated by it had acted as powerful solvents of old institutions. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity—they are words to conjure with, as the world has proved. For their Jacobin exponents, indeed, Liberty meant freedom to oppress, and in the long run—not usually very long—to suppress dissentients ; Equality the elevation of the scum of the earth to the seats of princes ; Fraternity the brotherhood of Cain and Abel. But, for good and for evil, the ideas of the French Revolution and also its verbiage—still more indeed its verbiage—have powerfully influenced modern life, and the course of politics in England as elsewhere. When Trade Unions first came into existence our working classes troubled themselves little about anything beyond their daily wants ; it took them all their time to provide for these. The existing social framework, with its division of wealth, if they thought about the matter at

all, they regarded—to use Mr. Casaubon's phrase—as "providential arrangements."* But gradually a questioning spirit was aroused in them as they heard it rumoured that all men were born and continued free and equal in rights. Providence—was there any Providence? It seemed to them, as to Coupeau in Zola's novel, "S'il y a un Dieu il arrange drôlement les choses": a favoured few enjoying the freedom which money gives: the many enduring the slavery of unremitting toil. Equal in rights? Why not then in fact? Why the purple and fine linen to Dives, who apparently had done nothing to earn them, while Lazarus gazed, with unsatisfied hunger, on the crumbs which fell from the rich man's table? And when what has now come to be known as Socialism developed, and its orators lifted up their testimony and distributed their pamphlets, is it any wonder that the manual labourers heard them gladly? The more so when—to quote some striking words from *The Times*—"the owners played into the hands of these teachers by a grasping policy," as they pretty generally did.

Meanwhile the course of European politics had been strongly dissolvent. If we weigh the

* "May I talk to you a little?" said Dorothea.
"Certainly."
"I have been thinking about money all day—that I have always had too much and especially the prospect of too much."
"These, my dear Dorothea, are providential arrangements."—*Middlemarch*.

matter well that course was, in effect, the development oft-thwarted, but in the event triumphant, of an idea introduced into the world by Jean Jacques Rousseau. He is the author of the doctrine of pseudo-democracy, of the autonomy of the individual. He postulates unrestricted liberty and boundless sovereignty for the abstract man who is the unit of his speculations, and whom he declares to be naturally good and reasonable. The doctrine of the absolute equivalence of men is of the essence of his teaching: and so is the dogma of the sufficiency of the individual in the order of thought and the order of action. He was gladly heard by his contemporaries in France as a new evangelist; and the French Revolution was an attempt to realise his gospel, at any cost of blood or crime. The conception of civil society adopted by its legislators, and underlying "The Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen," is a multitude of sovereign human units who—that is to say, the majority of whom—exercise their power through their mandatories. And in the will, or whim, of this numerical majority, we are bidden to find the unique source of all rights. The essence of the revolutionary dogma is that only on equality, absolute and universal, can the public order be properly founded. Arrange that everybody shall count for one, and nobody for more than one, and by this distribution of political power, whatever be the moral,

intellectual, or social condition of its depositories, you realise the perfect, the only legitimate form of the State.

Upon the causes which led to the enthusiastic reception of this doctrine in France it is unnecessary for me to dwell here. They are admirably expounded, as all the world knows, in the initial chapters of Taine's great work. It has been well said that an idea must become French before it can become European. And one effect of the French Revolution and its wars was to spread the doctrine of Rousseauan individualism throughout Europe. Napoleon's campaigns, bringing down in a common ruin the old-world polities, shook this idea into the air. He claimed that he embodied the Revolution ; and so, in a sense, he did. The essence of Bonapartism is plebiscitary despotism, which rests upon the conception of the people as an aggregate of isolated and unrelated atoms. Socialism is another issue of the same conception. It also rests upon the doctrine of the unlimited power of the majority of sovereign human units, so widely received and believed in France ; and that country, in the judgment of a very clear-headed publicist, the late M. Scherer, is bound to make trial of it. Very few English writers have realised how widespread is the influence of the speculations of Rousseau. But certain it is that in every country those who denominate themselves the party of progress, although they may have never

read a line of him, spout his sophisms and vent his verbiage. Contemporary Russia has supplied us with an object lesson of the ultimate resolution of his doctrine.

IV

In England the advance of the Rousseauan idea has been slower than on the continent of Europe. Perhaps it was not until about the year 1820 that it made itself much felt in this country. It found here a distribution of political power resting upon quite another conception than the numerical—resting, not upon counting heads, but upon the representation of classes, corporations, localities, interests, and, we may say, all the elements of national life. That system, as it then existed, undoubtedly required reform. The so-called Reform Bill of 1832 did not reform, but overthrew it. The Duke of Wellington, "rich in saving common-sense" beyond any man of that time, truly told the House of Lords that "the principle of this measure was not reform": that the spirit animating it was "the outcome of the French Revolution," and that "from the period of its adoption we shall date the downfall of the Constitution." It was, in fact, the introduction into this country of political atomism, of a representation of mere numbers; and it was but the beginning of a series of similar statutes, all underlain by the

Rousseauan principle, and each carrying that principle further. There were, indeed, wise and far-seeing men who sought to stay this disastrous movement, and who, for a brief time—but only for a brief time—did check it. Thus, Mr. Gladstone's Household Suffrage Bill of 1866 was opposed and defeated by the moderate section of the Liberal party, led by Mr. Lowe, afterwards Lord Sherbrooke. That clear-headed thinker protested that one class should not be allowed to outvote all the other classes combined, and predicted that the effect of the legislation, to which he offered such strenuous opposition, would be to convert Trade Unions into political organisations, merely intent on gaining their own ends, in utter disregard of national interests.

He was right. As the last century was drawing to its close, a great change came over Trade Unions. Many of them—and some of the most considerable—became largely imbued with the doctrines of Socialism. A vague term indeed, but, as I have pointed out elsewhere,* in words which I shall take leave to repeat, as I do not know how to better them, its sects seem all to agree upon one first principle which has been, from the beginning, its distinctive note. For its germ we must go back to a well-known passage in Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. But its first set exponent appears to have been the Abbé

* *First Principles in Politics*, p. 128.

Fauchet, who in the early days of the Revolution delivered orations at a club called the "Cercle Social," and edited a journal entitled *La Bouche de Fer*. He insisted "that all the world ought to live; that everybody should have something and nobody too much"; and denounced "the wretch who desires the continuance of the present infernal *régime*, where you may count outcasts by millions, and by dozens the upstarts (*les insolents*) who possess everything without having done anything for it." The eloquence of the Abbé, who had become a constitutional Bishop, was cut short by the guillotine in 1793. Another of the primitive Socialists was Marat, who pleaded in the *Ami du Peuple*: "Either stifle the workpeople or feed them. But how find work for them? Find it in any way you like. How pay them? With the salary of M. Bailly." Bailly, it will be remembered, was the patriot Mayor who floridly harangued poor Louis XVI at the barrier of Passy, congratulating the wretched monarch upon being "conquered by his people," and was himself put to death, three years afterwards, by the same "people," with circumstances of revolting cruelty. Chaumette, too, praised by Lord Morley of Blackburn, as showing "the natural effect of abandoning belief in another life by his energetic interest in arrangements for improving the lot of man in this life,"* urged that though

* *Miscellanies* vol. i, p. 78.

"we have destroyed the nobles and the Capets, there is another aristocracy to be overthrown —the aristocracy of the rich." The poor had the same gospel preached unto them by Tallien, who demanded "full and entire equality," and insisted that "the owners of property should be sent to the dungeons as public thieves"; by Fouché, afterwards Duke of Otranto and Police Minister to the first Napoleon, who maintained that "Equality ought not to be a deceitful illusion"; that "all citizens ought to have a like right to the advantages of society"; and by Joseph Babeuf, who exchanged his christian name for Caius Gracchus: "pourquoi vouloir me forcer à conserver St. Joseph pour mon patron?" he explained: "je ne veux pas les vertus de ce brave homme-là." He sought to realise his doctrines by a conspiracy, and was executed for his pains by the Directory. But perhaps the most memorable of these pioneers of Socialism was Brissot de Warville, for it is to him that we owe the famous formula about property and theft: "La propriété exclusive c'est le vol," was the original text of it. For sixty years the dictum lay buried and forgotten in his not very meritorious work, *Recherches philosophiques sur la propriété et sur le vol.* There Proudhon discovered it, and made it current coin in the shortened form, "la propriété c'est le vol," appropriating it, however, without acknowledgment; perhaps, M. Janet

conjectures, in virtue of the right, alleged by Brissot, of everybody to everything.*

Now, this is the best known tenet of Socialism, though I am far from saying that it is held by all Socialists. The literature of the subject is enormous: and its exponents vary in many particulars, some not unimportant. But they all, without exception, so far as my reading enables me to judge, view private property as tainted with injustice. Well, I for my part, though no Socialist, must confess that there is a very unpleasant amount of truth in the indictment. In the abstract, and considered in the light of first principles, the right to private property is an imprescriptible and inalienable prerogative of man: it is the corner-stone of civilisation. But this right is subject to conditions which have been stated with equal clarity and conciseness by one whom I must account the greatest master of ethics. "The possession of riches," Aquinas writes, "is not unlawful if the order of reason be observed: that is to say, if a man possess justly what he owns, and if he use it in a proper manner, for himself and others."† If we turn to property in the concrete, how does it satisfy those two conditions? "Justly gained." But, for example, how much of our existing wealth is not due to dreadful deeds of cruelty and extortion in the nienteenth century—I have

* *Les Origines du Socialisme Contemporain*, p.95.
† *Contra Gentes*, lib. 3, 123.

touched upon them in a previous page—when the *laissez-faire* gospel of the old Orthodox Political Economy had free course, and was glorified? Or, to come to our own day, "how many of the large fortunes which have been amassed by mushroom financiers and promoters, during the last few decades are there which have not been built up on foundations of trickery, deceit and fraud, by means little different from those of the race-course thimble-rigger?"* Or think of the money made by sweating, by underpayment, in other words, by the robbery of the poor and needy, because they are poor and needy, an iniquity accounted by Catholic theologians one of the sins that cry to heaven for vengeance. I need not continue the dreary catalogue of ill-gotten gains. Assuredly, no one whose moral sense is not atrophied can deny that much of existing property *is* theft.

That truth, very often unduly magnified, as is natural enough, appeals strongly to the mind of the manual labourer, and has largely coloured his way of thinking about industrial problems. Nor—to go on to the second condition of Aquinas—does the insane luxury, the profligate profusion which the opulent offer for the poor man's contemplation seem to him a right use of riches for themselves and others. Can he be reasonably expected to

* They are the words of Sir George Lewis, and are quoted from the anniversary number of the *Financial News*, 1910.

rejoice in the spectacle exhibited by the otiose rich—that large class who, as the French say, *mangent leurs rentes*, in all good conscience, apparently supposing that they were sent into the world for that purpose alone?

> Full to the utmost measure of what bliss
> Human desires can seek or apprehend,

they do not even suspect, apparently, that their wealth has any other end than that of ministering to their own gratification; that they are called upon to fulfil any other social function than that of absorbing—gracefully, if possible—the proceeds of their stocks and shares. The result of the poor man's meditations about these things is that they might be changed with advantage to himself, and that perhaps he, in his millions, has the power to change them. "Thou shalt eat the labour of thy hands." Do not others eat the labour of his hands, with the exception of the fragment doled out to him as wages? I find in the *Manifesto of the Socialistic League* the familiar proposition that "the workers produce all the wealth of society." This proposition is naturally acceptable to "the operative," and indeed it is true. But probably there is no one at hand to explain to him that he is not the sole worker: that both the labour stored up in the machine, and the labour of the inventive or directive brain which it represents, deserve reward no less than the labour of the artisan

who works it, and that the real economical question of the present day is, what is the just rule of division of the product among these different contributors. But if he were told this, and believed it—he would very likely prefer not to believe it, and belief is largely a matter of the will—what could he make of the question of distribution? It is often a question of the utmost difficulty, requiring for its solution qualifications which the vast majority of artisans do not and cannot possess. They resemble the men of the first French Revolution, who, as Mill has pungently observed, for the most part saw what was wrong, not what was right. The redress which Socialism offers them for their grievances—and let us never forget that in many cases they *have* very real and grave grievances—is simple, and attractive to untutored minds. In its ultimate development of Syndicalism it appeals especially to the more vigorous and pugnacious among them by its doctrine that the capitalist is always the enemy, the oppressor, the robber: that the true solution of the social problem is the total destruction of the existing social system.

V

The event then has proved that Mr. Lowe was right. His prophecy which I quoted just now has come true. The Trade Unions originally devised, and for some time carried on, for

the most righteous object of protecting manual labourers against the atrocious tyranny of capital, have largely become the instruments of Socialistic, yes, and of Syndicalist agitators. The average working-man—it is not his fault—is the natural prey of the charlatan who flatters his vanity, stimulates his passions, and makes of his very defects a qualification for power, assuring him—it is part of Rousseau's message to the world—that education is depravation, that the untutored children of nature are endowed with an instinct qualifying them to sway the rod of empire :

> You that woo the Voices, tell them old experience is a fool,
> Teach your flattered Kings that only they who cannot read can rule.

Was not such the teaching of that demagogue *in excelsis* the late Mr. Gladstone, " most incomparable master in the art of persuading the multitude of the thing that is not."? Was it not embodied in his memorable demand, " Are the classes ever right when they differ from the masses ? " The answer of history to that question is " Nearly always." But in history Mr. Gladstone was almost as unversed as the populace upon which he played. If there is one lesson written more legibly than another in the annals of the world it is that majorities are almost always wrong : that truth is the prerogative of minorities—nay, it may even

be of a minority of one. That is the verdict of history. It holds good of all ages. It specially holds good of the times in which we live. John Stuart Mill, in his *Political Economy*, is well warranted when he dwells upon "the extreme unfitness, at present, of mankind in general, and of the labouring classes in particular, for any order of things which would make any considerable demand upon their intellect or virtue." But it is on "the labouring classes" that preponderating political power has been conferred. And votes, given under the direction of Socialistic or Syndicalist leaders, will soon dominate the one Chamber left us. Sir Henry Maine has well characterised it as "a type of government associated with terrible events—a single Assembly armed with full power over the Constitution, which it may exercise at pleasure . . . a theoretically all-powerful Convention governed by a practically all-powerful secret Committee of Public Safety, but kept from complete submission to its authority by obstruction, for which its rulers are always trying to find a remedy in some kind of moral guillotine."* This has been the political progress of our country—often the theme of such proud boasting—since the Reform Act of 1832. Progress! But of what kind? Surely it is like that of the Gadarene

* *Popular Government*, p. 125. Sir Henry Maine wrote prophetically: "We are drifting towards a type," the sentence begins. His prophecy has come true. We *have* so drifted.

swine: swift certainly, but conducting to the steep place and the engulfing deep.

We may say, then, that the existing relations between Labour and Capitalism in England are the outcome of those three great Revolutions, the Industrial, Economical and Political, of which the Political, embodying the Rousseauan doctrine of the public order, has gradually transformed the English system of Government. It is notable how in recent years politicians in search of votes, trading on that doctrine, have set themselves to flatter and to fawn upon the masses. The votes of the many have become of vast importance, and the price demanded for those votes, however exorbitant, has been paid without scruple. Thus it has come to pass that Trade Unions have been converted from harmless necessary organisations for the protection of their members, into powerful corporations uncontrolled by the law. The chief means by which they exercised their beneficent functions was collective bargaining—the only means, it had been found, of combating and counteracting the tyranny of capital. But collective baragaining implies—necessarily implies—as its correlative, collective responsibility. Trade Unions and their funds are, however, exempt by statute from all liability for breach of agreements or awards made between workmen and employers. A notion had grown up that they were exempt, too, from actions of tort: that their funds

could not be made liable to compensate a person who had sustained injury by wrongful acts done by their agents. The decision of the House of Lords in the Taff Vale case exploded this notion, and affirmed the liability of Trade Unions in such a predicament. The Royal Commission appointed in 1903 unanimously recommended that the law as laid down in the Taff Vale case should not be disturbed, and the Majority Report contains the following passage :

> There is no rule of law so elementary, so universal, or so indispensable as the rule that a wrong-doer should be made to redress his wrong. If Trade Unions were exempt from this liability they would be the only exception, and it would then be right that that exception should be removed. That vast and powerful institutions should be permanently licensed to apply the funds they possess to do wrong to others, and by that wrong inflict upon them damage, perhaps to the amount of many thousand pounds, and yet not be liable to make redress out of those funds, would be a state of things opposed to the very idea of law, order, and justice.

The King's Ministers, however, did not adopt this view. Many of their supporters who had bought the votes of the miners at the previous General Election by promising to do all in their power to procure a change in the law as laid down in the Taff Vale case, united with the Labour party in bringing pressure to bear (as the phrase is) upon the Government. Of course the Government yielded to that pressure. By some means which have not come to

the light, the Front Opposition Bench in the Commons was squared, and resistance in the Lords was obviated, and so the Trades Disputes Act, 1906, contained the following astounding provisions :

1. An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable on the ground only that it induces some other person to break a contract of employment.

2. An action against a Trade Union, whether of workmen or masters, or against any members or officials thereof on behalf of themselves and all other members of the Trade Union, in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of the Trade Union, shall not be entertained by any court.

It is difficult to imagine anything more utterly opposed to justice, common-sense, or public policy than legislation such as this. To use the words quoted above from the Majority Report of the Royal Commission, it confers upon the powerful associations which the Trade Unions have now become, the power to apply with immunity the vast funds which they possess to do wrong to others. But that is not the whole of the surrender made to them by the Trades Disputes Act, 1906. One of the most sacred rights of man is the right to labour. It may properly be called a natural right, as being inherent in human personality; as being an essential part of that freedom which is an attribute of humanity. The Trade Unions claim to make it void at their will. They

demand that a workman shall work only when and how they dictate. They apply brute force to support their dictation, assaulting and battering those who resist it. And this tyranny the Legislature virtually authorises by its sanction given in the Trades Disputes Act to what is hypocritically called "peaceful picketing." Armed with this weapon of immunity from civil liability and from the criminal law, manual labourers enter upon a strike in a position of overwhelming superiority. Their demand virtually is: "Concede what we ask, or we will starve the nation." The King's Ministers, cowed by them, remind me of the attitude of the ass in *The Sentimental Journey*: "Don't thrash me, but if you will you may." The blandishment of appeals and conferences is resorted to in vain, and the main point in dispute is yielded.

VI

It is well to remember—indeed, it is most necessary—that industrial unrest, as the phrase is, prevails almost universally throughout what we call the civilised world. Everywhere preponderating political power has fallen to the manual labourers; and everywhere they have fallen, more or less, under the sway of men who set before them Utopias for the most part quite unrealisable. Not long ago I chanced to converse with a leading French Socialist, and I pressed him, as closely as courtesy would

allow, to tell me what he really wanted. " Eh bien," he said at last, " je suis pour la république universelle, et pour l'égalité des hommes." He acknowledged, indeed, that the universal republic was very far off, and that he was unable to conjecture how it would be organised, but he thought it would embody the ideas of Rossel regarding inheritance, the family and property.* However that might be, he was sure that the equality of men was the only true foundation of human society. I acknowledged that there is a fundamental equality in human nature which should find its corollary in the equality of all men before the law, and entreated him to tell me what other equality was possible. Physical and mental inequality he confessed as a fact, nor could he deny that this meant inequality in political and economical value. I, for my part, admitted that every man is entitled to some share of political power, for the simple reason that he is a *person*, whose rational co-operation is necessary for his own development: but I urged that to say all men have a right to *some* share of political power is one thing; to say all men have a right to the *same* share is quite

* He was good enough to send me the following extract from some work of Rossel's—he did not specify what—in which those ideas are sufficiently indicated: " Il y a dans la société une classe nombreuse, industrieuse, pusissante parce qu'elle est groupée, à laquelle ne s'appliquent ni vos lois sur l'héritage, ni vos lois sur la famille, ni vos lois sur la propriété. Changez vos lois, ou cette classe essayera de se créer une société à elle, où il n'y aura ni famille, ni héritage, ni propriété."

another. I ventured to contend that every man should count in the community for what he is really worth ; that his mights (*mächte*) should be the measure of his rights ; that to give every adult male the same share of political power is as unreasonable as to require all men to pay the same amount of taxation. To which he would by no means assent. The egalitarian doctrine was to him a first principle, sacred from discussion. To me it appears a false principle, and in the doctrine of the right divine (or shall I say the inherent right ?—the word " divine " might give offence in some quarters) of majorities, which rests upon it, I find the perennial source of political corruption and social unrest. I believe that Schiller spoke the words of truth and soberness when he wrote :

What are mere numbers ? Numbers are but nonsense ;
Wisdom is never found save with the few :
Votes should be rightly weighed, not only counted :
Sooner or later must that State go under
Where numbers rule and foolishness determines.*

John Stuart Mill has summed up the matter in six words : " Equal voting is in principle

* A poor translation, as I am well aware, of Schiller's majestic lines, but the best that will come to my pen at this moment :

" Was ist die Mehrheit ? Mehrheit ist der Unsinn ;
Verstand ist stets bei Wen'gen nur gewesen.
Man soll die Stimmen wägen und nicht zählen :
Der Staat muss untergeh'n, früh oder spät,
Wo Mehrheit siegt und Unverstand entscheidet."

wrong."* It is unjust. But justice is the foundation of the State: "justitia fundamentum regni." And justice is not a thing which can be manufactured by political machinery. You may decree injustice by a law, but it remains unjust. You may affirm the thing that is not, by ever so many Acts of Parliament, but you will not convert it into the thing that is. The false remains false in spite of the declamation of doctrinaires and the madness of the people. And it is a mere foundation of sand for the political edifice reared upon it. Rousseau himself discerned this truth clearly enough, and admirably expressed it: "If the Legislature establishes a principle at variance with that which results from the nature of things, the State will never cease to be agitated till that principle is expelled and invincible Nature has resumed her sway."

VII

"Commonwealths," Burke has excellently said, "are not physical but moral essences." Right, as the Latin word witnesses,† is "the spiritual tie" which knits mankind into society. It does not mean and cannot mean, merely thinking of one's self, living for one's self, fighting for one's self. The outcome of that conception of right is anarchy. Let us insist upon the fundamental truth—the age is

* *Considerations on Representative Government*, p. 173.

† *Jus* (*jungere*).

in dire need of the teaching—there are for nations, as for the individuals composing them, necessary conditions of existence, irreversible laws of life : and those laws, those conditions, are ethical. The art of politics, properly understood, consists in apprehending and conforming to " the moral laws of Nature and of nations," the laws of that invisible kingdom into which we are born. But such is the degradation of the age in which we live, that an appeal to those laws commonly raises a smile. They are put aside as copy-book maxims. And yet, apart from the primordial principles which regard the State as an ethical organism, and man as an ethical agent, worthy life is not possible for the individual, or social health for the body politic. Man consists in reason, and so does the State which, in Hegel's admirable phrase, is " Reason manifesting itself as Right." And it is the function of ethics, the science of natural morality, to indicate what is right or wrong, as befitting or unbefitting the rational being man. I believe that the root of the evils, which of late years have produced such bitter fruits of social disintegration in this country, is disbelief in the eternal difference between " Right and Wrong, between whose endless jar justice resides." We must recover that belief. There is a fine saying in the *Qu'ran* : " God does not change the condition of a people unless they change themselves." And such is the change which the

people of this country must work out for themselves. This is no new doctrine. Plato held that faith in unseen and supersensuous realities is in the true foundation of any human community. Am I told that the doctrine, whether new or old, is out of date in an age when, as a recent thinker has observed, " le surnaturel* perd, de plus en plus, sa puissance sur nos âmes ? " Well, I am far from denying—how can I deny ?—that the age is largely, I will not say Atheistic—that implies affirmation—but Agnostic. Still such is and ever has been the condition of Buddhists. And yet for them an unseen and supersensuous reality, the moral law, is the great and ultimate fact. Whether there be a God or gods, this moral law exists, as it has existed from everlasting and will exist to everlasting. The deepest spiritual disease of the present day is not the negation of one or another religious dogma ; no : it is disbelief in conscience, which, in the phrase of Aquinas, is the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature, and in the supreme obligation to obey conscience as the rule of human life, individual and collective. Once recognise the true meaning of the ethical " ought," and the troubles which have overwhelmed society will disappear, for the root of them will be cut away.

Whether anything but an overwhelming national disaster will work this change I, for

* He means the supersensuous.

one, often doubt. Meanwhile it can do no harm to mention some measures, obviously just and reasonable, which we could and should adopt to save the nation from the anarchy to which it is surely tending.

Clearly, the first step to be taken is the simple expedient of substituting for brute force, properly constituted tribunals amply equipped with authority to decide the points involved in industrial disputes. The State is deeply interested in contentions affecting vitally those interests of the community of which it is the guardian : moreover, it is the helper of those who cannot help themselves. I need not here dwell on the details of the enactments for the settlement of labour quarrels, which have been passed, and have been found to work well, in Canada, in Australia, in New Zealand. To consider such details, and to adapt them to the needs of this country, is the business of those who govern, and who receive the rewards of governing. Will it be objected by the strike makers, and the trade unionists led captive by them at their will, that such legislation is an interference with individual liberty? The objection is idle. Liberty, real liberty, consists not in lawlessness, but in servitude to law : that is its essential condition. Milton has put it in majestic words : " Where complaints are freely heard, deeply considered and speedily reformed, then is the utmost bound of civil liberty attained that wise men look for." Will

it be urged, on the other hand, that the grievances of the manual labourer are few and insignificant, that their complaints are exaggerated ? Dives in his purple and fine linen, with his daily sumptuous fare, will be ill advised to betake himself to that refuge of lies. The grievances of the men who furnish his luxuries are very sore and cry bitterly for redress. The old principle of competition working by supply and demand still rules unchecked in many trades. Our great cities still teem with toilers, the victims of under-pay and overwork, who, in the picturesque language of an Anglican Bishop, seem not so much to have been born into the world as to have been damned into it. " Twelve millions underfed and on the verge of hunger," were Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's words, and they deserve to be remembered.

But if it is the duty of Government to remove the grievances of these toilers, it is equally its duty to maintain the liberty of the subject, and all that this time-honoured phrase involves. It is an elementary proposition—I suppose no one will be found who will directly deny it—that every man has a right to pursue his own interests in his own way—Adam Smith's sound doctrine—provided, of course, that the way he chooses is not unethical, or injurious to the supreme interests of the community. It is impossible to imagine anything more opposed to this right than picketing, or

anything more disgraceful than the sanction given to it by the Legislature under cover of "words deceiving." I touched upon this subject in an earlier page. Here I must take leave to return to it at greater length. The Trade Unions Act of 1875 made it an offence on the part of anyone who, with a view to compel a person to abstain from working, "watches or besets the house or other place where such other person resides or works, or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place," or "who follows such other person, with two or more persons, in a disorderly manner, in or through any street or road"; a provision which surely does not do beyond what is necessary for the protection of a workman's liberty. But it did not suit those trade unionists, whose notion of liberty is freedom to compel other workers to do, or to abstain from doing: "Sois mon frère ou je te tue." So in the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 the following section was adopted in order, as was said, to legalise what was called "peaceful" picketing—as we all know, it was the price paid by the Government then in office for the Labour vote. "It shall be lawful for one or more persons acting on their own behalf, or on behalf of a Trade Union, or of an individual employer or firm, in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works, or carries on business, or happens

to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose of peacefully persuading any persons to work or abstain from working." This " peaceful " picketing is a fraud and a farce—unhappily, a tragical farce. In practice it means the employment of the worst forms of intimidation and violence against poor and hungry toilers desiring to accept the employment which trade unionists decline. It is a scandalous attack upon the right to work. It is an instrument of the coarsest tyranny over the community at large. " Peaceful " picketing ! The words are a contradiction in terms. Violence and crime are of the essence of picketing. It is a defiance of public order, dislocating trade, arresting industry, destroying property, subjecting law-abiding subjects of the King to brutality and terrorism, inflicting incalculable and utterly undeserved suffering upon the country, and especially upon the lower middle classes and upon the poor, its chief victims being little children. It should be made utterly illegal and sternly put down.

" Sternly." I use that adverb advisedly. It does not do to try blandishment, or cajolery, or wheedling with a riotous mob. True is that word of the wise and gentle Spinoza : " Terret vulgus nisi metuat." It is foolish—yes and worse, it is criminal—to call out troops and to exhibit them as targets for stone throwers. I know of no more contemptible spectacle than the drivelling of tears over insurgents shot by

the military in quelling them. It is an ugly manifestation of what Carlyle well called " the sick sentimentalism which we suck in with our whole nourishment, and get ingrained in the very blood of us, in these miserable times." What are the lives of a few—or a few hundred —rioters in comparison with the vindication of law and the maintenance of order, in comparison, to quote again Mr. Churchill's words, with the preservation of the community from " an abyss of horror which no man can dare to contemplate ? " I suppose the creed of the apostles of anarchy, who claim the " right to riot," is " Ni Dieu, ni maître." They must be taught that whether there be a God or not—a question for the solution of which they may wait till the next world—they certainly have a master in this—the State, whose function it is to execute vengeance upon him that doeth evil ; and what greater evil is conceivable for the community than that which Trade Union terrorists desire and endeavour to bring to pass ? It is worth while to recall, in this connection, the action of President Cleveland, who, in 1894, quelled the great American railway strike by putting the States of the American Union infested by it under martial law, or something equivalent ; a wise, and indeed humane measure, as the event proved. Non-union men were escorted to and from their work by troops, whose instructions were to shoot to kill anyone attempting to interfere,

and a considerable number of rioters were shot accordingly. Maxim guns were also brought upon the scene, and were found to have a most pacificatory effect. In three months order was completely restored, and the industries of the country were delivered from a paralysing terror. This is the only attempt ever made in the United States to disorganise society and to coerce the nation by a general railway strike. It failed because the Government knew their duty, and were not afraid to do it.

VIII

One of the most cheering signs of the times, as it appears to me, is the ever-widening and deepening apprehension of the great truth well stated by Dr. Ingram that, "the mere conflict of private interests will never produce a well-ordered commonwealth of labour."* No; another element is wanting, and for lack of that element anarchy has prevailed in the economic order. In the extreme individualism engendered by the old political economy called Orthodox, every man's hand has been against every man; the hand of the capitalist against the manual worker; the hand of the manual worker against the capitalist—yes, and often against his fellow worker too, who has found it a heavy hand. The dominant thought of the employer has been how much he can get out

* *History of Political Economy*, p. 214.

of his workers for how little. His workers have asked themselves the self-same question in respect of him. Neither employer nor worker has thought of inquiring what is *just*. The very notion that in this matter such a thing as justice enters does not cross their minds. The conception of " a fair day's wage for a fair day's work " which Carlyle well calls " the everlasting right of man," and which once was accepted, at all events theoretically, as ruling in industrial relations, has vanished in the greed for gain. And yet if the Moral Law is not a mere empty name—which to be sure it is to moralists* of the Utilitarian School—it must dominate these relations of life as all others. Only by realising and fulfilling their obligations as moral beings can capitalists and manual labourers work together for the good of themselves and of the State.

" The State." That word too must make us pause. The Benthamite doctrine, so long generally accepted in this country, accounts of the State as a power exterior and hostile to the governed, restrictive of their liberty, and to be tolerated by them only for the protection of person and property. It is a mean and miserable conception. The true idea of the State is the nation in its corporate capacity. The State is a political entity, but it is something more than that. It is a fellowship of *persons* : that is of moral beings for moral ends : it is an ethical

* Kant pithily observes " They reduce it to a roasting-jack."

entity. And as the organic manifestation of the personality of a people it may properly be called an organism or a person. It is an *organism*, for—to quote the words of Bluntschli—"it is a great body capable of taking up into itself the feelings and thoughts of a people, of uttering them in laws, and of realising them in facts."* It is a *person*, for rights and duties, the distinctive notes of personality attach to it. And one of its duties—a very sacred one—is to protect the weaker members of the community from being exploited and defrauded by the stronger. "Parliament," the younger Pitt finely said, "is omnipotent to protect." It should be. But in this country Parliament, largely under the sway of the old Orthodox Political Economists, for years gave no adequate means of protection to the working-classes against the tyranny of capitalists. The Trade Unions took up the neglected duty, and discharged it not with the sweet reasonableness which might have been expected from the Imperial Legislature, but belligerently; as indeed was inevitable when we consider how the reward of labour was then apportioned. Mill has told us in a few emphatic words: "Whereas the reward of each working man ought to be proportioned to his individual labour and abstinence, it is as a matter of fact almost in an inverse ratio, those who receive the least labouring and abstaining the

* *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, p. 22.

most." Mill here suggests a principle for the division of the product of labour which, though not by itself sufficient, should always be kept in view. It is not worth while to consider the demand, once widely made but now wisely abandoned by all disciplined minds, that the whole of that product should go to the manual labourers, commonly called the "workers," by an unfortunate restriction of the term, for they are not the only workers or, indeed, the most important. The product—as I have already had occasion to insist—is the result not merely of manual labour, but of many other factors also, among them capital, without which it assuredly could not have been reached. It is true that the origin of capital is not, on the whole, a pleasant subject for meditation. St. Jerome quotes, with apparent assent, the dictum "Omnis dives est aut iniquus aut hæres iniqui." St. Gregory the Seventh expresses much the same opinion; even Bossuet, Court Preacher as he was to Louis the Fourteenth, declared that it was impossible to look at the beginnings of great wealth without a shudder. But capital exists; it is a huge and indispensable factor in the modern industrial world; and the principle of prescription, I suppose, applies to it, though not assuredly to as large an extent as is sometimes claimed by its possessors.

A very intelligent and somewhat highly placed workman with whom I was talking the

other day told me that in his opinion Capital was played out. I replied that I could see no signs of it, and invited him to think how the industries of the world could possibly be carried on without Capital, to which they seemed to owe machinery, credit, connexions, traditions, and even art. I continued : " I had the pleasure of going over your factory last week, and I was struck as much by the unity of purpose as by the diversity of operation which it exhibited. There was a shop where workmen were employed in moulding—I marvelled at the skill of their hands ; they were dependent for their patterns upon another set of men whom I saw in a shop hard by—men whose work, I was told, required extreme accuracy ; next I visited the drawing office, described to me as the centre of the nervous system of the factory. Then I saw a lot of clerks busy in a sort of counting-house : there were many managers and foremen all over the place ; there were also a good number of men engaged in rough tasks requiring physical strength ; all these people, and many more whom I did not see, were employed in the business ; it could not have been carried on without them ; and how could they have been brought together without Capital ? " He could not tell me that ; he seemed to have a hazy notion that you could have capital without capitalists : that the State, for example, might find it. The notion appeared to me too

unpractical to be worth combating. But I did express the extreme astonishment I have always felt that workmen should so shut the eyes of their understanding as not to perceive that to war against the capitalist is to war against themselves ; that they should suppose the ruin of their employers would, as they phrase it, " let them into their own." As though a ruined business would be worth being let into. So as to limiting the output, a device evidently tending towards such ruin, I am well aware that at one time there may have been a plausible or even a sufficient reason for it : a time when collective bargaining was inevitably difficult : but that time has long passed away : now the worker who diminishes the output increases the price of the commodity against himself and his fellows : he is like an excited woman bidding against herself at an auction. It seems to me that the policy of ca' canny, introducing as it does a whole train of evils which I cannot dwell upon here—nor is it necessary : they are well known—should be abandoned as a wrong against the workers themselves, no less than against the masters ; and, what is more, against the nation, whose rights are superior to, and override if necessary, the rights alike of workers and masters.

This supremacy of the rights of the commonwealth should never be forgotten. It usually is. I cannot conceive anything more contemptible than the policy in respect of labour

troubles pursued by the gentlemen who have been by way of governing this country for many years. A remedy for these terrible evils they do not seem to have dreamed of. They have merely tried to find some palliative, the closest at hand and the least likely to be troublesome, which would act as soothing-syrup for a time, leaving them free to return to their everlasting and never palling occupation, the party game. Yet these evils lie very near to the sources of the national life ; nay, if not remedied they must involve the negation of liberty, of property which is realised liberty, and of all which constitutes civilisation in the highest sense. Nor is there any remedy for them, as it seems to me, save the reorganisation of industry on the basis of ethics.

Many writers who are reckoned as Socialists demand loudly reorganisation, but they ignore the rational and spiritual element in human nature : they forget that man is an ethical animal and the commonwealth an ethical organism. Not so, I am glad to see, Dr. Ingram, who insists, " The social destination of property, in land, and of every species of wealth, will be increasingly acknowledged and realised in the future, but that result will be brought about not through legal institutions, but through the establishment and diffusion of moral convictions." Moral convictions : Yes : There we go back to the root of the matter. Mill has laid down some primary

postulates on labour worth quoting here: "That the earth belongs first of all to the inhabitants of it, that every person alive ought to have a subsistence before anyone has more: that whosoever works at any useful thing ought to be properly fed and clothed, before anyone, able to work, is allowed to receive the bread of idleness—these are moral axioms."* Yes, they are, and I gladly assent to them. Mill indeed reaches them by a route which appears to me wholly unmoral. But here the dictates of rational ethics and of Utilitarianism coincide, which is far from being always the case. And when they do coincide—let me enter this caveat—the ethical quality of an action is quite independent of the advantage which it brings. Honesty is the best policy: but an action is not honest because it is politic, even in a supreme degree. The desire to do right as right, that alone is morality. The idea of right, or ethical good, cannot be resolved into the idea of happiness or of agreeable feeling or of greatest usefulness; neither does it mean commanded by any Deity, or imposed by social needs. It is a simple aboriginal idea, not decomposable into any other, but simply *sui generis*. It admits of no definition save in terms

* *Dissertations and Discussions*, vol. ii, p. 385. This is also the doctrine of Adam Smith. He declares it to be "equity" that "those who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged." *Wealth of Nations*, bk. i, c. viii.

of itself; which is equivalent to saying that it is an ultimate like the perception of sweetness or colours: and the moral law is a natural and permanent apprehension of that idea by man's reason for the deduction of rules of right living in conformity with his nature as a rational being.

I am afraid my "caveat" is lengthy: but I was anxious to guard against the supposition of consenting to Mill's Utilitarian premises even when, as here, I warmly assert his practical conclusions. As warmly do I adopt his doctrine as to the proper course for ameliorating industrial conditions. He writes in his *Political Economy*: "For any radical improvement in the social and economical relations between labour and capital we have chiefly to look to a regular participation of the labourers in the profits derived from their labour."* I believe this to be absolutely true. For independence we must substitute interdependence. Labour and Capital must cease to be two hostile forces. They were associated in the Mediæval Guilds. They must be associated again. We must have industrial organisations based on common rights, common duties, common pursuits, common aims, common interests. An obvious means towards this desirable end is co-partnership. Hitze, in his suggestive book, *The Quintessence of the Social Question*, describes the economic problem of

* Book v, c. x., sec. 5.

the day thus : " To find a social organisation corresponding to the modern conditions of production, as the social organisation of the Middle Ages corresponded with the simple conditions of production then existing, both in town and country." Yes : that is the problem. Labour and Capital are now dissociated—nay, are independent, distrustful, hostile ; and what wonder when we remember the history of the relations between them ? Well, then, we are told, let every worker have a chance of becoming a capitalist : give him a share of the profits, and let him be encouraged to abstain from spending the money and to invest it in the industry : so that he may become not only a profit sharer, but a shareholder—nay, a partner. It is a scheme which, on the face of it, is inviting, and in some instances it has worked well :* but it is beset with many difficulties. Some of the most considerable of them are occasioned by the workers themselves. Too many lack interest and pride in their labour : they go about it in a listless and indifferent spirit : they appear destitute of that " desire to better their condition " which Adam Smith thought so mighty a spring of human nature.

* For example, the *Maison Leclaire* in France, of which a very interesting account has been published by Mr. Aneurin Williams in a volume entitled *Twenty-eight Years of Co-partnership at Guise*. See also a pamphlet by him entitled *The Better Way*, describing what has been done in this direction in England, chiefly in connexion with the " Labour Co-partnership Association."

Again, as a recent writer justly observes, " No sane man of business is desirous of taking into partnership, in any form, or to share profits with, men who uphold the view that they belong to an antagonistic class and that it is sound business to do an agreed amount of work rather than the utmost that is consistent with health and reasonable leisure. When these ideas are finally eradicated from the working-men's minds will be time enough to think seriously of co-partnership."* I add that clearly in any scheme of co-partnership a just living wage for the workers must be a first charge upon the industry: a charge prior to all questions of profit and apart from them. This is surely equitable. The workman's labour, which is his contribution to the product, is his all. He cannot be asked to take the risk which is rightly assumed by a man who has capital behind him. It is obvious that the amount of a just living wage, which should be determined by public authority, will vary with time and place.† It is, or it ought to be, equally obvious that this right is a right against the State. For industrial labour is not a mere matter of the private order: it is a kind of

* *Labour Unrest*, by G. E. Toogood. This writer has an intimate acquaintance with his subject, and makes some valuable suggestions.

† Pope Leo the Thirteenth, in his Encyclical on Labour, indicates as the criterion " sufficient to support the labourers in reasonable and frugal comfort." Professor Marshall, in his *Economics*, recognises " a necessary level " below which wages should not fall.

function delegated by society to each member of the body politic : it creates, like every other function, a series of reciprocal obligations between the society which provides it and the worker who executes it. And therefore " the authorities of the State are bound by *distributive* justice to see that, in some shape or other, the individual workman receives enough not merely for his own decent subsistence, but also for that of his family ; and likewise the whole society is bound by *legal* justice to do the same : in other words, the Government and the public, elected and electors, are bound to make provision that fair wages can be paid and are paid."*

But this view of manual labour as a social function—surely the true view—raises a further and a deeper question than that of wages. For example, the cry of the miners is that they are condemned to spend their lives in a dangerous and repelling industry for private profit; that, in fact, they are a kind of serfs. It is, of course, true that their toil is essential to the welfare of the community ; their demand is that its conditions and proceedings should be regulated by the community in consultation with themselves. The demand seems reasonable enough. The very fundamental doctrine of the old orthodox Political Economy, the sufficiency of competition and the cash nexus, is untenable. Labour is not mere merchandise ;

* Devas, *Political Economy*, p. 504.

and the organisation founded upon the belief that it is, over-weighed by gigantic accumulations of capital and sapped by irrepressible discontent, is bound to disappear. What is to take its place ?

It appears to me that any scheme of what is sometimes called industrial democracy—I dislike the phrase—must recognise certain basic principles such as these :

1. Industry rightly belongs neither to the capitalists nor to labour.

2. Capital and labour are morally and economically partners in industry, and by reason of their different functions no distinction can exist in the relative importance of the services rendered by each.

3. Neither the control of industry nor its benefits can be rightfully claimed, or advantageously possessed, either by owners of capital invested or labour engaged, to the exclusion of the other.

4. The function of capital is that it be applied productively and sufficiently for the general good.

5. The function of labour is to produce to its full capacity.

6. The " standard of living," representing as it does the division of the commodities produced by the community amongst its members, is directly proportional to production, provided that the said division is equitable, having regard to services rendered.

7. The rewards rightly due for services rendered are as follows :—First, to labour, a reasonable living wage ; secondly, to capital, in respect of money secured by assets, a reasonable fixed rate of interest, sufficient to secure its employment ; thirdly, to

labour 50 per cent. and to capital 50 per cent. of the net divisible profits.

8. The term "labour" comprises workers both by hand and brain, and includes management.

These "basic principles," which I take from *The Times* of March 14th, 1919, are stated to have been agreed to by nine manufacturers and nine representatives of organised labour presided over by Lord Burleigh: and surely they well deserve careful consideration.

IX

Such are some of the *Monitions of Strikes*. They may be all briefly comprehended in this one saying: *Discite justitiam moniti*. But there is yet another word: we will let Wordsworth speak it:

> Learn to be just: just through impartial law;
> Far as ye may erect and equalise:
> And what ye cannot reach by statute draw
> Each from the fountain of self-sacrifice.

Yes, self-sacrifice; that is the necessary complement. If justice is the foundation of the commonwealth, sacrifice is its binding tie. And surely in the solemn season* which has come upon us, while I have been writing this chapter, our thoughts must needs turn to Him who is the Great Exemplar of self-sacrifice: who was offered up because He willed it—*oblatus ut quia Ipse voluit*—and from whose

* Passiontide.

supreme oblation all that is most precious in modern life flows. Nor can we forget our dear dead, their bones resting in alien graves, or scattered in Continental battlefields, who too counted not their lives dear for us, who died that England might live. Nay, does not a voice come from them, in their glorious sleep, a voice above the turmoil of conflicting interests and the strife of tongues, reminding us, " Sirs, ye are brethren " ?

CHAPTER III

THE MORALITY OF WAR

I SUPPOSE the year 1851 was the culminating period in England of what is now called pacificism, and that the Great Exhibition was its chief trophy. The wickedness of war was a fruitful theme for the homilies of preachers and the perorations of demagogues in the days of my youth. I remember a worthy person, now long dead, of whom I saw much then, an esteemed leader of Protestant Nonconformity and a Radical of the Manchester school, who, from time to time, would sadly ingeminate, " I hate war." He supposed, apparently, that this Podsnapian declaration of his sentiments settled the matter. Even Thackeray, in one of the poems of his leek and salad days, asks :

> Tell me what find we to admire
> In epaulets and scarlet coats :
> In men, because they load and fire,
> And know the art of cutting throats ?

In later life he answered the question, satisfactorily enough, in more than one of his novels. But at that time the air rang with Mr. Bright's denunciations of " bloated armaments," and Mr. Cobden, rapt into future times, prophesied of a calico millennium. The Great Exhibition was hailed as a presage and promise

of the fulfilment of the prophecy. Field-Marshal the Prince Consort—I think, by the way, he was then known as Prince Albert—was saluted in his quasi-canonisation by Tennyson as

> Far-sighted summoner of war and waste
> To fruitful strifes and rivalries of peace,

and a widely spread belief prevailed in the early 'fifties that, for the future, men would " work in noble brotherhood, breaking their mailéd fleets and arméd towers," and would beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks. It was an outcome of the Utilitarian philosophy dominant just then—the philosophy which had laid upon the neck of a long-suffering world the terrible burden of the old orthodox Political Economy. This doctrine, reposed on the assumption that men could be guided by a prudent calculation of their own interests, and that such a calculation, among other excellent results, would lead them to see the disadvantages of war and to give it up. Unfortunately, the doctors of Utilitarianism, from Bentham to Herbert Spencer,* were radically at fault in their estimate of human nature. Self-interest is not the

* I have no desire to be unfair to Mr. Herbert Spencer, or to hurt the feelings of his disciples, so I will subjoin a word of explanation. I may be reminded that in the Introduction to his *Social Statics* he, in terms, repudiates the Expediency Morality, whether in the raw Benthamite form or as cooked by Mr. Mill. But that nevertheless he is clearly involved in it appears to me absolutely certain from his own words in the *Data of Ethics* : " I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to deduce from the laws of life what kind of actions necessarily tend to promote

only or the principal motive determining our action. Man is not an animal wholly subservient to the love of filthy lucre, or even of agreeable feeling, which also is too often filthy. He is swayed, and in many instances much more strongly, by a number of other impulses, passions, desires, " envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness " being prominent among them. The Utilitarian philosophers, of whom the orthodox Political Economists were the first-born among many brethren, proceeded, as Professor Marshall happily puts it, on the supposition that the world was made up of city men. I should add that their city man was a quite unreal type. The city man is not an industrial machine engrossed by the thought of making money. So to conceive of him is grossly to malign him. Banker, financier, merchant though he be, he is " a man as other men are," with feelings, ideas, aspirations, reaching beyond, nay, often quite transcending, the trivial round, the common task of his occupation. The essential defect of the Utilitarian

happiness and what to produce unhappiness," (sec. 21). " The purpose of ethical inquiry is to establish the rules of right living, and, . . . the rules of right living are those of which the total results, individual and general, direct and indirect, are the most conducive to human happiness " (sec. 37). Now such is, *totidem verbis*, the Utilitarian or Expediency account of morals. It reduces ethics to eudæ monism. Mr. Spencer, it is true, admonishes the human race that the deductions of his ethical science " are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimate of happiness or misery " (sec. 21). A *direct* estimation of happiness or misery: the adjective gives the measure of the difference between Mr. Spencer's doctrine and Bentham's. This difference is not essential.

philosophy was its false view of human nature. Hence the failure of the orthodox Political Economy and of the pacificism born of it. And what a failure! Think of the wars which desolated Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century. Think of the prodigious carnage which has been recently before our eyes. Of all foolish dreams which are recorded in human history—of all vain will-o'-the-wisps that have led mankind on a false road—surely this of pacificism is one of the most foolish and most vain.

II

And the source of its foolishness and vanity is not that it sets too high a value on peace, the greatest of all blessings—"Pax optima rerum quas homini natura dedit," the Roman poet truly sings—but, as I have indicated, that it is founded on an utterly erroneous view of human nature and of human life. For life, whether in nations, or in the individuals of whom nations are composed, is essentially strife. "Man is born into the state of war," Emerson says, with equal pungency and truth. That is the real account of human life, in all its activities. It is so in the sphere of physical being. The struggle for existence is a primary fact throughout the universe. To the eye of science all animate nature is the scene of an incessant battle of individual against individual, of species against species. The more vigorous, the more

fortunate, triumph and survive, the weaker, the unlucky, succumb and perish. It is so in the vegetable world. Even the humblest flower that blows derives its every character and quality from the strife of countless ages. As for us men, our hands are red with the blood of other creatures which we call lower. Our throats are open sepulchres wherein they are entombed. Our life is their death. Our joy is their suffering. Nay, we prey not only upon other species, but upon our own. It ever has been so among men, from the rudest societies of "cannibals who one another eat," to the most refined communities of civilisation, where the process by which man devours man, though thickly veiled, is not the less real. It is so in the sphere of ideas, of intellectual research. What is the scientific progress of our own race but a successful battle against ignorance? Its capture after hard fighting, of fresh territory from the great Unknown? Moreover, this intellectual warfare is not seldom accompanied by physical. On how many pages of the world's history is the truth written that "principles are rained in blood!" In the domain of æsthetics, too, the same rule holds good. The masterpieces of painting, of sculpture, of architecture, at which we peaceably gaze, are victories gained, after hard battle, in the domain of the ideal. Our inventions and discoveries in the physical science are so many triumphs over the adverse forces of nature. I remember asking a

distinguished chemist, upon one occasion, what had become of a theory which he was confidently hoping to establish. "I am not getting on with it," he said. "How is that?" I enquired rather curiously. "Well," he replied, "for some time I have not come upon a single fact which is not favourable to it. Hostile facts are the really helpful facts. The triumph over them is the victory of science."

Again, even in the sphere of the affections, of love, of the sexual relations of life, war reigns. Cupid's bow and arrow are true emblems. As we all know, the earliest form of marriage was *per captionem*. The bridegroom forcibly carried off his bride. Advancing civilisation has put an end to that rough mode of wooing. But love-making, in its most refined forms, is essentially a battle. Conquest is the chief theme in the literature of what is called the tender passion.

> Vixi puellis nuper idoneus,
> Et militavi non sine gloria.

sings Horace:

> Till late I gave to girls my life,
> And won some glory in the strife.

The lady killer is a warrior. And the gentler sex, too, are warriors; nay, are they not often very Amazons in the erotic combat? Schopenhauer, in the chapter of his great work which deals with the "Metaphysic of the Love of the Sexes," roundly asserts: "It lies in

woman's nature to look upon everything only as a means for conquering man." And a philosophic novelist of our own, George Meredith, is of the same opinion. "If women have beauty they turn it into a weapon and make as many captives as they can." With what utter unscrupulousness they use that weapon is a matter of daily experience. I doubt whether the world, full of cruelty as it is, has anything more cruel to show than the way in which young girls, not out of their 'teens, will deliberately and remorselessly cause the extremist suffering in order to achieve a victory for their vanity.

And if we consider social life, there, too, we find war. Human society has been described as a tumult of inimical interests. And so it is. Throughout the generations of mortal men inequality reigns, and ever will reign, marking them off into conquerors and conquered, leaders and led, rulers and ruled. And the source of it—the perennial source—is the difference between men in respect of their intellectual constitution and the intensity of their desire. Now, as in the days of Homer, "Ever to excel and to have the pre-eminence."* is an aspiration deeply implanted in some natures. And if united with faculties adequate for its realisation, it has a right to be realised in fact. One great principle vindicated by the French Revolution—which, for good and for

* αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων. (Iliad, vi, 208.)

evil, has exercised, and is exercising, so momentous an influence upon modern civilisation—was, in the first Napoleon's phrase, "an open career for talents." Surely a most true and valuable principle, in virtue of which we see every day the spectacle of the son of the peasant or mechanic,

> Who breaks his birth's invidious bar,
> And grasps the skirts of happy chance,
> And breasts the blows of circumstance,
> And battles with his evil star.
>
> Who makes by force his merit known,
> And lives to clutch the golden keys,
> To mould a mighty state's decrees,
> And shape the whisper of a throne.

It is a career of combat all through. Birth's invidious bar is *broken*; the blows of circumstances are *breasted*; the evil star is *grappled with*; merit is made known by *force*.

Need we go on to the various other spheres of human activity, to the industrial and commercial, for example, where the very motive power is competition—that is, strife, so often unrestrained and cruel—or to religion, which, from whatever point of view you look at it, is war? All creeds are "militant here on earth," and more blood has been shed in their quarrels than in any other. But to speak only of one of them. The comparison of Christians to soldiers is as old as Christianity; it holds good, indeed, of earnest religionists of other

faiths. Kant, in a well-known treatise, describes religion as "the representation to ourselves of the moral law as the Will of God." But this moral law is in direct conflict with what the philosopher calls "the sensual tendencies of our own nature." The whole of our inner life is a battle between the higher self, the self of the reason, and the lower self, the self of the passions; between the law of virtue speaking through conscience, and the law that is in our members. And national—international—life, like individual, is war too. Nations, like the human units of whom they are composed, "follow their own interests and seek to better their conditions," as Adam Smith has it. Hence rivalries, emulations, contests. Cicero tells us that the word peregrinus,* in his day denoting a stranger, formerly meant an enemy. It is not surprising, for foreigners are always, to some extent, enemies. Their interests are hostile to ours, more or less, and in the last resort those interests must be maintained by armed force. Now, as in the time of Brennus, the sword is the ultimate arbiter. It always will be. War will ever remain the supreme act of the State,

* I cannot refrain from stating my conviction that the gentlemen who have so abundantly laboured to manufacture a League of Nations, without previously transforming human nature, offer the most conspicuous example of Shadow Hunting which Europe has witnessed since the time of Kaiser Karl VI. Like that unfortunate Prince, they seem to me to have been sowing dragons's teeth from which the world will reap a plentiful harvest of armed men.

unchanged in its essence, though varying in its mode. Human life, then, like all animate existence, is essentially battle: "bellum omnium contra omnes," as Hobbes puts it; we find the militant instinct implanted everywhere, even in the most feeble; and this is a sufficient answer to those who brand it as evil. The primary object of the militant instinct is, of course, self-preservation; but in man it is the root of that highest of virile virtues, courage. The most senseless of superstitions is the belief in life as the highest good. The most slavish of all fears is the fear of death. The soldier's song in *Wallenstein* rightly proclaims that only he is free who unperturbed can look it in the face.* The true life-work of every man, as of the Son of Man, is "to conquer sin and death, the two grand foes"; and for every man, whatever his degree, education ought principally to be the teaching of "the rudiments of his great warfare." It is a conception which Utilitarianism has done its best to rub out of the general mind, converting as it does, with its orthodox Political Economy, all the world's business into schemes of profit or processes of fraud and extortion. The soldier, counting not his life dear for his native land, is a witness to the paramount excellence of courage—rightly called by the old Romans *virtus*, the specially virile quality which should

* "Der dem Tod ins Angesicht schauen kann,
Der Soldat allein, ist der freie Mann."

rule life. For the virtue which calmly confronts death, at the call of duty, is the selfsame which —in Milton's noble words—makes us "hate the cowardice of doing wrong."

III

So much in the scantiest outline, and as if by a few strokes of a pencil, in support of my contention that human existence, like all animate existence, is everywhere a state of war. It is, as old Hobbes said, "Bellum omnium contra omnes": a war of all against all. Abolish war? You might as well seek to abolish death. The militant instinct is a primary fact of human as of all existence. Is that instinct, then, in itself evil? No; not in itself; and it may become the source of highest good. "Instinct," Kant says, finely and truly, "is the very voice of God." The militant instinct, which we share in common with the whole creation, groaning and travailing in pain together with us, was implanted by a Divine hand, in them, as in us, and primarily for self-protection. But there is a radical difference between us and them. Man, as Aristotle puts it, is the only animal having consciousness of right and wrong, justice and injustice and the like; he is an ethical animal; as Butler expresses it, he is "born under the law of virtue," the moral law, which is a natural and permanent revelation of the reason, indicating what is

suitable or unsuitable for him as a rational creature : the rule of what ought to be as distinct from what is. The moral law embraces every segment of his being, every field of his activity. It is the sun of righteousness and there is nothing hid from the heat thereof.

As regards the militant instinct, then, and as regards every other instinct, man must act as an ethical animal. There is an old saying— —and a most false—that all things are fair in love and war. All things fair in love ? Ah, no ! And in war ? Well, that is the doctrine which our German foes maintained and practised. And the moral sense of mankind rose up in execration of it. The whole subject of the morality of war has been considered in the light of first philosophical principles by the two greatest masters of ethics in the Christian era, St. Thomas Aquinas and Saurez, whose conclusions concerning it are virtually identical. But as it is the latter of these philosophers who has discussed it most fully, and who is some centuries nearer to our times, let us turn to him for guidance and see briefly what his doctrine is.* He begins in scholastic fashion with considering the question whether war is in itself wrong, and concludes that it is not : " Bellum simpliciter nec est malum, nec Christianis prohibitum." The reasoning by which he reaches this judgment is, in effect, that States,

* It is presented in his *Disputatio De Bello*, which will be found in Vol. xii. of his works (Ed. Paris, 1858).

like individual men, have the natural right to protect themselves by force, because national life, like individual, is based upon the instinct of self-preservation; and that war is sometimes the only means by which this can be done. But war may be either offensive or defensive. As to *defensive* war, there can be no question that it may be legitimately made to withstand force. But *offensive* war is lawful on one condition only, viz., that it is necessary for the repelling of injuries, for the coercion of enemies, when the State can in no other way be maintained in peace. The next point which he considers is, Who may declare war? And the obvious answer is, only the ruling power in a State. Then comes the important inquiry: What are the conditions of a just war? And the reply is, There can be no just war except for a legitimate and necessary cause. He notes as an error the view of the Gentiles, that war might be waged to obtain glory or riches. The only just cause of war, he insists, is a grave injury which can no otherwise be redressed; an injury proportionate to the grave evils of war. He adds that before commencing hostilities a ruler is bound to communicate to the State to be attacked his grievance, and to ask for reasonable satisfaction, and that, if such be offered, he must accept it, or his war will be unjust. He does not fail to consider the question how far a subject is bound to be satisfied of the justice of a cause

before fighting for it. He holds that if a man is clearly convinced of the injustice of a quarrel, he may not bear arms to support it; but adds that in the vast majority of instances a private soldier will not be in a position to arrive at such a conviction; and that, without it, his duty is to obey the orders of the Government and to serve in the war. As to the mode of carrying on war, he lays it down that nothing unjust must be resorted to—except, indeed, the slaying of combatants who are in themselves innocent, a misfortune which is inevitable. He teaches that it is not lawful to inflict on a belligerent any losses save those which are necessary to the end and objects of the war—*damna ordinaria necessaria ad finem belli* —thus condemning gratuitous barbarities, wanton insults, the slaughter or mutilation of non-combatants, brigandage, the destruction of public buildings of an unwarlike character, and, in short, all the enormities practised by Teutonic "frightfulness."

IV

War, then, if waged in accordance with the requirements of ethics, is perfectly legitimate. Nay, it is something more than that. I wrote just now that you can no more abolish war than you can abolish death. I add that, human nature being what it is, the abolishment, whether of death or war, would be no blessing

to our race. There is a profound truth in the words of Tennyson, "Happy men that have the power to die." Hegel has rightly called war "a high necessity in the world's order": a terrible necessity indeed: evil in itself, doubtless, but a necessary evil bringing home to the minds of men essential truths which they too often forget, ignore, or deny when enjoying the blessing of peace: truths which Utilitarianism is ever rubbing out of us. Such truths are these: that life is not the greatest good: that death is not the supreme evil: that there are things much more precious than life and much more terrible than death: that honour, for example, is more excellent than earthly existence, and dishonour more dreadful than the loss of it. "Why, slaves," says Juliette, in Beaumont and Fletcher's fine play, "Why, slaves, 'tis in our power to hang ye:" and the shipmaster replies, "Very likely; 'tis in our power then to be hanged and scorn ye."

That line is a noble expression of a tone and temper of mind absolutely incompatible with Utilitarian Materialism. The horrors of war—this surely is not the moment in which to minimise them: they have come home too closely to many of us. But war delivers from far worse horrors: it delivers from that lust of lucre, that cult of comfort which is the spiritual death of a people: it delivers from that spurious humanitarianism,—"an indiscriminate mashing together of right and wrong,"

Carlyle has called it—which atrophies the moral sense : it delivers from egoistic individualism fatal to national solidarity and incompatible with the supreme claims of the common country. Wordsworth is unquestionably right in telling us that " ennobling thoughts depart when men change swords for ledgers." " Ennobling thoughts." Yes : empty man of the militant instinct, and his nobility is gone : he is but a contemptible emasculate something for which a name must be found. And there seems to me overwhelming evidence that many among us have for years been approaching that condition—nay, that multitudes have attained it and have installed the most contemptible of vices, cowardice, in the place of our highest faculty, conscience. For years our politicians, intent on the party game—now, we may hope, well nigh played out—have altogether forgotten that the first duty of the rulers of a country is to provide sufficient military forces for its security : that the first duty of a citizen is to fight for it. For years peace—not peace with honour, but peace at any price—has seemed to them the *summum bonum*, while they have babbled of impotent Hague tribunals and fallacious arbitration. They have forgotten the old—most true proverb, " Si vis pacem, para bellum " : if you want peace, be ready for war. It seems to me that the call to arms which aroused Britain from its torpor came just in time. A quarter

of a century later we should have been largely demoralised—devirilised if I may coin a word—and if the virility of a people is gone, that people is finished. For the essential attribute of men is what the old Romans called "virtus," valour, manliness, in the highest sense. I came upon a statement the other day, by a well-known pacifist, that the Roman Empire was ruined by militarism. A more ignorant and foolish statement is inconceivable. The Roman Empire did not fall by militarism. It fell because its degenerate citizens had lost the militant quality—the *virtus* which enabled their forefathers to build up the mighty imperial fabric—while the barbarian hordes, who overthrew them, were richly endowed with it. "Useful in war"—*utilem bello*—is the account which Horace gives of one of the national heroes. Yes: heroism is useful, supremely useful in war, and war is sometimes supremely necessary to a nation, nay, to the world. Sir Oliver Lodge has quaintly and truly told us that the explosion of projectiles in a sufficient number may save civilisation.

There is just one observation which I will make before I quit this subject. The perfect soldier—so well described in Wordsworth's "Happy Warrior"—seems to me one of the very highest types of man. Our national patron, St. George, is a figure of him. But what is it that renders him so admirable? It is, I think, this, that the soldier, though the organ through

which the militant instinct supremely acts, is largely detached from the personal considerations which prompt its exercise in others. He obeys the call of duty without calculation. His not to reason why : his but to do and die. If reward of any kind, except a glorious death, comes to him, it is, so to speak, accidental : it is not the object which inspires him. Again, it is not his readiness to take the lives of others which wins the admiration of his fellow men : if it were so, we should admire equally, or far more, the Thug. Ruskin has well observed : " The soldier's trade, verily and essentially, is not slaying but being slain. That, without well knowing its own meaning, the world honours it for." This is unquestionably true. It is the old truth expressed in the familiar and beautiful line of Horace : " Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori." War is a great exhibition and a great factor of sacrifice,—the motive principle of the world. It is the safeguard of human solidarity. It is also the explanation of the greatest things in human history.

CHAPTER IV

THE ETHICAL FUNCTION OF MEMORY

I PROPOSE to say something about Memory, the most wonderful of all our faculties. The old Greeks, in their graceful way, called the Muses its daughters: and rightly, for it is the source and fount and vivifying principle of our intellectual life. But it is something even greater and more marvellous than that, by reason of its ethical function, as I hope to show in this present chapter. In what I am about to write I shall endeavour to avoid technical words as much as I can. I do not, indeed, go so far as Max Müller, who believed that "it would be of the greatest benefit to mental science if such terms as impression, sensation, perception, intuition, presentation, representation, conception, idea, thought, cognition, as well as sense, mind, memory, intellect, understanding, reason, soul, spirit, and all the rest, could be banished from our philosophical dictionaries, and not be readmitted till they had undergone a thorough purification."* This seems to me too trenchant. But I do believe that many of these vocables serve, very often, not to express precise thought but to hide the absence of it. And I am sure that this is eminently so in discussions about

* *Science of Thought*, p. 18.

memory. It is notable how in one of the most enlightening passages ever written on that subject there are no technical words at all—I mean the well-known pages in St. Augustine's *Confessions*. He tells us how in the plains and spacious palaces of the memory he finds the treasures of innumerable images brought to it by the senses, or called into being by the mind's action on them. Everything has entered by its proper gateway; light and all colours and bodily forms by the eyes; all kinds of sounds by the ears; all odours by the nose; all tastes by the mouth; all corporal feeling by the touch. There they are, all these images, separate and classified, in the great hall of the memory, with its secret and ineffable abysses, ready to appear when summoned.

I demand what I will, and my will is obeyed. Some things at once come forth: others need longer search and are brought up, it would seem, from more remote receptacles: others, again, rush out in troops, and when something is sought and asked for, present themselves saying, as it were, "Are we, perchance, what is wanted?" And so with the hand of my understanding I drive them away from before my remembrance, until what I wish for is disclosed, and from its hidden depths comes to me. Great is the power of the memory, Oh my God, a fearful thing, a profound and infinite multiplicity: and this thing is the mind: and this thing I am. What, then, am I? What nature am I? A various, a manifold life, utterly immeasurable. Behold in the plains and caves and caverns of my memory, innumerable and innumerably full of innumerable kinds of

things, either through images, as of all bodily forms, or through presence, as of the arts, or through I know not what notions and notations, as of the affections of the mind—which, even when the mind does not experience them, the memory retains, since whatever is in the memory is also in the mind —through all these I run, I fly: I penetrate, here and there, as deeply as I can, and there is no end: so great is the power of memory: so great the power of life—even in man born to die.*

These words of "the first modern man," as Harnack well calls St. Augustine, serve admirably as an introduction to my subject. Well does he say "tanta vis est memoriæ, tanta vitæ vis est in homine vivente mortaliter." Indeed, we must account memory the most essential characteristic of life. All our actions, even those which seem most singular or peculiar, are largely founded on it. Matter which cannot remember is dead.

II

And now let us contemplate some of the more important and more significant phenomena of memory: we will subsequently consider its philosophy. The word denotes a property common, in greater or less degree, to all beings endowed with sensation and thought, of preserving, reproducing, and recognising representations of past experiences.

* Lib. X. I have made a sort of mosaic from those wonderful chapters vii.-xvii.

Hence Plato well calls it "the conservative faculty" (σωτηρία αἰσθήσεως). It is strictly individual: "quot homines tot memoriæ." But in its unity* is vast complexity. In what we may call the general memory of a human being there are ever so many ramifications: particular memories, if I may thus speak. There is the memory of the eyes, the memory of the ears, and so of the other senses. And again, each of these particular memories may be decomposed. The memory of the eyes, for example, preserves not merely the colours of objects, but their brilliancy and their forms. To the pure visual memory, the memory of the retina, is joined that of the muscles of the eyes—the motive memory, which plays so important a part in all recollection. The ear retains sounds, their intensity and their *timbre*, but, in addition to that, we have the recollection of rhythm, of sonorous combinations, of sweet and delicate harmonies. Here is a certain complexity. But the complexity goes much

* M. Bergson, in an interesting and very subtle discussion at p. 165 of his work *Matière et Mémoire*, tells us that "there are two memories profoundly distinct"—not a very happy expression, perhaps, since, as he observes, in the next page, "these two memories do not constitute two separate things." In an earlier page (78) he speaks more cautiously of "deux mémoires théoriquement distinctes." Of these two memories his account is: "L'une, fixée dans l'organisme, n'est point autre chose que l'ensemble des mécanismes intelligemment montés qui assurent une réplique convenable aux diverses interpellations possibles. L'autre est la mémoir vraie, coextensive à la conscience." It must be understood that I do not take exception to M. Bergson's doctrine, but only to his phraseology.

further. The recollection of words is a very different thing from the recollection of objects or the recollection of musical notes. Clinical observations throw a curious light upon this fact. Cases are not infrequent when a patient has retained the recollection of things which he has seen, but cannot recall the names by which he used to describe them. Moreover, it sometimes happens that people who have lost the power of speech retain the power of song.

Again, consider the different forms and degrees of memory. In its greatest strength—"wax to receive and marble to retain"—it seems to be an almost invariable attribute of genius. Napoleon is said never to have forgotten a fact or a face. A great man of a very different order, Mozart, when composing, could remember the whole of an opera without putting pen to paper; then, when he had completed it, would he write it down in all its details. Taine, in his book *Sur l'Intelligence*, says: "To recollect, to imagine, to think, is to see internally, to call up the more or less enfeebled and transformed vision of things." No doubt in the vast majority of instances the vision *is* enfeebled. To remember ideas or sensations so vividly that they seem objects of actual perception is the prerogative of few. This luminous vision receives generally the name of imagination. Aristotle regarded it as a separate faculty. "Memory," he said, "pertains to that part of the soul to which

imagination pertains." Most modern psychologists reckon two forms of imagination, the reminiscent and the representative ; and when the representative faculty is most highly developed, as in art, they consider that we have memory in its most perfect form. The lowest form of it is found in idiots and lunatics ; but sometimes these unfortunate people make a striking display of recollection. For example, they will manifest a curious capacity for recalling musical airs, figures, dates, proper names. I may remark, in passing, upon the singular power of memory displayed by some animals. How touching is that passage in the *Odyssey* which relates that Ulysses, returning to Ithaca after his protracted wanderings, was recognised only by his old dog Argos ! The faithful beast, when he saw his master, pricked up his ears, wagged his tail and died.

One thing which is absolutely certain is that nothing which once enters into the memory ever leaves it. De Quincey is well warranted in saying : " There is no such thing as ultimate forgetting : traces once impressed upon the memory are indestructible."* A man's whole life, outward and inward, is written there in ineffaceable characters : nothing is omitted : not a thought of the mind, nor a feeling of the heart, nor an aspiration of the soul, pure or impure ; all is there, needing only the necessary stimulus to bring it out.

* *Confessions of an Opium Eater*, p. 253.

Who does not know how the odour of a flower will revive for us a past which had seemed to have utterly vanished away? So Landor, in inimitably graceful verse :

> Sweet scents
> Are the swift vehicles of still sweeter thoughts,
> And nurse and pillow the dull memory,
> That would let drop without them her best stores.
> They bring me tales of youth and tones of love.

This is a partial excitation of the memory, and, of course, it may be brought about in a hundred ways, as every man knows from his own experience. But I may here mention a curious instance of it which M. Ribot gives in his well-known work, *Les Maladies de la Mémoire*. A young lady fell down an iron staircase and was found insensible at the bottom of it. After her recovery she had no recollection of the cause of her illness or of the scene of the accident. Five years passed away, and then she chanced to go to the same place again, and immediately what had happened to her flashed before her mind. She remembered that she had become giddy and had tumbled down the staircase. Abercrombie, in his book on the *Intellectual Powers*, tells an even more striking story. A lady in the last stage of chronic disease was carried from London to a house in the country; her infant daughter was taken to see her there in her sick room and then was brought back to Town. The lady died a few days afterwards, and the daughter grew up to

mature age without any recollection of her mother. After a long time she happened to be brought into the same room without knowing that her mother had died there. She started on entering it, and when asked the cause of her agitation, replied: "I have a distinct recollection of having been in this room before, and that a lady, who lay in that corner, and seemed very ill, leaned over me and wept."

But besides these partial excitations of the memory there are general excitations. I observe that M. Ribot, in his book just mentioned, seems indisposed to admit them. Perhaps this is—I trust I may make the conjecture without offence—because they are extremely difficult to adjust with the materialistic theory to which he adheres,* and concerning which I shall have to speak hereafter. But the fact of them seems to be quite unquestionable: nay, I may even say that the evidence for them is overwhelming. De Quincey tells us of a near relative of his own who, having fallen into a river, and being on the very verge of death, "saw in a moment her whole life, clothed in all its forgotten incidents, arrayed before her

* It will be well to quote his own words: "Quand nous disons que l'excitation est générale, ce n'est qu'une induction vraisemblable. Comme la mémoire est soumise à la condition de la conscience, et que la conscience ne se produit que sous la forme d'une succession, tout ce que nous pouvons constater c'est que pendant une période, plus ou moins longue, une grande masse de souvenirs surgit dans toutes les directions." *Les Maladies de la Mémoire*, p. 140.

as in a mirror, not successively but simultaneously, and had a faculty developed, as suddenly, for comprehending the whole and every part." Admiral Bickford relates* a similar experience. He, too, was on the verge of drowning, upon one occasion; indeed, suffocation had begun; and then, he says:

> The whole period of my past experience seemed to be placed before me in a kind of panoramic review, and each act of it seemed to be accompanied by a consciousness of right and wrong or by some reflexions on its cause or its consequences; indeed, many trifling events which had long been forgotten, then crowded upon my imagination and with the character of recent familiarity. . . . The length of time that was occupied with this deluge of ideas, or rather the shortness of the time into which they were compressed, I cannot now state with precision: yet certainly two minutes could not have elapsed from the moment of suffocation to the time of my being hauled up.

As a parallel to this account I will place before my readers a bit of the magnificent hymn of St. Peter Damiani, "Gravi me terrore pulsas," which has been well called "the *Dies Irae* of everyday life." The poet imagines himself to be on the bed of death, and pictures "pavendum illud spectaculum"—that terrible spectacle when life's journey is almost accomplished and the summons to go hence has arrived. Fearfulness and trembling come upon

† In a letter to the Rev. Dr. Wollaston quoted by Syme in his *The Soul, A Study and an Argument*, p. 195.

him and a horrible sense overwhelms him, as the spectre of his past arises and confronts him with the dread question " Departing soul, What is thy life's record ? How will thy account lie ? "

Praesto sunt et cogitatus, verba, cursus, opera,
Et prae oculis nolentis glomerantur omnia :
Illuc tendat, huc se vertat, coram videt posita.

Torquet ipsa reum sua mordax conscientia,
Plorat acta corrigendi defluxisse tempora,
Plena luctu caret fructu sera poenitentia.

Falso tunc dulcedo carnis in amarum vertitur,
Quando brevem voluptatem perpes poena sequitur:
Jam quod magnum credebatur nil fuisse cernitur.*

Memory outlasts consciousness. A moribund person who fails to recognise those nearest and dearest to him around his bed will talk of incidents of his childhood. The dying

* The late Mr. Digby Wrangham's excellent translation of these stern verses is as follows :

" Then rise up old thoughts and sayings, habits formed, and actions done ;
And, as an unwelcome vision, crowd upon him every one :
Turn he hither, stretch he thither, from his sight they ne'er are gone.

Conscience, self, with gnawing twinges, racks within his guilty breast ;
He laments the fitting seasons for amendment that are past :
Full of grief, but wholly fruitless, proves his penitence at last.

Fleshly pleasure's feigned sweetness then to bitterness is turned,
When the endless torment follows by its short-lived transports earned,
What he once thought great, already to be nothing is discerned."

Falstaff "babbled of green fields."* More. We may say—we *must* indeed say—that memory is the only stable portion of us. Memory endures while everything is in constant flux. Erdmann puts it strikingly: "Leben ist nicht sein: ist werden: sein ist der Tod." Yes: life is not being, it is becoming: to be, is—death. When we consider it well, what is the present? There is nothing which has less actuality if we understand by it that indivisible limit which separates the past from the future. When we think of the present as going to be, it has, as yet, no existence; and when we think of it as existing it has already passed. But if, on the contrary, we consider the concrete present as really lived by consciousness, we may say that it consists, in great part, of the immediate past. In the fraction of a second that the shortest possible perception of light endures, trillions of vibrations have taken place, the first of which is separated from the last by an enormously divided interval. Our perception, however instantaneous it may be, consists of an incalculable multitude of remembered elements, and in truth all perception is already memory. Practically we perceive only the past, the pure present being the unseizable progress of the past eating away the future.†

* It is a conjectural emendation of Theobald's; but I cannot doubt that it is the right reading.

† I have before me, as I write, an admirable page (163) of M. Bergson's *Matière et Mémoire*, from which I have translated a few sentences. One which I do not translate, because it would

IS MEMORY INHERITED?

We saw just now that memory outlasts consciousness. How long, then, does it endure? Does this wonderful faculty, in some sort the real life of the individual, persist after the death of the body? The question may be divided into two. The first is, Whether memory is transmitted from one generation to another, whether there is such a thing as unconscious, hereditary memory? The other, Whether individual memory survives the dissolution of the corporal organs with which it has been linked? The second of those questions, which I suppose would be called speculative, we will glance at later on. The first, as we are now considering certain phenomena of memory, may fitly receive attention here.

Now we are sometimes told that we owe the distinctive qualities of our memory more to heredity than to anything else. It is a bold assertion which appears to me not yet within measurable distance of proof. But what is certain is this: that we find in man, and still more clearly in the lower animals, desire to gratify an instinct before experience of the pleasure that will ensue on its gratification, and, similarly, desire to avoid a danger before

lose so much in translation, is: "Vous définissez arbitrairement le présent *ce qui est*, alors que le présent est simplement *ce qui se fait*." I may here refer to the pages of this work immediately preceding those before me, for an excellent discussion of the question which we cannot help asking ourselves, "Où se conserve le souvenir!" We forget that the category *where*, like the category *whence*, applies only to material existence.

experience can have taught the fear of it. A duck hatched by the hen makes straight for the water. A little dog that has never seen a wolf will be thrown into convulsions of terror by the slight smell attaching to a piece of wolf skin. Why ? By instinct, the reply would generally be. But what do you mean by " instinct "? it may be further demanded. And to this demand the vast majority even of thoughtful persons would have no adequate answer. Well a school of thinkers, of whom the late Mr. Samuel Butler is the best known in this country, tells us that instinct is unconscious memory. The duck just hatched, he explains, makes for the water because it remembers what it did when it was one individuality with its parents, and when it was a duckling before. The wolf skin brings up the ideas with which it has been associated in the little dog's mind during his like previous existence, so that, on smelling it, he remembers all about wolves quite well. There is, he insists, a sense, an enduring sense in the germ, of its experiences in the person of its ancestors : he attributes memory—yes, and will also—to the embryo. And if the personal identity of successive generations be admitted—as in some sort it surely must be—the possibility of the second of the generations remembering what happened to it when it was one with the first, is obvious. A recent writer of great ability discussing this problem expresses himself as follows :

In ourselves, and, in a greater or less degree, in all animals, we find a sort of special tissues set apart for the reception and storage of impressions from the outer world, and for guiding the other organs in their appropriate responses—the Nervous System—and when this system is ill-developed, or out of gear, the remaining organs work badly for lack of proper skilled guidance and co-ordination. How can we then speak of memory in a germ-cell which has been screened from the experiences of the organism, which is too simple in structure to realise them, even if it were exposed to them? My own answer is that we cannot form any theory on the subject; but the only question is whether we have any right to infer this memory from the behaviour of living beings: and Butler, like Hering, Haeckel, and more modern authors, has shown that this inference is a very strong presumption.*

It is, we may say, borrowing a phrase from the theologians,† if not a demonstrated fact, at all events, *facto proximum*.

III

So much must suffice as to the phenomena of memory. Let us proceed to glance at its philosophy. Now the faculty of memory is usually treated under the head of psychology, and, until of late years, psychology has been held, as its name implies, to be a branch of learning dealing with the human mind or soul

* Hartog's *Principles of Life and Reproduction*, p. 259.

† They speak sometimes of an opinion not being *de fide* but *fidei proximum*.

(ψυχή) which was understood to be an indivisible, intelligent principle animating the body, and of which memory, understanding and will were regarded as faculties.* This is what psychology meant for Aristotle, for Aquinas, for Kant. It meant the study of thought: of the nature and activities of the thinking subject. But in these latter days a school has arisen—and it is adorned by many considerable names—which will not allow of the existence of psychology in the sense so long received. Early in the last century Maine de Biran uttered the warning: "O psychologie, garde-toi de la physique." But psychology has been quite unable to repulse the rude attack. It has been accounted by many writers, most competent in their own domain, a subsidiary department of biology,† and, as Dr. Martineau complains, with reason, these gentlemen "have caused much confusion by the employment of physiological terms to describe mental states." In particular, "British psychologists have been seeking to convert their science into

* So St. Augustine: "Hæc igitur tria, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vitæ sed una vita; nec tres mentes, sed una mens; consequenter utique nec tres substantiæ sunt, sed una substantia." *De Trinitate*, lib. x. c. 11.

† A curious and amusing instance of this treatment is supplied by the following announcement in *The Times* of the 13th of August, 1913: "For the first time in the history of the British Association, psychology will be represented as an independent subject at the forthcoming Birmingham meeting. It appears as a sub-section to Section I L. (Physiology)." "An independent subject," and yet "a sub-section to Physiology."!

a mere natural history of psychical phenomena."* They reduce what had been called the soul to an aggregation, a procession of conscious states, held together by no real bond. They ignore intellect as a higher rational activity, awakened indeed by sense, but transcending it: they tell us that it is transformed sensation, which seems to me an assertion that the effect is greater than the cause. And so their view of memory is frankly materialistic. I use that adjective, let me explain, not as a term of opprobrium, but of accurate description. It appears to me the only adjective available rightly to characterise the school which recognises nothing but sensible experience, and derives its data solely from that: for which mere movement is the only reality, and mechanical force the last word of everything. I reject the hypothesis resting on these foundations as unproved and unprovable: nay, as contradicted by physiological experience itself. So much in passing. To return to the point before us. The school of physiological psychologists holds that mind is nothing but a function of the brain, and that there is only a difference of intensity between perception and remembrance; they agree with M. Ribot that "memory is essentially a biological fact—by accident a physiological fact."† It is for them merely a matter

* *Psychology*, by Michael Maher, S.J., p. 19.
† *Les Maladies de la Mémoire*, p. 1.

of nerve fibres and nerve cells in the brain, and of cerebral registration, and they find in the revival of an old neural tremor the explanation of recollection. "Memory," says Dr. Maudsley, "is in fact the conscious phase of this physiological disposition, when it becomes active or discharges its functions on the recurrence of the particular mental experience."* It is a mere hypothesis, and not a specially credible one. Father Maher effectively points out that "it simply ignores the essence of the problem—*the act of recognition.*" And as this acute critic goes on to observe:

Apart from the insuperable difficulty due to the physiological law of metabolism—the fact of perpetual change going on in the material substance of the body—which remains untouched, this hypothesis fails to distinguish between the *reproduction* of states like former ones and the *identification* of this similarity. The problem to be solved is how some striking experience, such as the sight of Cologne Cathedral, the death of my father, a friend's house on fire, the first pony I rode, can be so retained during a period of fifty years that, when an old man, I feel absolute certainty of the perfect agreement in many details between the representation of the event now in my mind and the original perception. The circumstance that the passage of a neural tremor through a system of nerve-fibres may leave there an increased facility for a similar perturbation in the future, in no way indicates how this second excitation or its accompanying mental state is to *recognise* itself as a *representation* of the first. To account for the facts there

* *The Physiology of the Mind*, p. 513.

is required a permanent principle distinct from the changing organism, capable of retaining the old states in some form or other, and also in virtue of its own abiding identity, capable of *recognising* the resuscitated image as a representation of the former cognition. Given such a principle, the persistence of physiological " traces " or " vestiges " may facilitate its powers of reproduction, and may serve to account for differences in individual endowments; but without such an abiding mind the plastic properties of the nerve are useless to explain the fact.*

Such, then, appears to me to be a sufficient reason—it is only one out of many equally cogent which might be adduced—for rejecting the speculations of the psychophysiologists concerning memory. If the difference between perception and recollection is a difference not of degree but of *nature*—as appears to me certain—the materialistic hypothesis is untenable. It is not, indeed, a brand-new hypothesis. Lucretius taught long ago that the soul is born with the body, grows with the body, perishes with the body. Our psychophysiologists, however, have gone beyond the Latin poet, and insist that there is no soul at all.† But their hypothesis is a nude assertion, not adorned by poetic genius, but accompanied

* *Psychology*, p. 200.

† So Dr. Maudsley, one of the frankest, and I may be permitted to say one of the ablest, of them, in answer to the question, What is the mind, " the thinking substance ? " replies : " The physiologist answers that it is the brain, not any supposititious metaphysical entity, of the existence of which he has no evidence whatever, and of the need of which as a hypothesis he is not conscious." *The Physiology of the Mind*, p. 126.

by analyses of the elements and states of cognition which assuredly do not in the least establish it. Of course I am not ungrateful to these psychophysiologists for their patient and protracted researches into the working of the nervous system, the organic condition of the mental faculties, the part played by matter in the operations of the intellect. Especially curious and interesting is what they tell us about the mechanism of the memory. But to explain *how a faculty works* is not to explain the faculty. I know that every act of the human memory is a physical act; but that does not imply that it is not something more. I know that variations in the capacity of the memory, "in various organisms," are determined by corporal or chemical conditions, as Professor Loeb instructs us at length in his work on the *Comparative Physiology of the Brain*; but it does not follow that memory is nothing but corporeality or chemistry. I know, again, that cerebral affections, when there is organic disease of the brain substances, are accompanied by loss of memory; but that does not prove that memory is merely a function of the brain any more than the fact that a musician cannot produce certain sounds, if the notes whereby he expresses them are wanting, or are injured, proves that he is a function of his instrument. No:

> the soul is not the body, and the breath is not the flute;

Both together make the music; either marred, and all is mute.

The close connexion of the memory and the brain is certain; but close connexion is not identity. Unquestionably memory belongs to the organic: it is unknown in the inorganic world. Unquestionably it is traceable to a nerve-wave of the brain. "In one tenth of a second the nerve-wave is damped down. But the return to equilibrium is never complete or absolute. It fails of that by an infinitely small quantity. The neuron is no longer in the same state as before. It retains the memory of the wave, which will never be effaced: a nerve-wave of the brain is never completely extinguished."

Here [continues the savant, whose words I am quoting*] we are on the confines of two totally distinct worlds—the world of physics and the world of psychology. What is infinitesimally small in the physical world may possibly be infinitely great in the psychological world. The nerve-wave, in its form and period, and in the mode of its damping, is comparable with the various waves of the unbounded universe in which we live, move, and have our being. But this resemblance must not lead us away from the recognition of the abyss that separates the nerve-wave from all the other phenomena within our reach. The vibrations of the forces scattered about

* But without being able to refer to him by his name; my note, unfortunately, does not give it. Should what I am writing come before him, I trust he will kindly accept this explanation with my thanks. I believe my quotation is from an Address given to some Scientific Society.

us are—at least with the greatest possibility—blind phenomena which know not themselves, which are the slaves of irresistible fatality. The nerve-wave on the contrary knows and judges itself: it is self-knowing or self-conscious: it can distinguish itself from the world which surrounds and shakes it. This vibration enters into the domain of morals: and that fact establishes its essential difference from all other vibrations. The physiological theory of the damping of the nerve-wave is in agreement with the grand psychological fact of memory.

Yes, "the *psychological* fact of memory." It is that: not merely a physiological fact, disguised, perhaps, in an uncouth vocable as psychophysiological by teachers who would have us believe that man's conscious life is merely a subjective phase, an incidental aspect of necessary physical processes, whereof what is called the human mind is only a concomitant aspect. But the topic is too large. I must refer the reader desirous of following it further, to an invaluable chapter—the third—in M. Bergson's book *Matière et Mémoire*. I will here translate a few sentences giving the conclusions at which he arrives:

The doctrine which makes of memory an immediate function of the brain, a doctrine which raises insoluble difficulties, a doctrine the complication of which defies all imagination, and the results of which are incompatible with the data of internal observation, cannot even count upon the support of cerebral pathology. All the facts and all the analogies are in favour of a theory which would see in the brain only an intermediary between sensations

and movements, which would make of that totality of sensations and movements the extreme point of mental life, a point ceaselessly inserted in the tissue of events, and which, attributing thus to the body the unique function of directing the memory towards the real, and of binding it to the present, would consider that memory as even absolutely independent of matter. In this sense, the brain contributes to recall the useful recollection, but still more to put aside provisionally all the others. We do not see how memory could locate itself in matter. But we well understand—according to the profound observation of a contemporary philosopher—that " materiality induces in us oblivion."*

Sir William Hamilton regards physiological hypotheses on the subject of memory as " unphilosophical " : nay, he asserts that " all of them are too contemptible even for serious criticism."† For myself, I do not adopt this severe language. I would rather recall that profound dictum of Schopenhauer : " The materialists endeavour to show that all—even mental phenomena—are physical and rightly : only they do not see that, on the other hand, everything physical is metaphysical." The truth is, this controversy about memory—as my readers will doubtless have already recognised—is part of a larger issue. We all know, of course, that the only way in which the external world affects the nervous system is by means of motion. Light is motion, sound is motion, touch is motion, taste and smell are

* P. 194. " The contemporary philosopher " is M. Ravaisson.
† *Metaphysics*, vol. ii, p. 211.

motion. The nervous system brings to the brain the motion of the world's particles. The brain, in turn, reacts upon the world's particles through the nerves of motion. Hence the generalisation has been arrived at by a popular school that matter and motion explain all, and, as a corollary, the doctrine formulated by M. Ribot that "the ego at each instant is nothing but the sum of the actual states of consciousness, and of the vital actions in which consciousness has its root.* For myself, I hold the contrary doctrine that the very notion of the ego arises from the permanency of the thinking subject, as contrasted with the succession of states, and that recognition thereof is possible only through memory; and it seems to me that this view is vastly more in accordance with the facts of our inner life. Does it admit of proof? No doubt a number of very pretty syllogisms might be adduced in support of it. It is equally without doubt that they would not produce conviction in a mind dominated by a first principle which blocks belief: and such a first principle is this, that our only proper reason for belief is some physical, some perceptible evidence: that what is called positive and verifiable experience is the sole criterion of certainty. But this first principle is utterly unsustainable. The evidence, the criterion which it requires, are not the only tests of truth. We believe, and rightly—we

* *Les Maladies de la Mémoire*, p. 88.

cannot help ourselves—a multitude of things for which such evidence, such a criterion, are not available. Surely it is much more reasonable to hold that it is not the corporal brain, a mere mass of matter, that acts upon sensation, but a permanent, personal energy ; a dynamic, immaterial principle of individuation, revealed in consciousness, of which the brain is the agent.* The old Greeks saw this—what did they fail to see which is worth seeing ? Epicharmus put it two thousand years ago with much simplicity and force : " It is not the eye that sees but the mind : it is not the ear that hears but the mind : all things except mind are blind and deaf."† " Ego, ego animus," said St. Augustine : and he seems to me to speak more wisely than M. Ribot. Professor Knight in his book on Hume remarks : " A succession of states of mind has no meaning except in relation to the substate of self that underlies the succession giving it coherence, identity, and intellectuality." And Mill confesses that the proposition " Something which *ex hypothesi* is a series of feelings is aware of itself as a series " must be described as a paradox.

I know of no reasoning which has any real validity against our consciousness of personal

* M. Bergson quaintly compares the brain to a kind of central telephonic bureau ; its work to establish the communication, or to cause one to wait for it.

† Νόος ὁρῇ, καὶ νόος ἀκούει· τἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

identity, of an immaterial principle of individuation. Take, for example, Mr. Herbert Spencer's famous argument, so much relied on by his disciples. What—to quote Father Maher's pungent words—does that argument amount to but this: "that the fact of being conscious of a permanent self, demonstrates that it is merely transitory"? Nay, instead of saying that the "soul" is a function of the body, would it not be more reasonable to say that the soul *forms* the body? This has been well put by a thinker of a very different school from Father Maher. "The physicist," the late Mr. David Syme wrote, "has failed to explain the phenomena of organic life. What he puts forward as the causes of these phenomena are only the effects of an antecedent and unknown cause. He evades the conclusion to which the facts inevitably lead, that behind the brain, ganglia, germ cell, and protoplasm, there must be a force of some kind, a primordial cause of all organic movement. This primordial cause we may call the organising power. It is this which builds up the body cell by cell, organ by organ, system by system."* Of course, we may, if we please, call this "force—this primordial cause," "the organising power": but

* *The Soul: A Study and an Argument*, by David Syme, p. 205. Édouard von Hartmann, after an elaborate discussion, arrives at a similar conclusion, viz., "dass die unbewusste Seelenthätigkeit selbst sich ihren Körper zweckmässig bildet und erhältet," —*Philosophie des Unbewussten*, p. 173. This was also Schopenhauer's view.

I see no reason why we should not, with Aristotle, give the name mind or soul to it as the one vital principle informing and animating the corporal frame—the *form* of the body, in scholastic terminology. It may, however, be asked, what do we really know about this soul —its origin, its nature, its union with the corporal frame, its seat? These are questions which have been abundantly discussed, with vastly differing results. Thus, to mention only one point, St. Paul believed in a spiritual body: the early Christian Fathers could not conceive of an unmaterial mind: modern Catholic theologians hold, as Cardinal Newman expresses it, that "the soul is not only one, and without parts, but moreover, as if by a great contradiction in terms, is in every part of the body: it is nowhere but everywhere."* I must refer the reader who would pursue these high topics to the learned writers who have so laboriously dealt with them, hoping that he will arrive at more definite conclusions than have been possible for me. "They ask each other about the soul," said the great Arabian Prophet; "tell them God hath reserved the knowledge of it to Himself: He has left us but little light."†

One thing, however, is certain, and that is that the soul can operate and be operated on without the intermediation of the bodily

* *Parochial Sermons*, vol. iv, p. 325.
† *Qu'ran*, xvii, 87.

organs. This is abundantly evident—to go no further—from the facts of telepathy. Moreover, by memory, which we may justly regard as the essence of mind, we transcend time and space, and escape, for a while, from the bondage of the "muddy vesture of decay" which so closely hems us in. And if these things are so—as they assuredly are—may we not most reasonably believe that death has no dominion over the soul, the mind, the organising power? That we yield to it, in the words of the Roman poet, nothing more than nerves and skin? *

But an objection may here be made. Memory is the basis of all thought, feeling, and experience for us. But is it not that for the lower animals too? Well, we must not forget the caution of Max Müller that "we may infer all we like as to what passes in the minds of animals, and always do infer exactly what we like." We cannot argue from our inner life to theirs. Our *knowledge* is very small of the mental states even of our dogs and horses, with their wistful eyes and their winning ways. The most prevailing of the world's religions does, indeed, regard all sentient existence, "groaning and travailing in pain together with us," as morally responsible like us, as under the same supreme law of right and retribution. Far be it from me to speak of the

* clipeo Trojana refixo
Tempora testatus nihil ultra
Nervos atque cutem morti concesserat atrae.

teaching of the Buddha otherwise than with the deepest reverence. The doctrine of *karma* exhibiting all existence, divine, human, animal, as linked together by a chain of moral causation, is an ethical conception unsurpassed in grandeur. But if we weigh the matter well, have we sufficient grounds for supposing that the creatures on the earth beneath us in the scale of being are endowed, as we are, with the power of willing good as good, with capability of right and wrong, of merit and demerit? There can be no doubt that we find in the lower animals organic memory and imagination. But can we attribute to them that μνήμη συνθετική, that intellectual faculty of reflexion, whereof man makes such vast use? Is there not a chasm between our simplest ratiocination and the highest forms of their intelligence? Is not the great, the impassable barrier which divides us from them, reason with language as its outcome?*

IV

But to return from these, "our poor relations," to ourselves. Plato, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter called memory "the conservative faculty." May it not be that in a deeper sense than Plato meant? To what end

* A masterly discussion of this question will be found in chapter iv. of Max Müller's *Science of Thought*. I may be permitted to refer, also, to what I have written in chapter ii. of my *First Principles in Politics*.

the storing up of life's history in its secret recesses? Surely there is some end. Reason itself requires that there should be. I think the end is indicated in that profound utterance of Eastern wisdom: *A deed does not perish.* The command of conscience reveals to us a law within, imposing upon us, with its categorical imperative, "Thou oughtest," an absolute obligation to do, or to forbear.* This law implies a penal sanction which will vindicate it: that is of the essence of all law. But assuredly, in our world, the moral law is *not*

* It may be necessary here—it ought not to be, for the point has been abundantly disposed of, over and over again—to answer an objection drawn from the fact that the moral judgments found among men are diverse and irreconcilable; a fact from which Montaigne—and multitudes have gladly followed him—proceeded to the conclusion: "les lois de la conscience que nous disons naître de la nature, naissent de la coutume": "les règles de la justice ne sont qu'une mer flottante d'opinions." But the conclusion does not follow. Montaigne confounds the idea of duty in general with men's notions of their particular duties. No metaphysician holds the moral law to be an immediate datum of consciousness: a ready-made law, so to speak, which reflexion discovers in us. The consciousness of moral obligation is bound up with the consciousness of self. The sense of duty is universal: it is a form of the mind: but it may be said to exist as a blank form, which may be filled up in a variety of ways. It is the revelation of an idea, bound to develop according to its proper laws, like the idea, say, of geometry. The ethical ignorance of barbarous tribes is no more an argument against the moral law than their ignorance of the complex and recondite properties of lines and figures is an argument against geometrical law. Kant admirably observes, in the *Metaphysic of Morals*, "We know our own freedom, from which all Moral Laws, and consequently all Rights, as well as all Duties, arise, only through the Moral Imperative which is an immediate Injunction of Duty, whereas the conception of Right, as a ground of putting others under obligation, has afterwards to be developed out of it."

vindicated: it is denied, outraged, trampled under foot, apparently with impunity. Here is, as Kant irrefragably insisted, the supreme argument for a Hereafter, in which it *shall* be vindicated. Without that it would be a mere counsel, powerless to dominate unruly wills and affections. Yes: lose belief in this ultimate triumph of right, and fraud and force invade the place, as Hobbes puts it, of "the cardinal virtues"; the wild beast* in man asserts predominance: the only motive operative, for the vast majority, to resist temptations, to govern passions, to do justice and love mercy, disappears: for is it not true—as true now as when Aristotle wrote the words—"It is not the nature of the bulk of mankind to obey from a sense of shame, but from fear, nor do they abstain from evil because it is wrong, but because of punishment"?† But no: *A deed does not perish.* What a man sows here, that shall he also reap hereafter. This great law of remunerative and retributive justice is one of the most deeply seated, as well as one of the most rational beliefs of the human race. Rightly has it found place in the teaching of all the great religions of the world, however we may feel towards the eschatological representations in which they have presented it.

* "The lost gleam of an after life but leaves him
A beast of prey in the dark."—Tennyson, *The Promise of May*.

† *Nicomachean Ethics*, chap. x.

And in memory is the imperishable record of how our account lies. It is " the book of a man's deeds,"* spoken of in the *Qu'ran,* which, " on that great and exceeding bitter day, when the heavens shall be rent asunder, and the stars shall be dispersed, and the seas shall be mingled, and the sepulchres overthrown, shall be put into the hands of each—himself called to witness that the Lord will not deal unjustly with anyone." In this tremendous picture is revealed to us, *per speculum et in ænigmate,* the Ethical Function of Memory.

* There is a striking passage, expressing a similar conception, in St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei,* L. x. c. 14.

CHAPTER V

THE MYSTERY OF SLEEP

IT may perhaps be objected that the discussion on sleep, which I am about to submit to my readers, is out of place among *Chapters in Ethics*. Virtue and vice, it may be said, right and wrong, justice and injustice are of the will: but in sleep, where the will is passive,* there can be no merit or demerit: the state of slumber is a segment of man's life in which the moral law does not rule. This is true. Still I venture to think that the present chapter may fitly be given here as a sort of supplement to the last. And I would shelter myself under the example of the Master of those who know. Aristotle's treatise *De Memoria* is succeeded by the *De Somno* and the *De Somniis*. Nor is that arrangement accidental. The topics are cognate.

* Mr. Sully tells us: "It is an erroneous supposition that when we are dreaming there is a complete suspension of the voluntary powers and consequently an absence of all direction of the intellectual processes. Something resembling an exercise of voluntary attention sometimes happens in sleep," *Illusions*, p. 172. "Something resembling an exercise of the voluntary powers": possibly, but it is an illusive resemblance. The Moral Theologians hold that what happens in sleep is never a sin, though it may be the consequence of a sin preceding. Aquinas puts it: "In the sleeping state the reason has not a free judgment, and therefore when the judgment of reason is taken away, the character of sin is taken away." *Summa Theologica* 2.2. a. 5.

THE MYSTERY OF SLEEP

I am afraid that the word mystery may give umbrage to some. And yet, surely, we are encompassed by mysteries, according to the old saying "Totum desinit in mysterium." If, guided by the masters of astronomical science, we survey the heavens, we find that a vast part of space, so far as we have visible knowledge of it, is occupied by two majestic streams of stars —hundreds of millions of them—travelling in opposite directions; stars alike in design, in chemical constitution, and in process of development. So much we *know*. But what answer is there if we ask, Whence has come the unthinkable amount of matter out of which those luminaries have been evolved? Are they the sole ponderable occupants of space? May not the system to which they belong be one of millions of like systems pervading the illimitable universe? These are mysteries of which there is no solution for us. "We know not and no search will make us know." Or if we turn our eyes to the earth beneath our feet, how insoluble is the mystery of the life contained in a single ant-hill. Life! What is it? What do we really know about it? We discern matter and its motions, but the essential reality underlying them is imperceptible: it is atomic, molecular, ethereal, and beyond the grasp of human sense. Life, in its essence, is unknown and unknowable. Again: we talk—we must talk—of will, of sensibility, and the rest. But does any man know what will or sensibility

is—I mean in the last resort? Once more. We live by contrasts: light and darkness; health and disease; pain and pleasure; hope and disappointment; society and solitude. They are the conditions of our existence. Why? Further: look at individual life as it actually is. Consider man with "his large discourse looking before and after": man than whom, as the Attic poet said, nothing is more wonderful, with his vast triumphs over the external world: much vaster now than when Sophocles sang. And yet he is made to die; and his short term here, "between a sleep and a sleep"—what is it, if we strip off illusions and see things as things are?

When I consider life, 'tis all a cheat,
Yet, fooled with hope, men favour the deceit:
Trust on, and think to-morrow will repay:
To-morrow's falser than the former day,
Lies worse, and while it says we shall be blest
With some new joy, cuts off what we possest.
Strange cozenage! None would live past years again,
Yet all hope pleasure in what yet remain;
And from the dregs of life think to receive
What the first sprightly running could not give.

So Dryden: and Pope takes up his parable to the like effect.

Behold the child, by Nature's kindly law
Pleased with a rattle, tickled with a straw:
Some livelier plaything gives his youth delight,
A little louder, but as empty quite.

Scarfs, garters, gold amuse his riper stage,
And beads and prayer-books are the toys of age :
Pleased with this bauble still, as that before,
Till tired he sleeps, and life's poor play is o'er.

But Pope and Dryden were poets—and what is more, Papists ; warped, perhaps, by sentiment and superstition. Well, one of the chief preachers of what Lord Morley has called " the New Gospel " given to France in the eighteenth century—one of the most iconoclastic leaders of what that author denominates " the party of illumination "—abounds in the same sense.

To come into the world [says Diderot] in imbecility, in the midst of anguish and cries ; to be the toy of ignorance, of error, of necessity, of malice, of all passions ; to return, step by step, to that imbecility whence one sprang ; from the moment when we lisp our first words to the moment when we mumble the words of our dotage, to live among rascals and charlatans of every kind ; to lie expiring between a man who feels your pulse and another man who frets and wearies your head ; not to know whence one comes or why one has come, nor whither one is going ; that is what we call the greatest gift of our parents and of Nature—that is human life.

Such is our existence upon earth, if we consider it simply by itself, if we take it as its own end. Such is " the burden and the mystery of all this unintelligible world." Of course it is here that religion comes in. The various creeds of mankind offer each its own solution

of this great enigma—with what success it would be foreign from my present purpose to inquire.

II

For what I propose to do is merely to consider some problems offered by one of life's mysteries with which we are all most familiar, but about which few people, I imagine, think much. It is a startling fact that a considerable part, a fourth, or it may be a third, of the brief time allotted us here is necessarily spent in a state little distinguishable from death. And according to many thinkers—Socrates among them—that is the happiest portion of human existence. The well-known verses of Thomas Warton do but express a well-nigh universal sentiment :

Somne veni et quanquam certissima mortis imago es,
Consortem cupio te tamen esse mei.
Huc ades haud abiture cito ; nam sic sine vita
Vivere quam suave est, sic sine morte mori.*

* I essay an English translation of these lines, which has, at all events, the merit of literalness :

" Come, sleep, death's surest image though thou be,
And, as my consort, share my couch with me ;
Come quick : stay long : for sweet it is to lie
Thus living, without life : and thus, not dead, to die."

I observe that Warton has made a false quantity in his third line : cito will not scan. Half of that line, and the whole of the fourth, he seems to have " conveyed " from Heinrich Meibon, an Austrian Court poet of the seventeenth century, who wrote as follows :

" Alma quies optata veni, nam sic sine vita
Vivere quam suave est, sic sine morte mori."

But if, looking at the matter from the physical or physiological point of view, we ask, Why do we sleep? What is the cause of slumber? we are face to face with a problem of which no solution has been found. Here speculation—it is a common experience—has taken the place of knowledge.* Once it was confidently affirmed that the thyroid gland was the organ of sleep. But it has been proved that people deprived of this gland sleep as well as the rest of the world, or, indeed, upon the whole, rather better. Then a Dr. Osborne promulgated a theory that the organ of sleep is the arachnoid plexus, which works during our slumbers, filling the ventricles of the brain, and thus interrupting all communication between that organ and the body generally. But, unfortunately for Dr. Osborne and his conjecture, it was demonstrated that sleep is always accompanied by cerebral anemia. Then the world was presented with the vasomotor theory, or rather theories, for they are manifold, which repose on the fact of the intimate association between this cerebral anemia and sleep; none of them, however, seem to have reared upon that foundation anything worth noting.

* I have before me, as I write, Dr. Marie de Manacéïne's book, *Sleep, its Physiology, Pathology, Hygiene, and Psychology*, and also M. Henri Piéron's recently published work, *Le Problème Physiologique du Sommeil*, of which Part IV. is devoted to Theories of Sleep. M. Henri Piéron is Director of the Sorbonne Laboratory of Physiological Psychology, and a vivisectionist of much renown.

CHEMICAL THEORIES

There are chemical theories of sleep, but experiments made to support them have yielded only contradictory results. Among them may be mentioned Sommer's endeavour to prove that sleep is caused by impoverishment of oxygen in the brain; Pflüger laboured in the same direction: but both have laboured in vain. Professor Leo Errara has attempted to explain sleep by the accumulation of leucomaines or poisonous alkaloids in the tissues, but without success. In recent years the chief theories of sleep have been formulated by nerve histologists, and although one of them, as Dr. Marie de Manacéïne states, "has the advantage of being supported by actually observed facts," the outcome of their toil has been to establish nothing. I do not think I need dwell on them here, but must refer the reader curious in such matters to that lady's pages. She quotes Wundt, I observe, as saying that "the chief theories of sleep possess the common defect that they neglect its fundamental and direct cause"; and she also very sensibly observes, with special reference to the chemical theories which explain it by the accumulation in the organism of the products of fatigue, that "mere boredom or monotony, in the absence of all fatigue, is sufficient to cause sleep." I confess that has been my experience in reading the hypotheses contained in the ponderous pages of the physiologists under review and others of their tribe—hypotheses in aid of

which myriads of ferocious vivisections have been performed. "Sleepless themselves to give their readers sleep," we may say of these scientists, as Pope said of certain versifiers. Their diligence is indubitable, but they leave the problems, What sleep is, and Why we sleep, where they found them.*

Our real knowledge of the physiology of sleep may, indeed, be stated in a dozen lines. We know—to quote the words of Buffon—that "sleep is the first state of the living animal and the foundation of life"; the embryonic babe sleeps almost continuously in its mother's womb. To men born into the world sleep is a daily necessity; we cannot do without its unconsciousness—"the death of each day's life." Then as our "strange, eventful history" draws to a close, comes the stage of "second childishness and mere oblivion," conducting us to the "long, dreamless, unawakening sleep" which awaits us when we lie "covered over in the hollow earth."† That is the one great fact about sleep apprehended by us. For the rest we know that in our slumber the pulse falls by about one fifth; that the nervous system is depressed; that the central

* M. Piéron confesses at the close of his vast book, "Nos connaissances de la physiologie comparée de sommeil sont presque nulles," p. 448.

† I have in my mind some exquisite lines in Landor's beautiful translation of a beautiful idyll of Moschus:

"But we, the great, the valiant, and the wise,
Once covered over in the hollow earth,
Sleep a long, dreamless, unawakening sleep."

activity is lower. What the physical condition of the brain then is we cannot say, beyond that it is anemic. We know that sleep is a means of repairing corporal as well as cerebral fatigue; a remedy for waste in tissues, nerves, and cells caused by oxidation; but how or why it is this we know not. We know that it is more indispensable to life than even food;* that if it is not quite what Menander called it, "the natural cure of all diseases," it is certainly the great restorer in many: "If he sleep he shall do well." But whence this specific recuperative energy? To tell us what anything *does* is not to tell us what it *is*. There is a profound saying of George Eliot: "To me all explanations of the processes by which things come to be, produce a feeble impression compared with the mystery that lies under the processes."†

III

So much concerning the physical problems of sleep. I go on to regard it from another point of view. Most who have written about it consider it in its merely negative aspect as involving

* Dr. Marie de Manacéïne tells us that, in order to determine the problem whether sleep is more necessary to the organism than food, she tortured to death a certain number of puppies, some by means of insomnia and others by means of starvation, and that the subjects of the first-mentioned torture died soonest (*op. cit.* p. 65). In M. Piéron's book there is an account of the application of both tortures, simultaneously, to an adult dog, by a vivisectionist named Tarozzi (p. 261).

† *Life*, vol. ii, p. 148.

the absence of waking faculties, the diminution of external perception, the default of controlling intelligence. But it has also a positive aspect. It is just as much an integral factor in our earthly existence as is our waking state. It is an alternating phase of our personality. The function of sleep is to "steep our senses in forgetfulness." But there is something within us which is not so steeped: "I sleep but my heart waketh." There is something active within us and restricted by collision with external fact, although very likely following, more or less, the lines of our past experiences; something which does not, in sleep as in waking, draw its knowledge from without. This something I call mind, soul, spirit—the Hebrews said "heart," but that word has fallen into disuse as a name for it. For reasons which I gave in the last chapter, I am satisfied that this mind, soul, spirit, is an independent entity of which the organs of the body are the instruments. The proposition laid down by Ribot, that "the *ego* at each instant is nothing but the sum of the actual states of consciousness and of the vital actions in which consciousness has its roots," appears to me not only a nude but an extravagant assertion. The doctrine of Littré that "the soul, considered physiologically, is the totality of functions of encephalic sensibility" induces in me the reflection, "How poor a philosopher a good lexicographer may be!" It is a relief to turn

from such tyrannous *ipse dixits* of speculative physics to the strong commonsense of an old Puritan divine. "The body," says Baxter, in his by no means shallow treatise, *Of the Immortality of the Soul*, "no sooner sinks down in weariness and slumber than this thing within enters fresh upon other scenes of action, and that without the subservience of its organs which are then disabled from their functions. From which it appears it can be otherwise applied to than through the senses."

Yes, that certainly appears. The mystery of sleep, insoluble in some of its aspects, indicates, through the exhibition of the mind's independence of the bodily organs, the solution of another mystery—the relation of the soul to the corporal frame animated by it. The mind is absolutely detached in sleep from external phenomena. It exists in a sphere of its own. Herrick tells us in quaint verse:

> Here we are all by day: by night we're hurled
> By dreams each one into a separate world:

a world where we are far from help, far from sympathy: where the heart knoweth its own bitterness and a stranger doth not intermeddle with its joy: a world where will is impotent and the senses are quiescent: a world where, as Coleridge puts it, "Images and thoughts possess a power in and of themselves, independent of that act of the judgment or understanding by which we affirm or deny the

existence of a reality correspondent with them. Such is the ordinary state of the mind in dreams."*

And what are dreams? "We are such stuff as dreams are made of," Shakespeare writes. Plato noted that poets "utter great and wise things that they do not themselves understand"; and it may well be that this supreme genius did not fully realise the sense of his pregnant words. What are *we* made of? Not of the beggarly elements of matter. It is not in brain, ganglia, protoplasm, that we must seek the real man; no, but in the totality of his thoughts, words, deeds, treasured up by memory, whereof his spiritual and ethical character is moulded: in his *karma*, to use the nomenclature, now so familiar to us, of the great Indian teacher. What are we made of? Largely of memory. Memory is of the essence of mind. That is the stuff of which we are made. And it is the stuff of which our dreams are made.

What then is the definition of a dream? It is always well to give a definition if we can. And I suppose that as good a definition as any of a dream is "the intellectual activity of a sleeping person." One great difference between waking and sleeping is that the sleeper is not brought by the nervous system into those relations with the outer world which give rise to sensation. The activity of his

* Quoted by Havelock Ellis, *The World of Dreams*, p. 274.

imagination is unrestricted by contact with external fact. And thus isolated, it is to the vast treasury of his memory that he resorts, plundering amid its contents almost at random. He has access to an innumerable multitude of images latent in the state of waking: to—as Sir William Hamilton expresses it—"a complete storehouse of all ideals which have been impressed, however slightly or superficially, on the mind"—ideas which in sleep "flash into luminous consciousness" and people the dream world. Sir William calls "this phenomenon of latency one of the most marvellous in the whole compass of philosophy."* The terms subliminal and superliminal consciousness have recently come into fashion, introduced by the late Mr. Myers and other exponents of "Psychical Research." They serve a useful purpose, though perhaps we should be on our guard against the notion that the various feelings, faculties, functions of the soul may be arranged in strictly secerned compartments.

In writing on this subject at the present day one cannot omit all reference to Professor Freud. He distinguishes three forms of the mind's operations: the conscious, which is the normal state; the preconscious, which is the antechamber of consciousness, a storehouse of accumulated memories ready to be summoned forth by the ordinary process of

* *Lectures on Metaphysics.* Lecture xviii.

the association of ideas ; and the unconscious, the great receptacle of the latent images spoken of by Hamilton : " recollections and longings unhampered by convention, morals, social tradition, or education, which could not be recalled, by ordinary means, in waking hours"; " an infantile state of mind " he terms it. And if we ask, How is the unconscious prevented from attaining to the preconscious, and thence to the conscious ? he replies, By a mysterious agency, quaintly termed by him " the censorship," which, in the consciousness of a waking person, represses unconscious impulses banned by convention and morals, but is evaded in dreams because during sleep it is partially or completely relaxed. This is the essence of the theory of dreams which Freud has elaborately worked out, and I by no means question that there is a great deal of truth in it. But his work seems to me vitiated by that doctrinairism which is the common curse of Teutonic *savants*. He will have it that a dream is a wish, and usually, if not always, a wish of an erotic order.* Even a flying dream in a child's sleep, a common experience, signifies, he tells us, nothing more " than the desire to be capable of sexual activities." He tries to fit all his facts—a vast number, and some of indubitable value—into his one theory. It seems to me that this Procrustean process signally

* He unfolds his views on the subject at length in Section xii. of his work, *Ueber den Traum*.

fails.* And here I may properly find place for some very sound and sane observations of M. Bergson :

The dream state is the substratum of our normal state. Nothing is added in waking life : on the contrary, waking life is obtained by the limitation concentration, and tension of that diffuse psychological life which is the life of dreaming. The perception and the memory which we find in dreaming are, in a sense, more natural than those of waking life : consciousness is then amused in perceiving for the sake of perceiving, and in remembering for the sake of remembering, without care for life ; that is to say, for the accomplishment of actions. To be awake is to eliminate, to choose, to concentrate the totality of the diffused life of dreaming to a point, to a practical problem. To be awake, is to will. Cease to will, detach yourself from life, become disinterested : in so doing you will pass from the waking *ego* to the dreaming *ego*, which is less *tense* but more extended than the others.†

Professor Freud—to return to him again for a moment—insists that we dream only of things that are worth while, and further that all our dreams are purposive and significant. Here again I am quite unable to follow him.

* There are some valuable observations in Freud on the parallel between the dreamer and the artist. Both draw inspiration from their subconsciousness, but the artist makes a conscious use of what he so acquires. Of course, there is nothing new in this view. Poets, painters, musicians, have often expressed it. " Great art," says Ruskin in *Modern Painters*, " may properly be defined as the art of dreaming."

† *Revue Philosophique*, Dec., 1908, p. 574. I avail myself of Mr. Havelock Ellis's translation in *The World of Dreams*, p. 280.

It appears to me that our dreams usually consist of disconnected, incoherent fancies, by no means lending themselves to his symbolism or to any other. But that there *are* dreams which are purposive and significant I fully believe, and I believe it because I start from a first principle quite different from Professor Freud's. His point of view is merely physical. Mine is chiefly metaphysical. I think there is abundant—nay, overwhelming—evidence to prove that in sleep the soul is susceptible of relations independent of time and unfettered by spatial bonds, and so may discern events hidden from the bodily senses, both in the present and in the future: that it is capable of perceiving distant scenes, of communicating with persons who are afar off,* and even with disembodied spirits. Fifty years ago to make such a confession would have been to invite for oneself summary condemnation as a lunatic or a fanatic. Now it is beginning to be understood that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in the materialistic philosophy which so long dominated the general mind; and it is significant that one of the earliest pioneers of this intellectual revolution was the acute and bitter thinker chiefly known as the founder

* "Telepathic communications," they are commonly called; but telepathy as defined by Mr. Myers possesses a wider signification. It means "the communication of impressions of any kind from one mind to another independently of the recognised channels of sense."

of modern reasoned Pessimism. Schopenhauer knew far too much about the mysterious affinities and capacities of human nature to accept the dull negations of the medico-atheistic school which had passed into shibboleths. And he was quite alive to the reality of the problems of the dream state. He held it possible for the mind to penetrate to noumenal realities beyond the forms of space, time, and causality by which it is ordinarily conditioned in the phenomenal world. And one avenue whereby this may be accomplished exists, he thought, is magnetic sleep—a sleep far deeper than ordinary slumber—in which we cross the borderland between the *natura naturata* and the *natura naturans*; or, if I may so put it, in language which I know is open to misconception, between the natural and the supernatural. He quite admitted that presentiments, precognitions, apparitions, which come to us in dreams may be true. Edouard von Hartmann, who, although inferior in speculative ability to Schopenhauer, has high claims as a candid and comprehensive investigator, thought the same. He deemed that denial of the well-authenticated narratives of such phenomena could proceed only from ignorance—voluntary ignorance—of them.*

* "Ausserdem aber liegt die Möglichkeit des absoluten Leugnens aller solcher Erscheinungen für gewissenhafte Beurtheiler nur in dem Nichtkennen der Berichte, welches wieder aus dem Nichtkennenlernenwollen stammt," *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, pp. 75-76.

IV

The late Mr. Andrew Lang's not very noteworthy work, *The Book of Dreams*, contains, at all events, a noteworthy sentence: "If there be truth in even one case of telepathy, it will follow that the human soul is endowed with attributes not yet recognised by science." Following the corrupt usage of the age, Mr. Lang here employs the word "science" as a synonym for physics—as though there were no sciences but the physical, which indeed seems to be the conviction, or perhaps I should rather say impression, of people in general—and even of many of the learned.* There is a widely spread superstition that the methods of physical science are the only way of arriving at truth, that outside its boundaries we can know nothing. There is a tendency, and more than a tendency, to restrict our ideas to generalisations of phenomena, to erect experimental observation into the one criterion of certitude, to merge psychology in physiology. As a matter of fact, the mere physicist cannot get beyond ascertained sequences and co-ordinations of phenomena. But a sequence or a co-ordination is not a cause. It is the result of a cause. Cause implies necessity, that is law; and law is of the will and the intellect, which are not the proper objects of physics. Physical science by

* Thus our two great Universities seem to have sanctioned it by the creation of the absurd degree of Doctor of Science. What a tribute to contemporary materialism!

itself can do no more than tell us what *is*. For the necessity expressed by the word *must* it is obliged to go to an order of verities transcending the physical: to what Aristotle called τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, to metaphysics; that is to supersensuous realities lying beyond the visible and tangible universe. Every truth of physical science rests upon some metaphysical principle, which it is obliged to take for granted for the simple reason that the soul is not within its domain. Mr. Lang speaks of the effect which might be wrought "if there be truth in even one case of telepathy." I believe that there is truth in hundreds of such cases collected by the Psychical Research Society, not to go further afield, and established by unimpeachable evidence. I shall here give two of them—which is one more than Mr. Lang required. The first rests upon the testimony of a distinguished public servant of the Crown, the late Sir John Drummond Hay, who was for many years Her Majesty's Minister in Morocco and resided at Tangier.

September 16, 1889.

In the year 1879 my son Robert Drummond Hay resided at Mogador with his family, where he was at that time Consul. It was in the month of February. I had lately received good accounts of my son and his family; I was also in perfect health. About 1 a.m. (I forget the exact date in February), whilst sleeping soundly (at Tangier) I was woke by hearing distinctly the voice of my daughter-in-law, who

was with her husband at Mogador, saying in a clear but distressed tone of voice: "Oh, I wish papa only knew that Robert is ill." There was a night lamp in the room. I sat up and listened, looking around the room, but there was no one except my wife, sleeping soundly in bed. I listened for some seconds, expecting to hear footsteps outside, but complete stillness prevailed, so I lay down again, thanking God that the voice which woke me was a hallucination. I had hardly closed my eyes when I heard the same voice and words, upon which I woke Lady Drummond Hay, and told her what had occurred, and got up and went into my study, adjoining the bedroom, and noted it in my diary. Next morning I related what had happened to my daughter, saying that, though I did not believe in dreams, I felt anxious for tidings from Mogador. That port, as you will see in the map, is about 300 miles south of Tangier. A few days after this incident a letter arrived from my daughter-in-law, Mrs. R. Drummond Hay, telling us that my son was seriously ill with typhoid fever, and mentioning the night during which he had been delirious. Much struck by the coincidence that it was the same night I had heard her voice, I wrote to tell her what had happened. She replied, the following post, that in her distress at seeing her husband so dangerously ill, and from being alone in a distant land, she had made use of the precise words which had startled me from sleep, and had repeated them. As it may be of interest for you to receive a corroboration of what I have related from the persons I have mentioned, who happen to be with me at this date, they also sign to affirm the accuracy of all I have related.

When I resigned, in 1886, I destroyed, unfortunately, a number of my diaries, and amongst them that of 1879, or I should have been able to state the

day, and might have sent you the leaf on which I noted the incident.

Signed { J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.
ANNETTE DRUMMOND HAY.
EUPHEMIA DRUMMOND HAY.
ALICE DRUMMOND HAY.*

The next case which I shall cite is of a kind that is sometimes called "a flash of vision." Mr. Myers well observes that it is specially interesting "from the character of the narrator [Canon Warburton] and the definiteness of the fact attested."

The Close, Winchester,
July 16, 1883.

Somewhere about the year 1848 I went up from Oxford to stay a day or two with my brother, Acton Warburton, then a barrister, living at 10, Fish Street, Lincoln's Inn. When I got to his chambers I found a note on the table apologising for his absence, and saying that he had gone to a dance somewhere in the West End, and intended to be home soon after one o'clock. Instead of going to bed, I dozed in an armchair, but started up wide awake exactly at one, ejaculating "By Jove! he's down!" and seeing him coming out of a drawing-room into a brightly illuminated landing, catching his foot in the edge of the top stair, and falling headlong, just saving himself by his elbows and hands. (The house was one which I had never seen, nor did I know where it was.) Thinking very little of the matter, I fell a-doze again for half-an-hour, and was awakened by my brother suddenly coming in and saying, "Oh, there you are! I have just had as narrow an escape

* *Human Personality*, by Frederick W. H. Myers, vol. i, p. 396.

of breaking my neck as I ever had in my life. Coming out of the ballroom, I caught my foot and tumbled full length down the stairs."

That is all. It may have been "only a dream," but I always thought it must have been something more.

W. WARBURTON.*

I proceed to speak of two cases, in one of which a Pope, and in the other a *savant*, received in sleep knowledge sought in vain during their waking hours. For the first of these I must ask the reader to accompany me to the quarter of Rome known as Trastevere, where an ancient church, with a fine campanile of brickwork in stories of arcade windows, is a conspicuous object in the narrow gloomy streets. It had its origin as far back as the year 230 at least, and from the fifth century it is mentioned as one of the principal Titulars† of the city. Its exterior has changed little in the course of long centuries. But its interior suffered much from the hand of the new paganism at the beginning of the sixteenth century; and another "renovation" at the beginning of the eighteenth century carried further the process of destruction. Still a great deal of the old work remains, and the antique painting in the chapel on the right of the high altar is of special interest. It represents a sleeping figure clad in pontifical vestments, in front of which

* *Ibid*, vol. i, p. 138.

† A Titular church is a church which gives his title to a Cardinal.

stands a woman richly dressed. The slumbering Pontiff is Pope Paschal I. The female figure is St. Cecilia. And the incident depicted is told by the Pope himself in an ancient manuscript, still in the Vatican Library, which Baronius has printed.* Pope Paschal, so honourably known for his labours to repair the devastations caused in Rome by the Lombard invaders, was anxious to replace in suitable shrines the bodies of certain Saints which had for long been neglected ("quae diu inculta jacuerant"). Among these Saints was Cecilia. It was in the Pontificate of Urban I. (227-235) that she had suffered, according to the martyrologies,† and her cult soon spread throughout Christendom. In English literature she has been celebrated by three great Catholic poets: Chaucer, whose inimitably beautiful version of her legend forms the Second Nun's Tale; Dryden, whose magnificent Ode closes with her name; and Pope, whose fine but inferior imitation of that masterpiece is similarly terminated. Her house, the scene of her martyrdom, was converted into a church, according to her desire, and the walls of the room in which she suffered—the bathroom, now become a chapel—still exhibit traces of a furnace

* *Annales*, ad 802.

† The opinion, however, is now generally held that her martyrdom took place under Aurelius and Commodus (161-180), nearly a century earlier than the date hitherto received, and that the Urban mentioned in her legend was not Pope Urban I, but a bishop for the country district of the Via Appia.

and of leaden pipes. There her body was enshrined by Pope Urban. During the invasion of the Lombards it disappeared. Pope Paschal searched diligently for it, but in vain, and at last was led to acquiesce in the popular belief that it had been carried off by the invaders—relic-stealing was common in that age. But, the Pope tells us, on a certain day, as he was assisting at the Divine Office before the Confession of St. Peter—it was at dawn on a Sunday morning—he fell asleep, through bodily infirmity, and there stood by him as he slumbered a very beautiful girl of virginal aspect and richly arrayed. She told him that she was Cecilia, upraided him for giving up the quest of her, informed him that though the Lombards had desired to carry her off and had sought for her, they had not been able to find her, bade him persevere without slackness in his abandoned search, and assured him of the Divine will that he should be ultimately successful. The Pontiff accordingly persevered, was rewarded by the discovery of the body of the Saint in the Callixtan Catacomb, and transferred it to her church,* which he completely restored. This was in the year 802.

Such was the dream of Pope Paschal. I give

* Where it still lies. Of the opening of her shrine, early in the sixteenth century, by Cardinal Sfrondati, the Titular of the church, a long account will be found in Baronius. It was then that Stefano Maderno executed the beautiful reclining statue of her, as he saw her, which rests upon her shrine.

it as an example of "somnia vera," true dreams, undeterred by the gibe of a critical friend who, perverting to his purpose a line of Juvenal, exclaimed, "Intolerabilius nihil est quam somnia vera." With such an objecter discussion is useless. But I seem to hear a comment—and a very rational comment—which might be made on Pope Paschal's narrative. "It is no wonder that an old ecclesiastic, his mind full of his search for the relics of a Saint, should carry his preoccupation into his slumbers; and what more likely than that in the superstition amid which he lived, and which he fully shared, he should dream that the Saint appeared to him; but what more unlikely, on the other hand, even admitting for the sake of argument the existence of a spiritual world, than that one of its denizens should descend from it, after the lapse of centuries, to give information as to the fate of the body which she had so long quitted"? No doubt that is what might be called "the common-sense view." It might be urged, and very fairly urged, by those who agree with Mr. Sully that all dreams may be divided into "illusions (in the narrow sense) and hallucinations."* But Pope Paschal's way of thinking was different. He believed in the communion of Saints. Probably he had no notion of the opinion about time and space pretty general among metaphysicians since Kant. But he certainly

* *Illusions*, p. 130.

thought that in the life beyond the grave "memory lacks its natural resting points of years and centuries and periods."* Again, he is no doubt open to the indictment of holding a view about the relics of Saints which has unquestionably come down from a very early period of Christianity,† but which is, as unquestionably, alien from the modern mind. And indubitably he acquiesced in the belief, accepted universally in his time, that visions and revelations from the spiritual world were sometimes vouchsafed during sleep. It is impossible to establish by argument, am I told, the truth of Pope Paschal's way of thinking now so generally discredited? I am well aware of that. But it is just as impossible so to establish the way of thinking opposed to his. All I

* Perhaps I need hardly say that I am quoting from *The Dream of Gerontius*.

† In support of this assertion I may be permitted to cite a few words of mine written elsewhere. "The doctrine and practice of the Invocation of the Saints, and of the Veneration of their Relics, became firmly established in the Church from the very beginning of the second century. The *Acts* of the early Martyrs—I speak, of course, of the genuine *Acts*—are replete with evidence of this. And so—to quote no other authority—is the *Peristephanon* of Prudentius. It is true that Prudentius wrote in the fourth century. But he is entitled to fullest credit as an expositor of the thought of the third century, and even of the second; he is the spokesman of the whole Age of the Martyrs. Poets do but reflect and embellish the traditions of their times; they do not create them. They may stereotype beliefs; they do not invent a devotion or originate a doctrine. They are the echoes, nay, the emanations, of popular sentiment. They merely put into rhythmic form the ideas which they find prevailing. And their testimony is the more valuable because it is undesigned and indirect," *Christianity and Modern Civilisation*, p. 103.

have to say is that I am quite sure no candid mind could doubt the *veracity* of Pope Paschal's account of his dream and its fulfilment. That seems to me certain. The rest is a mystery.

The next witness I shall cite for a revelatory dream belonged to an age differing vastly from Pope Paschal's, and his evidence is not open to the exception which, in some minds, doubtless attaches to testimony in such matters given by professors of that Pontiff's religion. It is the justly celebrated naturalist Louis Agassiz. His widow in her biography of her husband writes as follows :

To this period belongs a curious dream mentioned by Agassiz in his work on the fossil fishes. It is interesting both as a psychological fact and as showing how, sleeping and waking, his work was ever present with him. He had been for two weeks striving to decipher the somewhat obscure impression of a fossil fish on the stone slab in which it was preserved. Weary and perplexed, he put his work aside at last, and tried to dismiss it from his mind. Shortly after, he waked one night persuaded that while asleep he had seen his fish with all the missing features perfectly restored. But when he tried to hold and make fast the image, it escaped him. Nevertheless, he went early to the Jardin des Plantes, thinking that on looking anew at the impression he should see something which would put him on the track of his vision. In vain—the blurred record was as blank as ever. The next night he saw the fish again, but with no more satisfactory result. When he awoke it disappeared from his memory as before. Hoping that the same experience might be repeated, on the third

night he placed a pencil and paper beside his bed before going to sleep. Accordingly towards morning the fish reappeared in his dream, confusedly at first, but at last with such distinctness that he had no longer any doubt as to its zoological characters. Still half dreaming, in perfect darkness, he traced these characters on the sheet of paper at the bedside. In the morning he was surprised to see in his nocturnal sketch features which he thought it impossible the fossil itself should reveal. He hastened to the Jardin des Plantes, and, with his drawing as a guide, succeeded in chiseling away the surface of the stone under which portions of the fish proved to be hidden. When wholly exposed it corresponded with his dream and his drawing, and he succeeded in classifying it with ease.*

I will next give a very curious instance of prevision in sleep for which I am indebted to Mr. Myers. He denominates it, not unhappily, a case of telaesthesia. It is narrated by Mr. Haggard, the British Consul at Trieste.

September 21st, 1893.

A few months ago I had an extraordinarily vivid dream, and waking up repeated it to my wife at once. All I dreamt actually occurred about six weeks afterwards, the details of my dream falling out exactly as dreamt.

There seems to have been no purpose whatsoever in the dream; and one cannot help thinking, what was the good of it? I dreamt that I was asked to dinner by the German Consul-General, and, accepting, was ushered into a large room with trophies of East African arms on shields against the walls.

* *Louis Agassiz, his Life and Correspondence.* Edited by Elizabeth Cary Agassiz, vol. 1, p. 181.

(N.B.—I have myself been a great deal in East Africa.) After dinner I went to inspect the arms, and amongst them saw a beautifully gold-mounted sword, which I pointed out to the French Vice-Consul—who at that moment joined me—as having probably been a present from the Sultan of Zanzibar to my host the German Consul-General.

At that moment the Russian Consul came up too. He pointed out how small was the hilt of the sword and how impossible in consequence it would be for a European to use the weapon; and whilst talking he waved his arm in an excited manner over his head as if he was wielding the sword, and to illustrate what he was saying.

At that moment I woke up and marvelled so at the vividness of the dream that I woke my wife up too and told it to her.

About six weeks afterwards my wife and myself were asked to dine with the German Consul-General, but the dream had long been forgotten by us both.

We were shown into a large withdrawing-room, which I had never been in before, but which somehow seemed familiar to me. Against the walls were some beautiful trophies of East African arms, amongst which was a gold-hilted sword, a gift to my host from the Sultan of Zanzibar.

To make a long story short, everything happened exactly as I had dreamt—but I never remembered the dream until the Russian Consul began to wave his arm over his head, when it came back to me like a flash.

Without saying a word to the Russian Consul and French Vice-Consul (whom I left standing before the trophy), I walked quickly across to my wife, who was standing at the entrance of a boudoir opening out of the withdrawing-room, and said to her, "Do you remember my dream about the Zanzibar arms?"

She remembered everything perfectly, and was a witness to its realisation. On the spot we informed all the persons concerned of the dream, which, naturally, much interested them.

The correctness of this narrative of Mr. Haggard's is vouched for by several official persons, among them M. de Kolemine, Russian Consul at Trieste, who writes as follows :

Monsieur Haggard, mon collègue d'Angleterre, en a eu un très remarquable au point de vue psychologique. . . . Veuillez accepter tout ce que Monsieur Haggard vous a écrit comme étant parfaitement la vérité et l'asserter de mon nom si vous le jugez nécessaire.

Agréez, cher Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée.

A. De Kolemine.*

VI

The opinion was once universally received† and, I suppose, is now almost universally discredited, that the spirit of man may leave the body for a time during sleep, and then return to its fleshly habitation. Mr. Myers is well

* *Human Personality*, vol. i, p. 408.

† Prudentius has expressed it in his fine *Hymnus ante Sompnum :*

Sed dum pererrat omnes
quies amica venas,
pectusque feriatum
placat rigante sompno,
Liber vagat per auras
rapido vigore sensus,
variasque per figuras,
quæ sunt operta, cernit.

Quia mens soluta curis
cui est origo cœlum,
purusque fons ab œthra,
iners jacere nescit.

warranted in speaking of "the antiquity, the ubiquity, the universality of men's belief in the wandering of the spirit in dreams." The lives of the Saints, not only of Christianity but of other faiths, contain numerous instances of such wandering, and in one place St. Teresa writes explanatorily: "The little bird of the spirit, darting like lightning from the miserable cage of the body, is fitter for the service of the Lord, and for its perfect freedom, in the state of trance and transport." I shall cite a curious example of this wandering as related in the *Life* of St. Alphonsus Liguori written by his intimate friend and disciple Father Tannoia.*

On the morning of September 21, 1774, after Alphonsus [he was then Bishop of St. Agatha] had ended Mass, contrary to custom he threw himself into his armchair; he was cast down and silent, he made no movement of any sort, never articulated a word, and said nothing to anyone. He remained in this state all that day and all the following night, and during all this time he took no nourishment and did not attempt to undress. The servants, on seeing the state he was in, did not know what was going to happen, and remained up at his door, but no one dared to enter it. On the morning of the 22nd he had not changed his position, and no one knew what to think of it. The fact was that he was in a prolonged ecstasy. However, when the day became further advanced, he rang the bell to announce that he intended to celebrate Mass. The signal was not only

* I avail myself of the translation given in the Oratorian Series of the *Lives of the Saints*.

answered to by Brother Francis Anthony, according to custom, but all the people in the house hurried to him with eagerness. On seeing so many people, his Lordship asked what was the matter, with an air of surprise. "What is the matter!" they replied. "You have neither spoken nor eaten anything for two days, and you ceased to give any signs of life." "That is true," replied Alphonsus; "but do you not know I have been with the Pope, who has just died?" . . . It was looked upon as a mere dream. However, before very long the tidings of the death of Pope Clement the Fourteenth were received. He passed to a better life on September 22 at seven o'clock in the morning, at the very moment when Alphonsus came to himself.

Father Berthe says in his *Vie de S. Alphonse* "this wonderful event cannot be contested." He is wrong. It assuredly can be, has been, and will be contested.* We are all familiar with that habit of mind so conspicuously and so constantly exhibited by too many physicists of the present day, which assumes to define, authoritatively, the limits of possibility and rejects everything, however well authenticated, not falling within the definition. It claims to be experimental, and on the strength of its own non-experience contemptuously rejects the experience of others. A good example of

* I feel bound to say that the evidence for it is not such as would satisfy an English lawyer—which is not the same as saying that it is not sufficiently proved. In the processes of St. Alfonso's beatification and canonisation it seems to have been thought of slight importance in comparison of the "dona spiritualia"—and "regulation" miracles, if I may so speak, ascribed to him—which I confess is not my way of thinking.

this habit of mind is afforded by Dr. Maudsley's work *Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings*, an interesting book, but utterly unphilosophical in its dogmatic materialism. It would be easy to write a book as interesting, and better reasoned, on *Natural Seemings and Supernatural Causes*.

VII

I shall end this chapter by putting before my readers an instance of the wonderful power over the corporal organs frequently acquired by the ascetics of India. They treat the body as a slave,* and make it the merely mechanical instrument of the mind. The long trances into which they are able to throw themselves are not the least curious of the problems of sleep. For example :

We have Sir Charles Wade's evidence that he was at the court of Runjeet Singh when a Fakeer was buried alive for six weeks. This event happened in Lahore in 1837, and Sir Claude was present when the Fakeer was disinterred and restored to a state of perfect vitality. The spot in which the man had been buried was a square building in the middle of one of the gardens belonging to the Lahore Palace, with an open verandah all round, and an enclosed room in the centre. On arriving there, Runjeet Singh asked Sir Claude to assist him in examining the building to satisfy himself that it was closed as he had

* As St. Paul apparently did : ὑπωπιάζω μου τὸ σῶμα καὶ δουλαγωγῶ.

left it. After the examination, which was perfectly satisfactory, the door of the dark room was thrown open, and Runjeet Singh and Sir Claude entered it in company with a servant of the Fakeer. A light having been brought, they descended about three feet below the floor of the room into a cell, where a wooden box, about four feet long by three broad, with a sloping roof, contained the Fakeer. On opening the box (which was padlocked and sealed) they saw an upright figure, enclosed in a bag of white linen, which was fastened by a string over the head. The servant put his arms into the box, took the figure out, and, closing the door, set it with its back against it.* Sir Claude and Runjeet Singh then descended into the cell, which was so small that they had to sit in front of the body and touch it with their hands and knees. Its legs and arms were shrivelled and stiff, the face full, the head reclining on the shoulder like that of a corpse. A medical man who was present could discover no pulsation, but there was, however, a heat about the region of the brain. The servant then began to bathe the body with warm water, and gradually relaxed the arms and legs, a process in which Runjeet Singh and Sir Claude assisted. A hot wheaten cake was placed on the top of the head, and twice or thrice renewed. The wax and cotton, which had filled up the nose and ears, was taken out, and after great exertion a knife was forced between the clenched teeth. The eyelids were rubbed with clarified butter till they opened, and the eyes appeared motionless and glazed. After the third application of the wheaten cake the body was violently convulsed; the nostrils became inflated, and respiration ensued. The servant then put some butter on the tongue, and made the Fakeer

* These three "its" are perplexing. I suppose what the writer means is "set the figure with its back against the door."

swallow it. A few minutes after the eyeballs became dilated and resumed their natural colour ; and the recovered man, recognising Runjeet Singh, asked in a faint hollow voice, " Do you believe me now ?"*

* I am indebted for this account to a newspaper cutting—I do not know what newspaper—which I have had by me for more than a quarter of a century. It appears to be an answer to a query by a correspondent. It is corroborated by Dr. Honigberger, who was Court Physician at Lahore, in his book *Thirty Years in the East*, and he gives a portrait of the resuscitated Fakir, whose name is said to have been Harisdas. He also alleges that some relations of the matter were published from Sir Claude Wade's statement, and mentions several other cases of hybernation—or suspension of the vital functions without injury to their subsequent power—which he considered well authenticated.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VALUE OF CHRISTIANITY

I PROPOSE to give some account of a book which I have perused with much interest —Dr. Chatterton-Hill's treatise on *The Sociological Value of Christianity*. I shall do this as much as possible in the author's own words, my object being to put before the reader what he thinks rather than what I think. The subject is of transcendant importance, and Dr. Chatterton-Hill's treatment of it is marked by originality of dialectic. His method—a perfectly legitimate method—is indicated by the words of the Latin poet, "*Exitus acta probat.*" He holds, as a sociologist, that all religious doctrines must be judged by their consequence to society, such being the sole criterion for appreciating their sociological value.

II

I suppose the vast majority of people see in Christ a mere preacher of individual regeneration and salvation, and in the Christian religion a mere individual phenomenon, a mere expression of individual emotion, of individual psychological needs. M. Salomon Reinach has tersely formulated that view in his *Orpheus*:

La morale chrétienne [he affirms] n'est pas sociale: elle néglige les devoirs de l'homme envers la cité, parce qu'elle tend à la perfection, à la pureté individuelle: mais elle prépare l'homme à mieux remplir ses devoirs sociaux en condamnant la haine et la violence, en enseignement la fraternité.

Now the view which Dr. Chatterton-Hill takes is diametrically opposite to this. He does not, of course, deny that Christianity in condemning hatred and violence, and in teaching fraternity, qualifies man to fulfil his social duties; but he contends that "the strength of Christianity and the secret of its survival amidst the storms of centuries, are to be sought precisely in the fact that the doctrine of Jesus *is* a social doctrine—a doctrine that inculcates rules of social life indispensable to the persistence of Western civilisation." It must be clearly understood that Dr. Chatterton-Hill writes simply and solely as a sociologist, and that is the reason why, while personally quite unacquainted with him, I have—so to speak—devoted this chapter to his argument. Theology he leaves aside altogether. He regards it as concerned with "matters which lie outside the sphere of human knowledge," with "sterile controversies," with "unverifiable hypotheses."

We of the twentieth century [he writes], know not one iota more about the so-called "fundamental truths of religion," than those of the first Christian century did; we stand to-day before the same unsolved riddles as did our Aryan ancestors of the

Veda, who invoked Varuna, Usha, Savitri, the Asuras, with the same legitimate degree of confidence and certainty as Christians of the twentieth century invoke the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; exactly the same amount of theological truth was expressed in the daily Vedic sacrifice to Agni, as is expressed in the daily Christian sacrifice of the Mass. *Der Wahrheit letzter Schluss*, the last word of truth, to use the expression of Faust, was spoken by the worshippers of Isis at Thebes and Memphis, when, on the veil that concealed the face of the goddess to mortal eyes, they inscribed the sentence "No mortal is able to raise my veil." The esoteric worshippers of Isis used to impose on all new adepts an *épreuve de foi* on entering the association of the faithful; they had to walk without trembling along the brink of an abyss, the depths of which were shrouded in darkness. This abyss, unfathomable to the eye of him who peered into it from above, symbolised the *Unfathomable Truth*. The abyss of truth remains as unfathomable to-day as it was unfathomable then; neither the blood of innumerable martyrs, nor the learned and persevering efforts of scientists and philosophers, have succeded in lighting up the sombre recesses of the precipice. The great enigma of Life and Death has not been solved; none of those who have set sail on the great Ocean of Eternity have ever returned to "give us a sign." We still stand on the shores of the Ocean of Mystery, and wait for a sign, until our turn comes; and we have to embark on the journey from which there is no return, without ever having received the sign. The seven Genii of the Vision of Hermes, the seven Devas of India, the seven Amshaspands of Persia, the seven Angels of Chaldea, the seven Sephiroths of the Kabal, the seven Archangels of the Christian Apocalypse—none of these have given us the sign

whereby we may comprehend the riddle of Life and Death.*

Such is the attitude of Dr. Chatterton-Hill's mind toward all theologies. But it does not follow that he thinks them useless or mischievous: far from it. He tells us:

> We see in every religious system that has survived in the universal struggle for existence, a fundamental factor in the life of that society to which such a system belongs. Every religious system that survives is adapted to the necessities of the society in which it survives. Such a religious system is therefore *true* in the only sense in which truth can be proved—in the sense that it responds to the end in view of which it was evolved. Truth is necessarily a relative conception; and the truth of a religious system can be judged of only with reference to a given environment. In this environment the system is true (or untrue), and its truth (or untruth) can be proved by the concrete results of its influence on social life. Christianity is true for the Western world; Islam, Brahminism, Buddhism, Confucianism, are true in their respective environments. Each responds to the particular needs of heterogeneous social aggregates.†

He claims that the sociological study of religion initiated by a school of thinkers, of whom Professor Durkheim is one of the best known, has begun to open up to our vision a new aspect of religious belief, to exhibit it as something more than a mere individual hankering after hidden truths, as a fundamental and permanent factor of social existence and evolution. Instead of seeking, as theology does, to

* Pref., p. 8. † P. 14.

justify or condemn a religious system by an appeal to evidence which, as our author judges, never can be proved, this new school justifies or condemns a religious system by an appeal to the concrete results obtained, in the life of society, by its working and influence.

This, then, is Dr. Chatterton-Hill's position, and I have been at the pains to present it fully and clearly, because, in my judgment, the special value of his book depends upon the point of view from which it is written. A Catholic theologian would probably arrive at conclusions not widely differing from his regarding the value of Christianity as a social factor and force. Dr. Chatterton-Hill, as we have seen, puts aside theology altogether, for the simple reason, as he frankly states, that he considers "all suprarational (*i.e.*, religious) beliefs equally legitimate, seeing that they are, all of them, equally unprovable." "Legitimate," not illegitimate, please note. He is far removed from the ordinary *libre penseur*, for whom all creeds are either illusions or impostures. He is well aware of the necessity of religious faith to man, because it corresponds to the deepest emotional needs of human nature. He knows that abstract doctrines cannot take its place as an inner light for the individual soul. But he contends that Christianity must rise about the individual—that its light must shine without into the world, in accordance with that great saying of its Founder.

"The permanent and the universal," he insists, "such must be the basis of Christianity, and not the ephemeral and the subjective"; and he finds that the very fact of its survival, of its triumph over pagan syncretism in the early ages of its existence, proves the religion of Jesus to possess a principle—nay, to be built on a principle—of a permanent and universal nature.

III

Dr. Chatterton-Hill begins his discussion by an emphatic repudiation of the doctrine of Animism, which, he observes, is based on the fundamental notion of the individual as the centre of all religious phenomena, and which represents the primitive religious systems of humanity as "grotesque illusions," as "ridiculous distortions of what to us are palpable facts." The question then arises: How comes it that these religious systems of early stages of culture, with their absurdities, so manifest to us, were universally received? He regards it as evident that ceremonies and beliefs, terribly burdensome to the individual in many ways, cannot have emanated from the individual, but must be derived from a power superior to the individual and able to impress unquestioning obedience on him. But here it will be well to let him more fully explain his meaning in his own way.

The only power superior to the individual, within the limits of our experience, is the society. Hence the conclusion that the beliefs which exert so immense an influence on the life of primitive men are of a social, and not of an individual nature. Their origin must be sought in social necessities, not in individual necessities. They dominate the individual, because the individual cannot exist outside the society or independently of the society; because the society is able to enforce its will with irresistible force. The individual mind has not invented such beliefs; it has received them from the society—from the social mind. Such beliefs are of a collective nature, and, as regards each individual, *a priori*. The collective mentality, the social mind, is not synonymous with the individual mentality, it is not a mere grouping of individual mentalities. The social mind, the collective mentality, is something *sui generis*, which is not subject to the laws that are operative in the domain of individual psychology. It is a force superior to the individual. True, the society is composed of individuals; but the life of society is as independent of the lives of the individuals composing it as the existence of the individual is independent of that of the cells composing the individual organism. As little as we can interpret the life of a man according to the life of one of the cells composing his organism at any given moment—as little can we interpret the life of society in the light of that of one of its individual components.

This is, of course, the teaching of the French school of sociology to which Dr. Chatterton-Hill adheres; and it issues in what he accounts three fundamental facts: that society is a phenomenon *sui generis*, the evolution of which

is independent of the evolution of its individual components; that religious beliefs and institutions are the product of society, of the workings of the social mind, and do not emanate from the individual; and that they constitute the most fundamental of all the forces underlying the vast process of social evolution. He continues:

Far, then, from being a mere individual phenomenon, religion appears to us as an essentially social phenomenon, as a product of social life, as a fundamental factor of social development. Religion, as M. Durkheim very justly observes, contains *in potentia* all the various elements which, subsequently dissociated and combined in a thousand ways, give rise to the diverse manifestations of social life. Science and poetry are derived from myths and legends; religious ornamentation and religious ceremonies have given birth to the plastic arts; ritual practices have engendered law and morals; parentage and relationship were originally conceived as purely mystical links; punishments, contracts, gifts, homage are but transformations of the doctrine of religious sacrifice; our philosophical conceptions concerning the soul, concerning immortality, concerning life itself, can be understood only by reference to the religious notions that constituted their first form. And the most recent researches, far from confirming the doctrine of historical materialism, show us the economic functions and structure of society as products of religious belief and religious influences. Engendered was religion by the social mind, because it is a factor of social existence, an instrument of social activity and evolution. Its diffusion is universal, because the same necessities,

universally prevalent, gave rise to the same organs of social life.*

IV

The next step in the inquiry is: What necessities can have engendered religion; to what social needs does religion respond? Our author replies that religion constitutes an indispensable element of social unity, of social cohesion and integration, in that it restrains individual liberty and subordinates the individual to society, in the interest of the continuity of social existence; for social existence is possible only if the individual limits his liberty, if he imposes certain restrictions on his desires, if he refrains from committing certain acts which his purely individual interests would urge him to commit. And, he continues, this liberty can be limited only by a power superior to him, and the only power superior to him, within the limits of our experience, is society. It is, then, society which, by means of religious belief, by means of collective representations imposing themselves *a priori* with irresistible force, controls the individual. Thus are individual interests sacrificed to social interests, and the sacrifice is necessary if the stability of society, if the continuity of social existence are to be maintained. "Necessary": the individual has no choice between a diminished existence and no

* P. 12.

existence at all. If life can in any way be considered a blessing—and we have no possible justification for an affirmative solution of the riddle, as we know nothing of life and have nothing known wherewith to compare it—then we may say that the individual's interests are " reconciled " with the interests of society.

Religion, therefore, the argument proceeds, is the instrument whereby the sacrifice of individual interests to social interests is obtained. Only quite secondarily, from the point of view of its conception, and quite subsequently, from the point of view of its historical development, does religion minister to individual needs. This is Dr. Chatterton-Hill's interpretation of the old doctrine, " Primus in orbe deos fecit timor " ; and he is unquestionably well warranted in insisting that the reign of religion was, originally, a reign of terror, and that only very late in mental evolution does it begin to temper severity with mildness, to blend its prohibitions with consolations, to seek not only to curb the individual by fear but to gain him by persuasion. " The religion of Israel," he observes, " marks a beginning in this direction ; the deity of the time of the later prophets appears possessed of more humanitarian sentiments than the old relentless Yahveh whose Ten Commandments represent him as ' a jealous god.' " He continues :

But the great religious revolution, whereby religion, whilst remaining true to its fundamental

function of assuring social integration and cohesion, became nevertheless a source of unequalled consolation for individual distress, of unrivalled hope and comfort for the individual—this great religious revolution was the work of Christianity. Christianity proved hereby its immense superiority, in that it succeeded—and succeeded magnificently—in combining the defence of social interests with the defence of individual interests, in acting at the same time as the supreme restraint on the individual and as the supreme consoler of the individual. Before Christianity, no religion had succeeded in effecting any sort of moral junction between the interests of society and those of the individual—no religion, unless we except the religion of Israel in its later stages, had ever made an effort to compensate the restrictions imposed on the individual, by rewards for complying with irksome and wearisome regulations, had ever sought to gain the individual by persuasion as well as grinding him down by terror. The superiority of Christianity, the wonderful social adaptability possessed by it, consist essentially in the exquisite blending of severity and mildness. By the severity of the restraints imposed by it on the individual, Christianity proved its adaptability to social necessities : and by the unequalled consolation it offered, on the other hand, to the individual, Christianity proved its adaptability to individual needs. The older religions only manifested the single aspect of factors of social evolution : Christianity manifested the double aspect of a factor of social and of individual development.*

This, then, Dr. Chatterton-Hill holds, is the double aspect presented by Christianity, and, he insists, it is only when we consider it

*P. 15.

under this double aspect, it is only when we regard it as realising an equilibrium between social and individual interests—interests which are naturally and fundamentally antagonistic —that we can hope to judge rightly of its value. That equilibrium he considers to be as perfect as it is humanly possible to imagine. "The necessity of individual sacrifice is well recognised by the Christian doctrine; but this individual sacrifice, which cannot be compensated for on earth and in this life, shall receive an adequate reward after death. The balance between social and individual interests, which is so unfavourable in this life to the individual interests, shall be adjusted in the life to come. If the individual be condemned to sacrifice himself now to the interests of society, he shall recover, so to speak, the lost part of himself in Eternity. The diminished existence which he must needs lead on earth is but the prelude to the integral life beyond the tomb."*

V

But further. Social progress, considered from a mental point of view, consists in the diminution of the sphere of influence of collective

* P. 17. Elsewhere he observes, "As it is impossible that any benefits accrue in this world to the individual [from the sacrifices of egotism, so necessary to society], the reaping of such benefit is, with rare cleverness, adjourned by Christianity to the world to come—that is, to a world of which we can have no knowledge," p. 164.

representations, in the liberation of individual thought from the yoke imposed by the collective mind. But this means the formation of logical concepts, the growth of rational thought, a development of individualism threatening the foundation of social existence. Is that, however, in truth the function of this rationalism? Our author answers "No." If such be indeed the social function of rationalism the latter certainly would never have been evolved; seeing that the development of an organ in a species that survives is always a proof of the utility of that organ, or, at any rate, of its indifference. As a matter of fact, the social function of rationalism, he insists, "consists in its ability to secure the adaptation of society to environing conditions with less expenditure of social force. . . . By enabling us to comprehend the working of natural laws, rationalism enables us to put ourselves into harmony with those laws, to adapt ourselves to them—thereby permitting a positive increase of happiness, and a positive diminution of misery." Herein, our author judges, is the true function of rationalism. But, he adds, it must be limited; universal rationalism conduces not to social welfare but to social disintegration, for it leads to an excessive unilateral assertion of individual rights which is incompatible with the co-existence of social rights.

It is here that religion steps in. In primitive societies, as we have said, religion and society are

synonymous terms—religious thought is synonymous with social thought. But, in the measure that individual thought differentiates itself from collective thought, the latter tends also to become ever less co-extensive with religious thought. *The differentiation of the terms religion and society is the counterpart of the differentiation of the terms individual and society.* In the later religions, notably in the religion of the Israelites and in Christianity, we find ever more and more developed the idea of a Moral Law* exterior to society, which at once dominates society and completes the latter. In Christianity this idea of the Moral Law attains the highest point of its evolution. In Christianity we find the Moral Law acting at once as a reinforcement and as an extension of the social law. In other words, the moral sphere contains the social sphere, but is not limited by it. The ethical religions, and especially Christianity, constitute an extension of society and of the social law, in that they subordinate directly to themselves that part of the individual which has liberated itself from social control. Religion thus imposes a limitation on rationalism, a limitation which responds to the necessities of social life. *By limiting rationalism in this way, religion adapts it therefore to its social function.*†

The first social function of religion, then, in the higher states of culture is, as Dr. Chatterton-Hill holds, the limitation of rationalism in order to adapt it to the social uses which it is destined to serve. Religion establishes an equilibrium between the individual and society,

* Dr. Chatterton-Hill's conception of the Moral Law is strictly transcendental. "The Moral Law," he writes, "is eternal because absolute," p. 46.

† P. 25.

in the interests of both, by means of the idea of duty—a Categorical Imperative reinforced by an Absolute Sanction.

It constitutes the counterpart of the notion of Rights; and, in the moral system of Christianity, an exact correlation between the two is established, so that the rights of every individual—rights which are conditioned by capacity—are exactly balanced by his duties. Reason suffices for the dictation of individual rights; but it is not capable of dictating to the individual the corresponding duties—much less of attaching to the notion of duty the notion of an adequate sanction. The limitation of the rationalised personality by religion, as also the subordination of the still socialised part of human conduct to social laws—both imply the sacrifice of individual (*i.e.*, egotistical) interests. In primitive societies, where the individual is wholly under social control, this sacrifice is effected without the slightest recompense being offered or, indeed, hoped for. It must not be thought that primitive men are more disinterested than civilised ones—for the psychological motives underlying human conduct remain invariably the same. If primitive man sacrifices himself to society without receiving or hoping for any compensation, this is due solely to the fact that he is so solidly embedded in the group to which he belongs that his existence as individual is reduced to the lowest possible minimum. Living exclusively for the collectivity, thinking almost exclusively by means of representations coined for him *a priori* by the collectivity, dominated at every moment of his existence by the all-absorbing influence of society, the power of the latter is sufficient to compel him to make all the sacrifices of his personal liberty required by the group. It is only later, when the individual has

emancipated himself in a certain degree from social tyranny, when thought has become partly rational, that the utility of sacrificing individual interests to social interests will come to be questioned. As the necessity of a certain sacrifice of egotism remains, it becomes indispensable to counterbalance the notion of sacrifice by the notion of recompense. . . . . Christianity understood this well. . . . Individualism and egotism, being derived from the development of rational thought, cannot be curbed by acts of material pressure, but only by an efficient moral control. But a moral control, if it is to be efficacious, cannot neglect the fundamental sentiments at the basis of the moral and mental life of the individual, once this life commences to evolve independently of collective representations—that is to say, the egotistical sentiments. Such a moral control must, to be efficacious, utilise these sentiments : and this is precisely what Christianity did. Christianity restrained egotism in this life by the hope of compensation hereafter—it vanquished egotistical desires by other egotistical desires. In so doing, it showed its consummate knowledge of human psychology, its profound sense of realities. And not only that : but also its profound sense of justice. For does not justice require that Duty and Compensation be correlative notions ?*

VI

This, then, in the view of Dr. Chatterton-Hill, is the sociological value of Christianity as realised in European civilisation. That civilisation is very far removed from the primitive condition in which all the power of the community over the individual could be *directly*

* P. 28.

exercised. It is sectioned into many sub-divisions—classes, professions, corporations, syndicates—which are intermediates between the whole society and the individual. And in these the individual is incorporated and controlled, all being adapted to the end in view of which they were evolved—namely, his "socialisation." "The individual is in such a case attached to society by means of the notion of duty, and his egotism is subordinated to higher, extra-individual aims; this being so, he will work through the agency of his class, or professional organisation, for the benefit of the whole society." No doubt that is, as a matter of fact, a correct account of the social organism as formed by Christianity. For, when religion has ensured an equilibrium between the individual and society, it has *ipso facto* ensured an equilibrium between the sub-divisions of society and the whole. To these sub-divisions, as to the individual, Christianity had a message—the message summed up in the word "duty," which, in effect, means the subordinating of class interests to social interests.

The social integration realised by religion implies, therefore, the checking of individual egotism and of class egotism. When the former is checked the latter will *ipso facto* be held under restraint. *Vice versa* does the growth of individual egotism always entail the correlative growth of class egotism. Egotism being naturally the most powerful sentiment in

individual life, the tendency must always be present to make use of the power and influence derived from the class, in order to further egotistical interests. Present in all classes, such a tendency is inevitably stronger in the classes at the top of the social hierarchy. It requires discipline of a rare force to be able to prevent the individual with much capacity, much power, and many riches from misusing these advantages—to be able to induce him to employ these advantages for the collective welfare, rather than for individual welfare. The biographer of Jesus of Nazareth tells us that the young man whom the Master counselled to sell his goods and give the proceeds to the poor went away very sorrowful—for he was rich. And Jesus pronounced the words that millionaire Christian company promoters prefer to pass over in silence: "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of God." The words do not signify that Jesus condemned riches *per se*. But Jesus saw in wealth, not an end, but a means to an end—a means for doing good to the community. When he said that the rich shall have difficulty in entering the Kingdom of God, he was insisting on the immense difficulty, for the rich man, of combating egotism, of putting his wealth at the service of higher ideals, of not employing that wealth solely for the satisfaction of egotistical wants and desires. And thereby did Jesus once more manifest his profound knowledge of human life and of the human character.*

Everything depends, then, on social integration; on the efficacy of the principles on which the notion of duty is based; on the efficacy of the sanction which gives to this

* P. 34.

notion the character of a categorical imperative. The Moral Law if not absolute is nothing. It incorporates social laws into religion; it exhibits duty as the very voice of God. Obedience to the powers that be is grounded upon a Divine sanction: they are ordained of God: "whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." But more: the Moral Law embraces every segment of human life; acts and thoughts not under social control are subject to it; and its aim confounds itself with the aim of religion generally, the subordination of the individual, the repression of egotism.

Such are the essential ideas of Dr. Chatterton-Hill's treatise. Having laid them down, he proceeds to consider "the theory and practice of Christianity—the teaching of Jesus and the concrete applications of this teaching given by the Church." Those applications, he holds, must necessarily be judged according as they asserted themselves under the influences of a Christian *régime* acting on an entirely Christianised society. He contends, most justly, that from a sociological point of view it is quite impossible to draw any distinction between the Church of the first four centuries and the Church of the Middle Ages, which merely carried into the domain of concrete practice and application principles already laid down. Of course, it was only when the Church was definitely victorious, after the meeting of the

Council of Nicea in 325, or, even later, after the death of Theodosius in 395, that the seed sown by Jesus, and germinating during nearly four hundred years, ripened to maturity. Then we see the application of His teaching to social conditions. And if we find such application, on the whole, beneficial to society, we may say unhesitatingly that the social value of Christianity has been duly proved.

And here Dr. Chatterton-Hill is led to consider a view very prevalent in these days—the view of the Founder of Christianity as teaching the dogmas of modern democracy. This view represents Him, indeed, as the democrat *par excellence*, as the preacher of equality, as the apostle of universal peace and humanitarianism, as the forerunner of socialism, or, as Tolstoy will have it, of anarchism. It attributes to Him the origin of all the sickly sentimentalism which has been current since the eighteenth century. Now this argument, which seeks to separate theory and practice in Christianity, to place the teaching of Jesus in antagonism to the entire development of the Christian doctrine and practice during nearly twenty centuries, Dr. Chatterton-Hill shows conclusively, as it seems to me, to be untenable and indeed absurd. In some closely reasoned pages he combats the view that social evolution is a merely arbitrary process, a mere thing of choice, the product of chance and chaos and haphazard. We know that in the

realm of nature the survival of an organ, the persistence of a species, proves that they are adapted to surrounding conditions, that they are in harmony with their environment; and he contends that similar conditions prevail in social life. I quote a portion of his argument:

Whether the view be taken that Christianity, in general, be a negligible factor in social evolution, that Christianity in general has exerted practically no influence on the formation and development of Western civilisation, or whether the view be taken that Church Christianity in particular has exerted a noxious and evil influence on social evolution—in both cases the diffusion and remarkable persistence of Christianity, precisely under the form of what we may term Church Christianity, remain enshrouded in a veil of impenetrable mystery, and can only be explained as the effect of a miracle. If Christianity be destitute of sociological value and bereft of sociological importance, what is the meaning of its diffusion and persistence? If the form under which Christianity has asserted itself be a distorted form and hostile to the real interests of society, why should precisely this distorted form have asserted itself victoriously and persisted? Such is the dilemma to which partisans of either theory are reduced. And the only way out of the dilemma is to suppose social evolution to be absolutely arbitrary, to be the result of chance and haphazard, to be a chaotic and incomprehensible process. If, however, we accept the idea of social evolution as determined by fixed and unchangeable laws, in the same way as any other order of phenomena in the natural world is determined, the theories in question become quite untenable. It is curious to observe that those who, in general, insist most strongly

on the notion of natural law, and seek thereby to shake the foundations of supernatural belief, are often those who ignore absolutely the working of natural law in social evolution. It is to this ignorance of the working of immutable social laws that we must attribute the popular belief that social evolution is a thing of choice, that society can be recast and reformed at will, according to the likes and desires of legislators and would-be social reformers. To those who ignore social laws, the idea of the fruitful teaching of Jesus remaining barren, or of the noxious teaching of the Church prospering and developing, has nothing surprising in it. By such as these, the idea of an indissoluble link existing between the society of the Middle Ages and the society of to-day is entirely ignored. The fact is that these persons, who constitute, unfortunately, the majority, are wholly ignorant of the rudiments of social philosophy. They are ignorant of the fact that heredity and selection constitute fundamental laws of social existence, just as much as the same factors determine the life of biological species and organisms. They know not that every society is the offspring of heredity, that in its past history lies its indispensable vital patrimony.*

No doubt that is so. The extraordinary success of the Christian Church was due to the fact that, as the ideas of its Founder responded to the immediate needs of society, they afforded an adequate basis for reconstructing a moribund civilisation. They gave to the Western world a fresh ideal, capable of securing anew its integration, of maintaining discipline and repressing insubordination : they revealed the

* P. 59.

true laws of social existence, chief among them being the subordination of the individual to higher ends, the necessity of suffering, the maintenance of authority and discipline.

VII

The debt, then, of the Western world to Christianity is, Dr. Chatterton-Hill concludes, a colossal one, for it is to Christianity that European civilisation owes its survival. We live in an age when there is a very widespread tendency to cast off Christianity among the nations which it has formed. The individualism which, as our author remarks, constitutes the foundation of Protestantism, as cast by Rousseau into the form of Egalitairism, was the central idea of the French Revolution. "Hoc fonte derivata clades." Issuing from France this false dogma has become European. It is, and cannot help being, a doctrine of disintegration; for society is organic, and that implies differentiation and inequality. It is flatly opposed to the facts both of biology and of human history. It is equally opposed, as Dr. Chatterton-Hill has shown at length, in an excellent chapter of his book, to the Christian doctrine of fraternity. "All men are brothers —but all men are not equal: such is the truth contained in the Gospel message."

The doctrine of fraternity, as preached by Christianity, implies the existence of three underlying

conditions, without which it can be but an empty and meaningless phrase: firstly, the subordination of individual aims to social aims; secondly, the recognition of the equal dignity, of the equal *moral* value, of all categories of labour—or, in other words, the recognition of individual dignity, of the moral value of the individual, irrespective of the latter's capacities or social position; thirdly, individual humility, as contrasted with the arrogance, vanity, and self-satisfaction we find so widely prevalent at the present day. When we come to analyse more closely the idea of fraternity, we shall find, effectively, that this notion implies the existence of the three conditions aforesaid. All men are brothers, because all work with a view to realising aims which are common to all—because all are strongly integrated in a whole dominated by powerful ideals that act as a bond of unity; all men are brothers, because all are equal in dignity before the Moral Law; all men are brothers, because all are conscious of their moral insufficiency—because this consciousness incites to solidarity, since each must show indulgence to the failings of others, even as he needs the indulgence of others for his own failings. Social integration, the recognition of human dignity, individual humility—are thus the conditions presupposed by the doctrine of fraternity. If these conditions fail, fraternity may exist on paper, as in the first and third Republics in France; but it cannot exist as a living reality.

It was by realising these fundamental conditions that Christianity integrated society, knitting the members of the community together as *domestici Dei*, in the love and veneration of a common tradition. Social inequality has from the first been recognised and preached

by the Catholic Church, whose constitution is essentially hierarchical. And here she was but following and applying the doctrine of her Founder. The inequality that necessarily exists in social life and which results from differences of capacity constantly engendered by heredity and constantly accentuated by selection, was as clearly admitted and recognised by Jesus as was the equality of all before the Moral Law. Inequality is the law of the finite world: equality of the infinite. But in the system of Christian ethics the greater the superiority of the individual the more important his duty, the graver his responsibilities.

> What is grandeur? What is power?
> Heavier toil, superior pain.

Solidarity is the true law of the social organism: the family—not the individual—is the foundation of the State, which indeed may truly be regarded as the expanded family. To that solidarity the Revolution—which is merely an incarnation of the Rousseauan doctrine of equality—of the sufficiency of the individual in the order of thought and the order of action—is fatal. One of the profoundest students of man and society that ever lived has admirably observed "En coupant la tête à Louis XVI., la Révolution a coupé la tête à tous les pères de famille." Balzac continues: "Il n'y a plus de famille aujourd'hui; il n'y a plus que des individus." Yes, the French Revolution ushered

in an age of unbridled individualism, and logically enough rejected Christianity which is the effective curb of individualism, for, to quote Balzac again, Christianity, of which he finds Catholicism the only expression worth considering, "is a complete system of repression of the depraved tendencies of men, and the greatest element of social order."

But in the present age the belief prevails that social progress is to be sought in the ever greater development of individualism, in the reduction of social authority to a minimum, in the unrestricted domination of rationalism. It is anarchy plus the policeman—the only authority left if religion is rejected: anarchy in the economic sphere, anarchy in family life, anarchy in morals, anarchy in politics—all the inevitable outcome of the loss of the fundamental notion of human solidarity, of the Christian tradition by which our forefathers solved the problem of the relation of the individual to society. Anarchy is the inevitable result of the principle of counting heads as the criterion of right and wrong, on which the pseudo-democracy of our time is based. Authority so derived is an illusion and a snare. What sanctity can apply to the will, or rather whim, of the multitude? To be real and efficacious authority must rest upon the moral conviction of the governed. The political system—if system it can be called—based on the sophism of individual equivalence, is radically incapable of

instituting authority of any sort—except the authority of brute force, which must fall by its own weight: "Vis consili expers mole ruit sua." Look, our author bids us, at France:

> Lacking in all authority, unable to appeal to any principles whereby liberty may be limited and discipline imposed, French democracy has seen, during thirty years, disorder and anarchy gradually spread until the whole edifice of French civilisation is undermined. Chronic strikes wantonly declared without economic justification, indiscipline in all branches of the public services; the incredible tyranny exercised by the revolutionary labour syndicates, and to check which the constituted authorities are powerless; the systematic undermining of the fundamental ideas of social solidarity, such as the idea of patriotism; the disorganisation of family life, and the incoherence and corruption of political life—such are some of the symptoms by which the bankruptcy of the democratic system of government in France may be recognised. And this bankruptcy is due to the lack of all the principles whereon Authority, indispensable to the maintenance of social integration, may be based.

What, then, is the prospect before us? Dr. Chatterton-Hill answers:

> The great problem confronting Western society to-day is not that of how to best safeguard and develop liberty, but the problem of how to best safeguard the great principle of authority—of how to safeguard that discipline without which social integration is an impossibility. And the only social organisation in our midst in which authority and discipline are adequately safeguarded is the organisation of the Catholic Church. . . . As long as

THE CHURCH TO SAVE SOCIETY

Western society is to survive, it must continue to be based on those fundamental principles of government which Christianity, and particularly Catholic Christianity, enunciated—on those fundamental traditions of social policy which we owe to the genius of the Catholic Church. Of the social teaching of Jesus, and of the great principles of social organisation and government derived from that teaching, the words of the Master are true: Coelum et terra transibunt, verba autem mea non transibunt.*

* Pp. 250-257. It is but fair to Dr. Chatterton-Hill to quote the following words: "In order to prevent all misunderstanding, it is necessary that we should add that we by no means imply that Western Society, if it is to survive needs go back to the Middle Ages, and re-establish complete religious homogeneity under the authority of the Papal See. . . . What we mean is that every effort made with a view to securing the greater integration and cohesion of Western Society, to placing efficient restraints on our individualism which threatens to undermine the fabric of our civilisation, must needs be based on the same principles as those which inspired the Catholic Church in her work of building up and consolidating European Society."

CHAPTER VII

A PROPHET OF THE MORAL LAW

MANY a time, as I have sat in my library, facing the thirty-six volumes in which John Henry Newman collected such of his writings as he specially wished preserved, I have asked myself, What will be his chief claim upon posterity? It is a question which has been asked by many others: and before I indicate the reply to which I personally incline, let us see how it has been answered by three writers, worthy of much respect, who belong to different schools of thought, and may be accounted fairly representative. First let us look at a remarkable book* by the late Lady Blennerhassett. In the judgment of this accomplished author, Newman's influence has been mightiest and most enduring on the religious culture of the Anglo-Saxon world during the nineteenth century. She writes:

> The generation whose cradle-song Byron and Shelley sang, for which Coleridge philosophised, and Sir Walter Scott discovered a vanished world, and Carlyle and Macaulay wrote history, the generation to which John Stuart Mill exhibited the Utilitarian teaching, and Darwin introduced a new view of Nature, names the name of John Henry Newman

* *John Henry Kardinal Newman, ein Beitrag zur religiosen Entwicklungsgeschichte der Gegenwart.*

as that of the man who most deeply influenced the feelings, most strongly stirred the souls of men. To the last day of a life of ninety years this influence was exclusively religious; but it was exercised by one who held the foremost rank both in the intellectual province and in literature.

Such is the judgment of this highly gifted woman upon Newman. And, as she points out, it is now being accepted far beyond the limits of the English-speaking peoples. For the last twenty years, she observes, the more thoughtful minds of French divines have increasingly appreciated the true way of treating the explication of religious doctrine unfolded in the *Essay on Development* and the *Grammar of Assent*; and the present theological progress in France, she considers, is due, if not in its results, yet in its method, to Newman. No doubt she is right in considering Newman's greatest achievement in the theological department to be his book on the development of religious doctrine, which has done so much to bridge together past and present. But it must be remembered that his teaching on this topic is not new: the Catholic tradition has always maintained it. Newman adds not a syllable, so far as *principle* goes, to what is laid down in well-known passages and even treatises of the early Fathers. He does not innovate; he merely emphasizes, illustrates, illumines, and resets. He may, however, be said to have made an end of the old unhistorical view of

Christian dogma which, supplanting the earlier teaching, had for long been dominant in the theological schools. At the present day, no well instructed scholar would maintain that thesis of the immutability of Catholic doctrine which Bossuet held. When Newman wrote, few Catholics questioned it.

II

And now let us turn to an extremely competent Belgian critic, whose thoughtful book on Cardinal Newman delights us as much by the breadth of its sympathies as by the excellence of its diction in a language which is not the author's own. Dr. Sarolea indeed confesses the enigmatic nature of Newman's personality* "at once orator and theologian, philosopher and journalist, novelist and poet." "We are still very far," he writes, "from possessing the final portrait of Newman. I very much doubt whether we shall ever possess it." All that Dr. Sarolea hoped to do in his book was to clear up some aspects of the problem. I think this modest hope has been amply realised. Of course, one aspect is presented by Newman's conversion to the Catholic Church. Dr. Sarolea holds that Newman became a Catholic "because there was a pre-established harmony between his character

* *Cardinal Newman and His Influence on Religious Life and Thought*, by Charles Sarolea, D.Ph., D.Litt.

and the Catholic system, because his soul was *naturaliter Catholica.*" "His conversion," we read, " is not the result of some sudden crisis, of some external catastrophe : it is the result of a development gradual, internal, inevitable : and nothing strikes us more when we read the *Apologia* than this very inevitableness." Dr. Sarolea continues :

> In that rich and complex personality, I distinguish three fundamental needs, three activities, three highly developed organs, which in other men are generally mutually exclusive, but which in Newman complete each other : the intellectual and logical need of a dialectician, the metaphysical and mystical imagination of an idealist, the practical sense and the indomitable will of a man of action. Such seems to me to be the complete formula of his genius, if such a genius can ever be expressed in a formula. Now an incomplete, one-sided, mutilated religion like the historical forms of modern Protestantism, a religion which is a principle, necessary no doubt, and which will assert itself as long as the dignity of human nature, but which can be nothing more than a principle, and which cannot be a philosophical synthesis and a political system, such a religion could not possibly satisfy the needs of a temperament such as Newman's. Only an *integral* religion, complex and contradictory like his own personality, could meet the demands and harmonise the oppositions of his nature.

I take it that Newman's " abiding achievement in religious controversy is—to use again Dr. Sarolea's words—his proving that the unity and continuity of the Church tradition

is found only in Catholicism," and that " either there is no revelation or that revelation is vested in, and safeguarded by, the Church of Rome." Of course, his great argument in defence of this thesis is supplied by his theory of the development of Christian doctrine, at which we have already glanced, and Dr. Sarolea's account of which it will be worth while to quote. He calls it " an anticipated application of Darwinism to religious philosophy "* :

Newman considers the Roman Catholic Church as a living organism like the mustard-seed of the gospel. By the side of the Roman Church other organisms have arisen and have struggled with it for nourishment, for light and life. The Catholic Church alone has become a gigantic tree, which affords shadow and shelter to the whole human race and which plunges its roots in the first ages of Christianity. The Church has always remained identical to herself, and has yet adapted herself to every climate. She has developed a coherent system, every part of which consists with every other, and she has yet conformed herself to every human need. She has maintained the same severe and austere ideal, opposed to every natural instinct, and has therefore been assailed from age to age by internal and external foes. She has resisted every assault, and has emerged from each successive struggle stronger, better organised and equipped for new ordeals and dangers. Now the very growth and development of the Catholic Church is, according to Newman, an irresistible argument in favour of

* It preceded by fourteen years the publication of the *Origin of Species*.

her divine origin. For, humanly speaking, in the struggle for life amongst various religions, there must happen what happens in the struggle for life in the animal or vegetable world. It is the strongest organism which survives, and which, merely by surviving, proves that it is the strongest. If, therefore, there exists a revealed religion—and Protestants admit that it does exist—an experience of twenty centuries has been conclusive in favour of the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church. And either there has been no revelation, or we must decide for the one Church which has preserved that revelation in its purity and integrity.

Dr. Sarolea thinks that from the Anglican standpoint this argument does not admit of a reply: that the only way of escape for Anglicans from Newman is to deny his premises: to regard revelation not as an external historical fact, but as a process not transcendental, but immanent in the human soul, the gradual conquest of science and the slow achievement of moral effort,—which is what Dr. Sarolea, for his part, does. But he is well aware that "the enormous majority feel the need of an external authority and a visible Church": and to this enormous majority Newman will always appeal, and as the years go, ever more and more cogently. It is true that his argument rests only on probabilities: probabilities whose weight and cogency depend on "the illative sense" and on the private experience of each individual illumined by faith: but he insists that probability is the

guide of life, and that "conspiring probabilities grow into a perfect conviction." "Turn away from the Catholic Church," he appeals, "and to whom will you go? It is your only chance of peace and assurance in this turbulent changing world. There is nothing between it and scepticism where men exert their reason freely. Private creeds, fancy religions, may be showy and imposing to the many in their day: national religions may lie huge and lifeless and cumber the ground for centuries, and distract the attention or confuse the judgment of the learned: but in the long run it will be found that either the Catholic Religion is verily and indeed the coming in of the unseen world into this, or that there is nothing positive, nothing dogmatic, nothing real in any of our notions as to whence we come or whither we are going."* And to this argument is added the weight of his personal experience "Exquisivi Dominum et exaudivit et ex omnibus tribulationibus eripuit me."† "From the time that I became a Catholic I have had no anxiety of heart whatever: I have been in perfect peace and contentment, I have never had one doubt."‡

* *Discourses to Mixed Congregations*, p. 283.

† Rendered in Tate and Brady's doggrel by lines to which Newman, doubtless from early association, had a certain attachment:

Of his deliverance I will boast
Till all that are distressed,
By my example courage take,
And charm their griefs to rest.

‡ *Apologia*, p. 238.

CANON BARRY'S VIEW OF NEWMAN

III

The third author whom I shall consult is Canon William Barry, a master in theology and philosophy, in history and romantic fiction, whose little book* deals with Newman as a great English classic, regarding him, however, not from a merely English but from a European point of view. Dr. Barry is concerned with Newman's intellectual life, and with the external accidents of his career, the texture of his beliefs, and the moments at which they were acquired, as illustrating and illuminating his literary development. But with Newman, literature was not an end in itself; it was a great means to a greater end. A deeply, one may say, a naturally religious mind, he from the first discerned that his vocation was prophetic. This comes out strikingly in some verses addressed by him to his brother Frank in the year 1826:

> Dear Frank, we both are summoned now
> As champions of the Lord:
> Enrolled am I; and shortly thou
> Must buckle on thy sword:
> A high employ, not lightly given,
> To serve as messenger from heaven.

"To serve as messenger from heaven." What, then, according to Dr. Barry, was Newman's message?

Dr. Barry's answer to that question may be

* *Newman*, by William Barry.

read at large in his brilliant pages, and especially in the two chapters entitled "The Logic of Belief" and "Newman's Place in History." All I can do here is to give, in a very compressed form, some outlines of it:

Newman realised, as others did not, that Christianity was fading away from the public order; that Christians would be called upon more and more to exercise their individual judgment, to mix in a society no longer Catholic or Protestant, but free-thinking as was the later Roman Empire, sceptical yet superstitious, corrupt yet polished; and he began to provide against the evil day. His policy would have gone upon lines, novel as regarded the immediate past, now irrecoverable, but identical with those by which Clement, Origen, Basil, and the early Fathers had guided their course under heathen rule. It was a programme for to-morrow which implied great and permanent losses, not pleasant to think of, a reliance on energy instead of routine, and what many took to be a change of front. By this time Darwin had published his *Origin of Species*, the Bible criticism familiar to Germany since Lessing had put out feelers in *Essays and Reviews*; Colenso was applying his arithmetic to the Pentateuch; Hegel had been heard of in Oxford. Newman was alive to the signs of the times; he read and gave them a meaning. Events have shown that he was not deceived.

So much in general as to Newman's attitude of mind. Now let us look, more closely, at a portion of his teaching. All his life long, he said in his address at the Palazzo della Pigna, on receiving the Cardinal's hat, he had opposed

what he called "Liberalism in religion," meaning by Liberalism, as Dean Church happily puts it, "the tendency of modern thought to destroy the basis of revealed religion, and ultimately of all that can be called religion at all." The question, then, which he asked himself was this: "What must be the face-to-face antagonist by which to withstand and baffle the fierce energy of passion and the all-corroding, all-dissolving scepticism of the intellect in religious inquiries?" To answer that question he falls back on personality as "the key to truth."*

"He takes himself," writes Dr. Barry, "for granted, his nature, faculties, instincts, and all that they imply. Metaphysicians have commonly started from the universal to arrive at the particular; but he, who is not of their sect, reverses the process. . . . 'Let concretes come first,' he exclaimed, and 'so-called universals second.' He went back to the days of childhood, when he was 'alone with the Alone'; and on this adamantine basis of reality he set up his religion. . . . The inevitable, though commonly unrecognised, premiss of all reasoning is each man's individual nature, so that if a multitude agree, still it is because every one finds in himself a motive for assenting to the view taken by all. Whether the motive be weak or valid we do not now inquire. But what of the process? In many books it is described as an art—the art of logic—and rules have been given for its proper exercise. Newman, as we might

* It has been profoundly observed by Dr. Barry that Newman's view of personality is essentially Carlyle's doctrine of heroes "wearing its academic robes."

expect, denies this old position, at least in its accepted form. ' Reasoning,' he says, ' is a living spontaneous energy within us, not an art.' . . . Revelation is an accommodation to our weakness, an ' economy,' in its nature unequal to that which it bodies forth. And as is the object, so is the evidence. ' Almost all reasons formally adduced in moral inquiries are rather specimens and symbols of the real grounds, than those grounds themselves.' They are ' hints towards the true reasoning, and demand an active, ready, candid, and docile mind, which can throw itself into what is said, neglect verbal difficulties, and pursue and carry out principles.' Defenders of Christianity, however, are tempted to ' select as reasons for belief, not the highest, the truest, the most sacred, the most intimately persuasive, but such as best admit of being exhibited in argument, and these are commonly not the real reasons in the case of religious men.'

" It would be difficult to name a controversial divine who had ever made these admissions before Newman ; to the unphilosophical, of whom Froude or Kingsley was a type, they would seem to border on scepticism, to conceal infinite reserve, and to furnish bigotry with weapons of offence. Newman was engaged upon two inquiries, for which the shallow enlightenment of an age when Bentham was a prophet and Macaulay a preacher could not be prepared. He was grappling with the idea of Evolution and the fact of the Unconscious. So have they been termed since ; in his language we must call the one ' development,' the other ' implicit reason.' His claim to be original in philosophy rests on discoveries to which zeal for theology impelled him. . . . Newman held that ' it is the mind which reasons, and not a sheet of paper ' ; but he went a step beyond this judgment upon artificial logic when he brought in as auxiliaries emotion, instinct, and the will to

believe. This was escaping from literature to life, subordinating science to action, or rather testing presumptive knowledge by its behaviour in contact with realities ; the world was now the school, whereas religious apologists had taken their narrow little class-room for the world. In this truly Aristotelian spirit Newman, after some thirty years of meditation, set about writing, with infinite pains, his *Grammar of Assent.*

"Ten times he went over some of its chapters, we are told ; over the last, perhaps twenty times. It bears the marks of revision in a certain weariness which broods upon its pages, and will scarcely compare with the great Oxford Sermons where he handles the same topics. But its wisdom, depth, significance, and pathos make of it a work such as St. Augustine might have offered to a century like our own. It is philosophy teaching by experience. How man ought to arrive at certitude has been the subject of many an ambitious treatise. How, in concrete matters, he does arrive at it, was Newman's concern."

In reading over these extracts, I have a sort of guilty feeling as though I had mutilated the admirable pages (114-191) whence they are taken. Still they will, I think, convey to my readers the main outlines of Dr. Barry's argument, and I trust will lead many of them to study it at length in his own volume. I add to my citations a few lines in which he sums up his estimate of Newman's work :

Newman was to be the Christian prophet and philosopher of the coming century. " By the solitary force of his own mind," to quote J. A. Froude, he has not only restored Catholicism in the English-speaking world to a place and power which it might

seem hopelessly to have lost; he has also reacted on the mental habits of those whom he joined by teaching them a language they could not have gained without him, modelling afresh their methods of apologetics, making known to the Roman schools a temper of philosophy and style of argument which promise a common ground, a forum or an agora, between North and South where, at least, they may discuss with understanding—and by drawing their eyes to the abyss of the unknowable which must ever lie beneath our most certain affirmations. Should the Catholic Church extend its conquests in the world where Shakespeare is king, [Newman's conversion is] not less likely to have enduring results than had St. Augustine's on the intellect of the Middle Ages which he formed."

IV

I now go on to set down a few thoughts of my own regarding Newman's place as a thinker and a teacher.

Let me put it in this way. We live in an age when all first principles once generally held in the Western world, are called in question; when what is designated "the right of private judgment" is freely exercised, not only by the wise and learned, but by the foolish and ignorant; when the man in the street, who, according to Carlyle's contemptuous estimate, is really competent to judge of little save the merits of the coarser kinds of stimulants, confidently gives sentence on all things in heaven and earth. Authority once deemed conclusive

is discredited and impotent. "Dost thou not think that thou art bound to believe and to do?" the *Church Catechism* asks of the neophyte. *Bound to believe and to do?* The smallest boy in a provided school would resent the suggestion as an outrage upon the Non-conformist conscience to be met with passive resistance. The obligation now generally recognised is not to believe and to do, but to examine—hopelessly incompetent as the vast majority of people are for the task. It is true, however, that in this province, as in all others of human life, men are gregarious. They follow their leaders—there is no help for it. They take their beliefs, their principles of action, on trust, while fondly imagining that the notions which have drifted in to their heads originated there. The trend of thought is determined by a few thinkers. The number of Germans capable of intelligently appreciating the Kantian philosophy has ever, probably, been extremely small. And yet it is not too much to say that Kant wrought the moral regeneration of his country.* Now, Newman, as it appears to me, is doing as great a work for England as Kant did for Germany.

* This will perhaps appear to some of my readers a great deal too much to say. I may be permitted to refer such to pp. 167-172 of my volume, *Essays and Speeches*, for that vindication of it which my space does not allow me to enter upon here. As we all know Kant's work for his country has been undone by later teachers who have enthroned brute force in the place of the Categorical Imperative, and have turned aside Germany from the narrow way, to the broad path which hurled her to merited destruction.

It would probably be difficult to bring together two names representing minds more differently constituted: Newman, "an Alexandrian who wrote in English, if ever there was one," a literary artist whose prose is unmetrical poetry, a mystic, a saint; and Kant, a Teutonised Scotchman, dry, hard, unemotional, unspiritual—a critic whose judgments are delivered in what is probably the most repelling diction ever achieved by man. The contrast is very like that between the Platonic demiurgus and an analytical chemist. And yet the analogies between their teachings are most curious and significant.* To draw out this in detail would be impossible here. I can only touch in passing upon a few instances. How striking, then, is the identity of their testimony regarding Theism and Immortality. "Belief in God and in another world," writes Kant, "is so interwoven with my moral nature that the former can no more vanish than the latter can be torn from me." The words of Newman seem to come as an echo of this deep saying: "The existence of a God of Judgment is as certain to me as my own existence; it is the great truth of which my whole being is full." One signal merit of Kant's philosophy,

* Newman, who knew no German, was quite unacquainted with Kant, at all events up to 1884. "I have never read a word of Kant," he wrote to me in that year. I am told by a common friend that subsequently he perused translations of the *Critiques of the Pure* and *The Practical Reason*, pen in hand—that was his usual way— and made some notes on them.

it seems to me, consists in the abundant light which he has thrown upon personality, enabling us to see clearly its fundamental characteristic —a self-consciousness involving self-determination and the power of making our desires an object of our will. This cardinal fact of personality, as we saw just now, is the very foundation upon which Newman builds. Kant conceives of the moral law—not, according to a widely popular misconception of his teaching, as a higher self, but—as an independent reality which entering into a man evokes the higher self within him. And this conception underlies Newman's teaching, though he carries morality to the height of sanctity and passes through ethics to holiness. "The Divine Law," he writes, "the rule of ethical truth, the standard of right and wrong, a sovereign, universal, absolute authority in the presence of men and angels, is the Divine Reason, or Will of God, and this law as apprehended in the minds of individual men is called conscience." Newman and Kant, whatever the dissimilarity of their intellectual constitutions, the difference of their phraseology, the divergence of their beliefs, were apostles of the moral law. And that is what I meant when I said just now that Newman did for his age a work similar to Kant's a century before.

Yes; this is the main line of Newman's thought; all segments of his teaching must be referred to it. Man was for him a *person*,

that is, an ethical being, marked off by this unique and supreme distinction from

> the beast that takes
> His licence in the field of time,
> Unfettered by the sense of crime,
> To whom a conscience never wakes.

Man, alone of all animals "born under the law of virtue," is endowed with conscience, a Deity within him—*βροτοῖς ἅπασι συνείδησις Θεὸς*, as Menander sang centuries ago, in words where we seem to hear "the Spirit of the years to come yearning to mix himself with life." For the old Hellenic moralists conceived of goodness rather than rightness as the rule of duty. They busied themselves in inquiries about the *summum bonum*. The word "ought" did not mean for them what it means for us. Even in Aristotle the faculty of conscience, though implied, receives no explicit recognition; he gives no adequate account of its categorical imperative, of the ethical *δεῖ*. It was the ascetic element in Stoicism which led men more sharply to distinguish the good from the pleasurable, and to apprehend the absolute character of the moral law. But Christianity, which has been truly said to have in some sort unveiled human nature to itself, has revealed the full import of the word. Its significance for us represents the ethical advance of the modern world over the Hellenic. When Newman began to preach and to teach,

the school of Bentham was high in popular favour: a school the outcome of whose doctrines was the cancellation of that advance. Denying that good and evil are of the will, resolving morality into a long-sighted selfishness, it sought—and that in the name of progress!—to undo the work of the noblest of ancient philosophies and of the most august of all religions. The Physicists, who came later, went further than the Utilitarians. They declared by the mouth of Darwin that "the imperious word ought" implies merely the existence of persistent instincts; that a man ought to speak the truth in a sense in which a pointer ought to point, a retriever to retrieve, a hound to hunt. Doctrines such as these stirred the spirit of Newman within him. It was his life-work to combat them.

"All through my day," he writes, in his *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, "there has been a resolute warfare, I had almost said conspiracy, against the rights of conscience. Literature and science have been embodied in great institutions in order to put it down. Noble buildings have been reared as fortresses against that spiritual, invisible influence which is too subtle for science and too profound for literature. Chairs in Universities have been made the seats of an antagonist tradition. Public writers, day after day, have indoctrinated the minds of innumerable readers with theories subversive of its claims. As in Roman times, and in the middle age, its supremacy was assailed by the arm of physical force, so now the intellect is put in operation to sap the foundations

of a power which the sword could not destroy. We are told that conscience is but a twist in primitive and untutored man; that its dictate is an imagination; that the very notion of guiltiness, which that dictate enforces, is simply irrational, for how can there possibly be freedom of will, how can there be consequent responsibility, in that infinite eternal network of cause and effect, in which we helplessly lie? And what retribution have we to fear, when we have had no real choice to do good or evil?

"So much for philosophers; now let us see what is the notion of conscience in this day in the popular mind. There, no more than in the intellectual world, does 'conscience' retain the old, true, Catholic* meaning of the word. There too the idea, the presence of a Moral Governor is far away from the use of it, frequent and emphatic as that use of it is. When men advocate the rights of conscience, they in no sense mean the rights of the Creator, nor the duty to Him, in thought and deed, of the creature; but the right of thinking, speaking, writing, and acting according to their judgment or their humour, without any thought of God at all. They do not even pretend to go by any moral rule, but they demand, what they think is an Englishman's prerogative, for each to be his own master in all things, and to profess what he pleases, asking no one's leave, and accounting priest or preacher, speaker or writer, unutterably impertinent, who dares to say a word against his going to perdition, if he like it, in his own way. Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to

* As a matter of fact, Newman's view of conscience is not precisely that of the Catholic schoolmen. He goes beyond them in regarding it as a distinct faculty, which is also the teaching of Butler and of Kant.

dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and Judge, to be independent of unseen obligations. . . . Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century it has been superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it never heard of, and could not have mistaken for it if they had."

To these doctrines Newman opposed the august teaching that conscience, a constituent element of the mind, is a Divine Voice speaking in the nature and heart of man; the internal witness both of the existence and the law of God; a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas: to every individual man the rule and measure of duty. I think Newman's most enduring service to the world will be found to be this vindication of the autonomy and supremacy of the individual conscience.

V

But the individual is not in truth the *individuum vagum* of Rousseau's abstractions; he is organically connected with other men in a polity civil or ecclesiastical; he is found not in solitude—*unus homo nullus homo*—but in society. And society lives by law which, rightly conceived of, is an expression of the same reason that speaks through the voice within. I need hardly observe that the principle of authority enters everywhere; into every field of human thought and of human action. And

it is as necessary as it is universal; necessary as an aid to the individual conscience. Conscience, Newman points out, in a striking passage of the *Grammar of Assent*, is like a clock—"It may be said to strike the hours; but it will strike them wrongly unless it be regulated." It is a guide fully furnished for its office; but it cannot exercise that office without external assistances. One of those assistances is furnished by authority.* And here arise practical difficulties in the religious as in all other provinces, the solution of which is by no means always easy. The question of authority *versus* conscience was for years—

* It may interest some readers to know that Mr. Gladstone did not think "a religion of authority incompatible with freedom of thought," as appears from the subjoined letter addressed by him to me on the 29th of January, 1882. In acknowledging it, I expressed regret at having misunderstood him, gave references to passages in his Vatican pamphlets to which the misunderstanding was due, and asked if I should publish the correspondence. He replied that just then—at that time he was Prime Minister—he had "no desire to appear in the field of an even friendly controversy," but left it to me to deal later as I might think fit with his letter—which, I am sorry to say, I forgot all about until I came upon it, casually, a few days ago. It is as follows:—"Your interesting article in the *Contemporary Review* for February has a passage, marked by courtesy and evident sincerity, in which you have, I am sure unwittingly, fallen into error concerning an opinion of mine to which you do me the honour to refer. I have never laid it down, or believed, that a religion of authority is incompatible with freedom of thought. Forty-three years ago I was severely criticised by Lord Macaulay, in the *Edinburgh Review*, for having maintained the exact contrary, which I have at all times held, and have variously endeavoured to set forth, as, for example, within the last few years, in articles published in the *Nineteenth Century* respecting Sir George Lewis's work on the influence of authority in matters of opinion."

indeed, I may say, during his whole life—before Newman, and it seems to me difficult to imagine anything wiser than his treatment of it. A recent writer has called Origen "the very type of the true combination of reverence of authority with the active spirit of inquiry and courageous facing of difficulties." Surely these words of Professor Stanton most aptly characterise Cardinal Newman. Let us pursue the matter a little further with especial reference to Catholics and the Catholic Church.

A religion, Newman has observed, in his *Grammar of Assent*, "is not a proposition, but a system: it is a rite, a creed, a philosophy, a rule of duty, all at once." Yes, it is all these; but, as he insisted long before he was a Catholic, "it has ever been an assertion of what we are to believe"; and it is this first of all. "Bound to believe" is the very preamble of its message. And, to quote the words of *Loss and Gain*, it was because he found in Rome, and in Rome only, a competent authority to tell him what he was bound to believe, that he submitted to the Catholic Church. This is the burden of his book on Development: "there can be no combination on the basis of truth without an organ of truth," "a supreme authority ruling and reconciling individual judgments by a divine right." For him conscience was the subjective organ of religion; the Catholic Church its objective organ. But what if the two come in conflict? What if

ecclesiastical authority should require us to accept statements which go against our conscience; which, after the best and most careful exercise of our judging faculty, appear to us erroneous? Well, I cannot deny—how can I, with history before me?—that cases may arise in which boldly to speak the truth, in opposition to authority, and if necessary to suffer for it, is a bounden duty: *tempus est loquendi*. "There are," to quote the words of Burke, "times and circumstances in which not to speak is at least to connive." But they are rare. If there is a time to speak, there is also a time to keep silence: *tempus est tacendi*. We must be always intellectually loyal to what we believe to be the truth—that is certain. But obedience is a virtue as well as veracity. It is never safe to go against conscience, even if it be a faulty conscience.* It is always dangerous to defy that consentient judgment which in theology is called *sensus fidelium*. In practice there are two questions to be considered. Is the view of which we think ourselves so assured really a certitude; or is it merely a more or less probable opinion? And if it is really a certitude, does there lie upon us the obligation to publish it *hic et nunc?*† Lord Acton, in one

* Newman says of himself: "A faulty conscience, faithfully obeyed, through God's mercy, has in the long run, brought me right."

† So Kant, upon occasion of a memorable incident in his life, amply vindicated his reticence: "'It is dishonourable to retract or deny one's real convictions, but . . . though all we say must be true, it is not our duty to declare publicly all that is true.'"

of the *Letters* given to the world since his death, speaks of "the deadly taint of a conscience perverted by authority."* Such perversion is, of course, possible. History unquestionably exhibits instances of it. But history exhibits far more numerous instances of a conscience perverted by vanity and self-will. Cardinal Newman held that, ordinarily, the rule is patience, and in quietness and confidence to leave the issue to time :

> Time, which solves all doubt
> By bringing Truth, his glorious daughter, out.

They were very favourite lines with him.

For myself, then, I do not hesitate to express my belief that Newman's chief claim upon posterity will rest upon his work as a Prophet of the Moral Law. The unruly wills and affections of sinful men are always in rebellion against that law, and there are in every age sophists who falsify its character, impugn its authority, and deny its sanctions. These are they who would substitute for it the laws of comfort, the dicta of physicists, general utility and I know not what other *idola fori* as the only scientific and experimental criteria of

* My regard and reverence for my deceased friend compel me to express my deep sense of the wrong done to his memory by the publication of these documents, not meant for publication, of which many, written in his haste, or, as the Vulgate has it, in his excess (*Dixi in excessu meo*), by no means represent his calm and deliberate judgment upon the subjects with which they deal, as I have reason to know, and convey quite a false impression of one of the truest and most loyal of men.

human action. "Vain wisdom all and false philosophy!" Newman exhibited the old and only true path in ethics. For him the Moral Law, a participation of the Eternal Law in the rational creature, is an expression of Universal Reason. In the Categorical Imperative of duty he finds the kindly light leading us on amid the encircling gloom of life, alone rendering intelligible the world's burden and mystery. Of him, as of another, it may be said, "who reverenced his conscience as his King," deriving from it a positive argument for the being of a Divine Noumenon and vindicating its august prerogative as the Aboriginal Vicar of the Infinite and Eternal.

00068798

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 20 February, 2020